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Abstract:
Since political discourse portrays politicians’ knowledge state and their ideological assumptions, a critical analysis of Clinton’s speeches may unveil her perceptual and conceptual worlds. More specifically, critical discourse analysis may uncover her mental representations about the Tunisian Revolution and the US attitude towards such an important political event in North Africa and the Middle East. Studying factive presupposition and epistemic modality seems to be an effective pragmatic tool to reveal what is presented as factual and ideological knowledge in political discourse. The research instrument used to work out the frequency distribution of these lexical features is the latest version of ‘AntConc’ software. To uncover the epistemic state of Hillary Clinton, van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive approach, mainly discourse-cognition-society paradigm, is applied to analyze her speeches between January 2011 and December 2012. At the discourse level, research findings reveal that factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidential verbs unveil the speaker’s strong personal commitment to the truth value of her propositions. At the cognitive level, results show that the speaker’s personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge unmask her mental mapping of Tunisia, democracy and human rights. It also uncovers the cognitive mechanisms that govern discourse production and understanding via ICMs, cognitive frames, mental models and context models. At the social level, research demonstrates that Clinton's perceptual and conceptual worlds are based on a dichotomy that involves 'WE', or democracies Vs. 'THEY' or the enemies of democracy, hence a dual vision of the world or polarization. This research bridges the lack of research combining epistemic presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality within a socio-cognitive framework.

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A Socio-Cognitive Approach to Factive
Presupposition and Epistemic Modality in Hillary
Clinton’s Political Discourse: Tunisia’s Democratic
Transition as a Case Study

A Thesis Submitted in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Linguistics

Elaborated by
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Professor Mounir TRIKI

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ABSTRACT

Since political discourse portrays politicians’ knowledge state and their ideological assumptions, a critical analysis of Clinton’s speeches may unveil her perceptual and conceptual worlds. More specifically, critical discourse analysis may uncover her mental representations about the Tunisian Revolution and the US attitude towards such an important political event in North Africa and the Middle East. Studying factive presupposition and epistemic modality seems to be an effective pragmatic tool to reveal what is presented as factual and ideological knowledge in political discourse. The research instrument used to work out the frequency distribution of these lexical features is the latest version of ‘AntConc’ software. To uncover the epistemic state of Hillary Clinton, van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive approach, mainly discourse-cognition-society paradigm, is applied to analyze her speeches between January 2011 and December 2012. At the discourse level, research findings reveal that factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidential verbs unveil the speaker’s strong personal commitment to the truth value of her propositions. At the cognitive level, results show that the speaker’s personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge unmask her mental mapping of Tunisia, democracy and human rights. It also uncovers the cognitive mechanisms that govern discourse production and understanding via ICMs, cognitive frames, mental models and context models. At the social level, research demonstrates that Clinton's perceptual and conceptual worlds are based on a dichotomy that involves 'WE', or democracies Vs. 'THEY' or the enemies of democracy, hence a dual vision of the world or polarization. This research bridges the lack of research combining epistemic presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality within a socio-cognitive framework.

Keywords: political discourse, factive presupposition, epistemic modality, evidentiality, factive, knowledge, representations, mental frames, cognition, society, ideology, perception, human rights and democracy.
I would like to dedicate this work to the soul of my father (May he rest in peace!),

To my cherished mother who devoted all her life to see us succeed and excel.

To my little one, Farah, who inspired me in times of hard work and sleepless nights.
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II (includes the corpus of the present research)
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Φ: proposition
App: Appendix
AI: Artificial Intelligence
C: Conceptualizer ICMs: Idealized Cognitive Models
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
CDS: Critical Discourse Studies
CG: Common Ground
CL: Critical Linguistics
CLA: Cognitive Linguistics Approach
EJL: Evidential Judgment List
EM: Epistemic Modality
EM: Episodic Memory
G: Group
JTB: Justified True Belief
K-device: Knowledge device
LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
LTM: Long Term memory
MENA: Middle East and North Africa
P: Proposition
PDA: Political Discourse Analysis
Prop: Proposition
S: Sentence
SB^M: Space-Builder
SCDS: Socio-Cognitive Discourse Studies
SFG: Systemic Functional Grammar
SRs: Social representations
STM: Short Term Memory
t: time
W: world
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The present chapter focuses on the theoretical background on which the current PhD research has been conducted, mainly Presupposition Theory, epistemic modality and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) frameworks. In addition, this chapter explains the rationale and the scope of the study that analyses factive presupposition and epistemic modality from a socio-cognitive perspective. It also sheds light on the problematic link between presupposition, modality and evidentiality, which has prompted research in such fields. The aim is uncovering Clinton's perception of human rights, democracy, and Tunisia’s democratic transition. Finally, the last part of this chapter highlights the research objectives and the questions to be investigated while conducting the current PhD research.

1.1 Theoretical Background

The current research has been conducted within three theoretical frameworks, namely Presupposition Theory, epistemic modality and CDA. The first theoretical framework is Presupposition Theory. Pragmatic research has drawn attention to Presupposition Theory as a vast and fruitful area of investigation. Presuppositions are complex pragmatic phenomena that involve different types and categories. They shed light on the implicit or hidden meaning of text or talk. Consequently, they are alluring pragmatic and linguistic tools that may unveil backgrounded truths (Karttunen, 1973, 1974; Levinson, 1983; Marmaridou, 2000). Since presupposition is a background belief which truth is taken for granted in discourse, the study of presupposition may reflect the speaker’s evaluation of events, entities and concepts (Karttunen, 1973, 1974; Levinson, 1983; Marmaridou, 2000; Stalnaker, 2002). From a political perspective, the analysis of presupposition in political discourse may uncover the speakers’ hidden agendas and the principles they struggle for. The main focus is on factive presupposition, which unveils implicit beliefs or taken for granted knowledge (Dilts, 1998). Factuals may uncover the cognitive representations constructed in the speaker’s mind, and hence her perception and conception of the world.

The second theoretical framework is epistemic modality. Presupposed knowledge can be expressed via epistemic modality, which may unveil the speaker’s epistemic state and her understanding of the real world (Drubig, 2001; Kratzer, 1981; Song, 2009; von Fintel & Gillies, 2007; Wolf, 2012; Yule, 1996). Epistemic modals imply the speaker’s evaluation of
evidence, and therefore portray her epistemic evaluation of knowledge. More specifically, the evidential dimension of epistemic modality may convey the source of information that determines the speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of propositions. In the present research, epistemic modals may uncover the factive and ideological knowledge of the speaker. Likewise, they may give a cognitive account on how the speaker grasps the epistemological, conceptual and perceptual worlds.

The third theoretical framework within which the present PhD research has been conducted is CDA. Over the last decades, one can notice the increasing concern about discourse, discourse analysis and more specifically CDA (Chilton, 2004, 2005; Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995; van Dijk, 2004, 2006, 2012; Wodak, 2001, 2005). Indeed, CDA is an up-to-date field of research that allows the researcher/analyst to describe, explain and interpret linguistic features and pragmatic phenomena in discourse. In addition, CDA goes beyond the text to uncover social injustice, power abuse, the ideological backgrounds of participants, their socio-cultural assumptions, as well as the political agendas of language users. In the present study, CDA may interpret the speaker’s cognition and her epistemological and ideological backgrounds (Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 2004a; Wodak, 2001). Thus, CDA may unveil Hillary Clinton’s epistemic state and embed traces or features of her ideological assumptions, presuppositions and evaluations of the issues raised in her political discourse.

In view of the above, Presupposition Theory, epistemic modality and CDA are the main theoretical frameworks of analysis of factive vs. ideological knowledge on human rights and democracy in Hillary Clinton’s political discourse has been conducted. This research has been motivated by many factors, which are clarified in the following section.

1.2 Rationale for the Study

Different motives have fostered the present study. First, the current paper is a continuation of my MA’s thread of thought that shed light on George W. Bush’s perception of Arabs and Muslims in his political discourse related to the Iraqi War (2003-2004). Major concerns were about speech acts, political pronouns and value-embedded nouns, adjectives and adverbs in political discourse. Such linguistic features were analyzed using both Speech Act Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis. Similarly, the present PhD study is an attempt to critically tackle Hillary Clinton’s political discourse and highlight other interesting pragmatic and linguistic features, mainly presupposition and epistemic modality, both supported by evidential markers. Indeed, presupposition and modality seem to be fertile areas for linguistic
and critical analyses since they may portray the speaker’s knowledge background, her beliefs, assumptions and perceptions of events.

Second, after specializing in International Relations in the second cycle of my university studies, politics and political discourse are considered interesting and alluring domains of research. Increasing attention is paid to relations between politicians, nations, ideologies and political systems, which seem to be established via political discourse (Fairclough, 1992b, 2000; van Dijk, 2000, 2003, 2004; Wodak, 2001). Moreover, politicians translate their thoughts, beliefs and assumptions in their speeches and, therefore, mediate their political agendas, ideologies, interests and concerns. Therefore, a study of Hillary Clinton’s political remarks may show what is presupposed as true or taken for granted in her cognition and her ideological assumptions about the world.

A third factor that has motivated the choice of the current area of research is the recent Arab uprisings and their consequences on Arab countries. In this regard, the ‘Arab Spring’ has become an international phenomenon that has stimulated the curiosity of western and eastern researchers and analysts to understand the main reasons for its eruption. One of these reasons is the Arabs' dissatisfaction with their rulers and their yearning for more freedom and democracy. This has led to upheaval and the overthrow of Arab regimes, like Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia (Said, 2011). The powerful message of the Arab uprisings has been that Arabs deserve freedom, democracy and dignity. They could no longer endure dictatorship, totalitarian regimes and unilateral decision making or governance.

Economically, people are struggling to survive the disastrous recessions that swept away their jobs, services and rights (Lalieu, 2011). Socially, an important portion of the population in many Arab countries lives under the edge of poverty and suffers from bad health insurance and deteriorating education services. These worsening political, economic and social conditions have sparked the ‘Arab Spring’, resulting in the awakening of the Arab World (Said, 2011; Lalieu, 2011; Hijab, 2011; Kimenyi, 2011). Since such uprisings have witnessed huge media coverage and wide international concern, and since these revolutions seem to be promising and inspiring for other Arab populations under totalitarian regimes in the region, they have raised interest in studying the western perception of these events. This has also stimulated particular concern about human rights and democracy in Tunisia, the cradle of these Arab revolutions. In the present study, the main concern is about Tunisia’s democratic transition and Clinton’s factive as well as ideological knowledge fragments regarding these issues.
In short, previous studies, interest in politics and political discourse as well as the recent events in Tunisia during the revolution and its democratic transition explain the main factors that led to conducting the present research. After describing the theoretical framework and rationale for the present PhD research paper, the following sub-section highlights the scope of the study.

1.3 Scope of the Study

The scope of the present research is studying factive presupposition and epistemic modality, both supported by evidential markers, within the framework of CDA and political discourse. It is an attempt to uncover the socio-cognitive mechanisms that are manifested in Hillary Clinton’s discourse regarding revolutionary Tunisia and its democratic transition. More particularly, the present study figures out the perceptions of and cognitive representations about human rights and democracy with respect to the Tunisian issue. Concern would be about van Dijk’s (1995b) multidisciplinary or triangular approach, discourse-cognition-society, to work out the discourse features, cognitive processes, ideological representations and societal dimensions of Clinton’s remarks.

1.4 Research Problem

The current PhD research has been prompted by the presupposition that Hillary Clinton’s political discourse on the ‘Arab Spring’ is rich in terms of factive presupposition and epistemic modality. These lexical features may reflect her perception of democracy, human rights and freedom in the Arab world (Tunisia as a case study). What is epistemically presupposed in Clinton’s discourse may convey her implicit, hidden, or covered factive knowledge as well as ideological assumptions embedded in her utterances. Clinton's mental models may be ideology-laden assumptions that locate non-democratic communities in certain mental frames. Consequently, factive presupposition and epistemic modality would be analyzed within the framework of CDA, particularly van Dijk’s (1995b) discourse-cognition-society triangular approach, to critically analyze political discourse. The problem is uncovering factive, presupposed, backgrounded knowledge of the speaker as well as the ideological, explicit, foregrounded knowledge on human rights and democracy in Hillary Clinton’s discourse.
1.5 Research Objectives

The present study aims to reach the following objectives:

1- Examine factive presupposition, epistemic modality, along with evidential verbs, and the lexical triggers that express such meanings in Hillary Clinton's political remarks.

2- Display the cognitive mechanisms employed to decode factive presupposition and epistemic modality, and their embedding of the factual knowledge as well as the ideological assumptions of the speaker.

3- Work out the speaker’s epistemological and cognitive background, what is foregrounded and what is back-grounded, along with the ideological drives of the speaker (mental models, cognitive frames, socially shared representations or SRs).

4- Study the speaker’s presupposed or embedded view of democracy and human rights in the Arab world (Tunisia as a case study).

5- Uncover in-group/out-group relations, self-positive presentation and negative-other presentation from Hillary Clinton’s perspective, and the Idealized Cognitive Models or ICMs about Tunisia and democratic vs. non-democratic communities.

1.6 Research Questions

The current PhD research attempts to answer the following questions:

1- What are the lexical features that trigger factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality in Hillary Clinton’s political discourse?

2- What is the link between factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality?

3- How do these discourse features unveil Clinton’s perceptual world?

4- What impact do mental models have on discourse understanding and production? And what kind of mental models are constructed by Clinton’s political discourse?

5- How can the cognitive interpretation of Clinton's discourse uncover her personal values and attitudes towards human rights and democracy in Tunisia in post-Ben Ali era?

6- How do these values and attitudes unveil the speaker’s ideological background?
7- How is knowledge manifested in Clinton’s political discourse? Is knowledge factive or ideological and on what bases it is back-grounded or fore-grounded?

8- Are Clinton's personal values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge selections of the socially shared representations (SRs)?

9- How do mental models, personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge reveal Clinton’s perception and conception of democracy and human rights in post-Ben Ali Tunisia?

10- How are the societal and institutional structures organized in Clinton’s discourse? How do they convey relations between participants, their identities, roles, interests and goals?

11- How are group relations and group structures, more specifically in-group/out-group relations between democratic and non-democratic countries, depicted in Clinton’s political discourse?

1.7 Thesis Organization

The present PhD thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the thesis, in which the theoretical background and rationale for the study are provided. The first chapter also involves the scope of the study, along with the research objectives and questions. The last part of this chapter describes the thesis organization. The second chapter is a review of the literature regarding presupposition, more specifically factive presupposition, and epistemic modality, more particularly mental state verbs, epistemic adjectives and adverbs. Likewise, the second chapter reviews discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis, along with their history, principles and aims. Particular emphasis is allocated to Political Discourse Analysis since the corpus of the present study is a collection of Hillary Clinton’s political remarks regarding the Tunisian revolution, democracy and human rights. In addition, it studies van Dijk’s socio-cognitive framework of discourse analysis, social cognition and the cognitive mechanisms of discourse production and comprehension.

Chapter three explains the methodology of the current PhD research. It describes the corpus to be analyzed, the research tool to be applied and the data to be examined. Likewise, chapter three identifies the CDA approach to be applied, along with the different analytical stages. More particularly, it explains the discursive, cognitive and societal analytical stages of van Dijk’s (1995b) approach applied to a randomly selected sample. Chapter four provides a description of the main findings of the research and a discussion of the most important points.
The findings part of chapter four describes the three stages of analysis of van Dijk’s (1995b) triangular approach, mainly the discursive analysis of lexical features, the cognitive analysis of mental models, values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge, and the social analysis of the overall societal and institutional structures, group relations as well as group structures. The last part of chapter four discusses the main research questions raised in chapter one of the present thesis. It also describes the validation test used to confirm the validity of the research findings. Chapter five recapitulates the main findings, states the implications as well as the limitations of the current PhD study and suggests further research in the field.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

The current study is conducted within a combined framework, incorporating Presupposition Theory, CDA and Cognitive Pragmatics. More specifically, presupposition is studied within the framework of CDA and Cognitive Pragmatics. This can be explained by the idea that studying presupposition from a cognitive and epistemological perspective seems to be an inviting area of analysis. As such, the first part of the present chapter is devoted to presupposition, its properties and types. More concern is about factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality. The second section focuses on discourse, CDA and Political Discourse Analysis (or PDA) in particular. The third part tackles cognition, ideology and knowledge, along with some important concepts that are highlighted by Cognitive Pragmatics and may serve to achieve the aim of the current research paper.

2.1 Presupposition

In this section, first, different definitions of presupposition are provided to pave the way for deeper analyses of this linguistic phenomenon. Second, a historical overview of the founding fathers of presupposition theories is presented. Third, the different approaches to presupposition are examined, mainly the semantic and pragmatic approaches. Fourth, certain properties related to this pragmatic phenomenon are highlighted. Fifth, presupposition triggers are listed, and sixth, the difference between presupposition types is distinguished respectively. Seventh, particular attention is given to epistemological or factive presupposition since it represents the main concern of the current research paper. In sub-sections eight, nine and ten, concepts, like common ground, Idealized Cognitive Models, evidentiality, epistemic modality, subjectivity, intentionality, source reliability and ideology are explained. All these notions are related to presupposition, which is one of the major concerns of the current PhD thesis.

2.1.1 Definitions

The term ‘presupposition’ is defined in different ways. *Presupposition* is “a kind of background assumptions against which an action, theory, expression, or utterance makes sense or is rational” (Levinson, 1983, p. 168). The technical term covers “certain pragmatic inferences or assumptions” which are expressed through linguistic items (Levinson, 1983, p. 168). The term is also used to shed light on a very broad category of semantic and pragmatic phenomena that plays a crucial role in the understanding of utterances.
Presuppositions are what the speaker assumes to be the case after making an utterance. In this context, “any proposition whose truth is accepted by the speaker in order to be able to make an utterance, but which is not asserted by the utterance, is a presupposition of the utterance” (van Dijk, 1995c, p. 273). Presuppositions thus unveil the unconscious beliefs embedded in the structure of an utterance, or the presupposed knowledge that is not asserted in discourse (Dilts, 1998, p. 36). For example:

Do you want to do it again?  >> You have done it already, at least once.


Knowledge is presupposed because the interlocutor is assumed to be able to uncover it via pragmatic inferencing. This is by decoding the meaning of an utterance through the presupposition triggers (See section 2.1.5) that interlocutors deposit on the surface of discourse as clues for inferring knowledge (Levinson, 1983).

In a similar vein, presupposition is presented as a kind of context-dependent inference. Indeed, it is related to certain linguistic expressions and is also sensitive to contextual factors (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 117). Unlike other parts of speech, presuppositions denote propositions, whose truth is not questioned, but taken for granted (Krahmer, 1998; Marmaridou, 2000). Adding to that, a presupposition should be mutually known, or assumed by both the speaker and hearer, for the utterance to be considered appropriate in context (Dilts, 1983, 1994-1995, 1998; Levinson, 1983). In other words, a presupposition must be normally part of the shared knowledge of the interlocutors for the sentence to be felicitous (Krahmer, 1998; Levinson, 1983; Marmaridou, 2000).

Likewise, presuppositions are referred to as preconditions or backgrounded references. Indeed, presuppositions may be defined as “propositions that are taken to be true as a prerequisite for uttering a sentence” (Clausen & Manning, 2009, p. 70). They are obligatory ‘preconditions’ for a sentence to be true or false (Stubbs, 1983, p. 203). A presupposition is also defined as back-grounded and taken for granted, that is assumed by the speaker to be already assumed by the hearer to be true (Partee, 2004, p. 6). Grammatically formal presuppositions in a sentence will be treated as back-grounded references to particular information that is included in the common ground of discourse (Treanor, n.d., p. 10). After defining the concept of presupposition, one can focus on the different founding fathers of presupposition theories.
2.1.2 Presupposition theories

Concern with the concept of presupposition originates in philosophy with Frege (1892), Russel (1905) and Strawson (1950). The analysis of presupposition phenomena goes back to the philosophers of language and debates about reference and referring expressions (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 120).

First, presupposition was observed by Frege (1892, 1952) who suggested more than one view of presupposition. Frege (1952) talked about (as cited in Levinson, 1983, p. 170) “uses of sentences (assertions) as having presuppositions, sentences themselves as having presuppositions, and speakers as holding presuppositions”. He also held that referring expressions designate referents in the real world. Similarly, he observed that these expressions or presuppositions should be verifiable in terms of truth conditions. He came to the conclusion that both referring expressions and temporal clauses have a reference, given the fact that they carry presuppositions. Likewise, Frege pointed out (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000) that for an assertion or a sentence to be true or false, its presuppositions must be true or satisfied. However, the sentence “the king of France is bald” lacks referents since it fails to refer to something that really exists, and hence designates nothing. It has sense, but it is neither true nor false (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 121).

Second, Russel (1905) introduced his theory of ‘definite descriptions’ to challenge Frege’s presupposition reference in the real world. Russel argued (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 121) that a presupposition is “a kind of inference arising from conventions concerning the use of referring expressions”. Although both theories stem from a truth-conditional approach to the meaning of sentences conceived as logical abstractions, Russel’s theory of presupposition came to show that Frege’s views were simply wrong (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 122). According to Russel, by distinguishing between sense and reference, Frege’s views led to anomalies. He, therefore, suggested (as cited in Levinson, 1983, p. 170) his theory of definite descriptions that seemed to handle the difficulties encountered by Frege.

Third, Strawson (1952), in his turn, came to challenge Russel’s analysis, proposing a quite different approach. Strawson distinguished (as cited in Levinson, 1983) between sentences and statements, arguing that only statements can be judged for truth or falsity. Strawson agreed with Frege on the survival of presupposition under negation (See Strawson, 1952), but disagreed with Russel who, according to Strawson, was unable to identify the
difference between sentences and their uses. In this context, both Frege and Strawson (1952) argued (as cited in Levinson, 1983, p. 172) that “a statement A presupposes a statement B if B is a precondition of the truth or falsity of A”. Frege (1892) and Strawson (1952), therefore, suggested very similar approaches that opposed Russel’s (1905) view regarding definite descriptions.

From the 1980s onwards, presupposition has been studied by many philosophers and linguists. In the 1980s, Stalnaker (1973, 1974) and Karttunen (1974) related presuppositions to speakers rather than sentences. More specifically, presuppositions are considered as part of the speaker’s propositional attitude (Stalnaker, 1973, 1974). They determine the contexts in which the sentence can be felicitously uttered (Karttunen, 1974, p. 181). In the 1990s, Krahmer (1998) considered presuppositions as propositions that must be accepted as true by recipients so as other propositions can be meaningful. Recently, van Dijk (1976, 2012) has focused on the link between presupposition, context, cognition and knowledge. He has suggested a cognitive interpretation of presupposition by providing a list of expressions embedding or presupposing the knowledge of the speaker (See van Dijk, 2003, p. 103-116, or section 2.3.2.6 of the present chapter).

Such a brief historical overview of the founding fathers of presupposition theories is a focal step to understand the similarities and differences between their views. Another crucial step seems to be the study of the different approaches to this pragmatic and philosophical phenomenon.

2.1.3 Approaches to presupposition

One can note that there are semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. Indeed, it is stated, in this context, that “the usual definitions of presupposition, taken as a relation between sentences or propositions (with their interpretations), either belong to semantics or to pragmatics” (van Dijk, 1976, p. 74). In the first situation, presupposition occurs in terms of logical consequences or necessitation relations, while in the second situation pragmatic presupposition is based on conditions for the appropriate use of uttered sentences (van Dijk, 1976, p. 74). It is worth noting that semantic presuppositions of text and talk automatically become pragmatic presuppositions of the context (van Dijk, 1976, p. 77). This distinction is clarified in more details in the following sub-sections.
2.1.3.1 Semantic approach

Semantic presupposition can be defined from different perspectives. The classic definition presents \textit{semantic presupposition} as follows: “[a] sentence S presupposes a proposition p if p must be true in order for S to have a truth-value (to be true or false)” (Partee, 2004, p. 6). Likewise, a semantic presupposition of a sentence S is a proposition that the hearer must consider true in order for the sentence S to make sense (Partee, 2004, p. 6). Similarly, semantic presuppositions can be defined as “conditions on the meaningfulness of a sentence or utterance” (Simons, 2006, p. 1). The semantic approach is, therefore, based on the truth conditionality of sentences.

Semantic presupposition is based on some linguistic features. According to Green (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000), these features are linguistic objects, like words and sentences, and more specifically the lexical structure of triggers that determine lexical presupposition. According to Fillmore (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 133), verbs like ‘blame’, ‘accuse’ and ‘criticize’ embed that ‘A did B’ and that ‘B is bad’. For instance, the example “Mary accused Harry of writing an obscene letter to her mother”, shows that A is responsible for that since he did a blameworthy deed. However, in “Mary criticized Harry for writing an obscene letter to her mother” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 133), the speaker presupposes that Harry wrote the letter. Consequently, ‘criticize’ emphasizes the factuality of the situation by presupposing it, whereas ‘accuse’ does not entail that (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 133). Such lexical presuppositions are analyzed within the semantic approach.

One can mention more examples of lexical presupposition triggers within the semantic approach. These examples include the word ‘reign’ that presupposes that the person governs an empire or a kingdom. Moreover, the lexical item ‘regime’ presupposes that the ruler is a dictator (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 134). Semantic presuppositions are, therefore, “conventional properties of lexical items or constructions” (Simons, 2006, p. 2). In other words, all presuppositions that seem to be closely related to specific words or constructions can be identified as semantic presuppositions. This also enhances Burton-Roberts’ semantic view (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 135-6) that “a lexical account of presupposition is necessary to explain the speaker’s stronger, unquestioned commitment to the presupposed proposition”. Unlike semantic presupposition, based on purely linguistic and textual features, pragmatic presupposition seems to go beyond linguistics and semantics.
2.1.3.2 Pragmatic approach

The pragmatic approach links presuppositions to their context. The pragmatic analysis of presuppositions introduces the concept of felicity by connecting sentences to their contexts or situations where they are appropriate or felicitous (Allwood, Anderson & Dahl, 1977, p. 153). In other words, pragmatic presuppositions are “a relation between the speaker and the appropriateness of a sentence in a context” (Levinson, 1983, p. 177). Based on Stalnaker's (1973, 1974) view, Chemla (2008) assumes that a sentence with a presupposition p is felicitous only in contexts where p is a common belief. This means that all contributors to the communicative act believe that p, and they believe that all believe that p (Chemla, 2008, p. 148). The following example, provided by Kuroda (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 136), illustrates pragmatic presupposition:

(a) Is Mary an actress or a dancer?  
(b) Mary is either an actress or a dancer

If (a) is uttered sincerely, (b) is certainly given. (b) is, therefore, a pragmatic presupposition of (a). More particularly, “S presupposes p iff S can be used felicitously, just in case p is old or given information” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 136). As such, the presupposition depends on the appropriate use of sentences.

Pragmatic presupposing also refers to the propositional attitude of the speaker (Stalnaker, 1973, 2002; Karttunen, 1973). Partee (2004, p. 6) states that the “use of a sentence S in a context C pragmatically presupposes a proposition p if p is back-grounded and taken for granted by the speaker in C”. In addition, a pragmatic presupposition of S is a proposition that should be already known to the addressees in order for the assertion of S to be appropriate in a given context (Partee, 2004, p. 6). Subsequently, the presupposition that emanates from the pragmatics of a sentence or world knowledge shared by participants is called pragmatic presupposition (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 123). The idea that pragmatic presuppositions are defined as propositional attitudes is illustrated by Stalnaker (2002, p. 707) as follows:

(PP) × pragmatically presupposes p ↔ × believes p to be common ground

In this context, “a speaker pragmatically presupposes p iff she believes that all members participating in her discourse accept p, believe that all accept p, believe that all believe that all accept p” (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, p. 251). Pragmatic presupposition is thus defined as a
special type of propositional attitude and a special type of belief (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 2012).

In a similar vein, presupposing is presented as a linguistic disposition. According to Caffi (as cited in Schmid, 2001, p. 1539), pragmatic presuppositions “do not consist in knowledge, in something which is already known, but in something that is given as such by the speaker, in something that is assumed as such and is therefore considered irrefutable”. They are related to people’s expectations, wishes, interests, claims, attitudes toward entities in the world, fears, etc. Similarly, presupposing a proposition in the pragmatic sense means taking its truth for granted and presuming that other participants who are involved in the context do the same (Stalnaker, 1972). They are “propositions implicitly supposed before the relevant linguistic business is translated” (Stalnaker, 1972, p. 387). Stalnaker’s presuppositions (as cited in Atlas, 2004, p. 33) are thus what the speaker considers to be common background for participants in a given context. This idea is illustrated by Stalnaker (1974, p. 52) as follows:

\[(PP^*) \times \text{pragmatically presupposes } p \text{ in } C \leftrightarrow \times \text{ is disposed to behave, in her use of language, as if she believed } p \text{ to be common ground in } C.\]

Subsequently, pragmatic theories focus on two basic concepts, mainly 'mutual knowledge', 'common ground' (See section 2.1.8.2 for more details), or 'joint assumptions, on the one hand, and 'appropriateness, or felicity', on the other hand (Levinson, 1983, p. 204-5). Referring to the first concept, Karttunen & Peters (1975) state that cooperative participants must “organize their contributions in such a way that the conventional implicate of the sentence uttered are already part of the common ground at the time of utterance” (, p. 269). In other words, p has to be shared, presupposed information at time \(t\) or talking time. As for the second concept, pragmatic presupposition is best described as “a relation between a speaker and the appropriateness of a sentence in a context” (Levinson, 1983, p. 177). If contexts satisfy the conditions required to allow the utterances to be meaningful, semantic presuppositions of sentences turn into pragmatic presuppositions of speakers (Simons, 2006, p. 1).

In sum, semantic presupposition depends on linguistic and lexical items, whereas pragmatic presupposition is context-dependent. This raises more questions about presupposition properties and how they can be relative depending on context.
2.1.4 Properties of presupposition

Presupposition properties, namely constancy under negation, projection problem, defeasibility, accommodation and acceptance, are tackled in the following sub-sections.

2.1.4.1 Negation test

This property of presupposition is, generally, described as consistency under negation. According to Strawson (as cited in Levinson, 1983), it means that presuppositions of statements will remain constant or true even if the statement is negated. The negation preserves presupposition, hence the survival of presupposition under negation (Levinson, 1983). Negation, therefore, “leaves the presuppositions untouched” (Levinson, 1983, p. 178). The following examples, borrowed from Stubbs (1983, p. 204), illustrate the preservation of presupposition under negation test:

(a) The American woman found the cat.
(b) The American woman did not find the cat.

Both (a) and (b) presuppose that the woman is American. More examples about presupposition consistency under negation are provided by Carston (1998, p. 309).

(c) The king of France is bald- there is no king of France.
(d) I don't regret inviting him- he jolly well gate-crashed.
(e) I haven't stopped smoking- I've never smoked in my life.

From (c), we may understand that there exists a king of France who is bald, but the second clause denies that. From (d), and without the second clause, we may think that we invited the person, and we did not regret having done so. From (e), we may believe that the speaker is a heavy smoker, but this presupposition has been rejected in the second clause (Carston, 1998, p. 309). Apart from consistency under negation, another presupposition property is the projection problem, which is tackled in what follows.

2.1.4.2 Projection problem

The projection problem is commonly related to presupposition properties. In this regard, the projection problem is defined as follows: “the meaning of an expression is a function of the meaning of its parts” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 127). In other words, the truth condition of a complex sentence or utterance depends on the truth condition of its parts (Marmaridou, 2000). Indeed, the meanings of sentences are compositional, i.e. the meaning of a whole
expression is determined by the meaning of the parts (Levinson, 1983, p. 191). More specifically, a presupposition of a part of a statement is, sometimes, a presupposition of the whole sentence. For instance, in “John thinks that my wife is beautiful”, the phrase ‘my wife’ triggers the presupposition that the speaker has a wife. In spite of occurring in an embedded clause, the whole sentence carries that presupposition (“Presupposition”, n.d., para. 6).

Some verbs allow presupposition projection, while others block it. Verbs that allow presuppositions to project to the whole sentence are called ‘holes’. Holes can be defined as “those operators that act on the assertion, but where presuppositions are unaltered by the entire construction” (Abels, 2010, p. 151). Clausal negation and modals are the most prominent examples of holes for presuppositions (Abels, 2010; Karttunen, 1973; Levinson, 1983) (See Levinson, 1983, p. 193-197 for more details). Whereas, verbs that block such a projection of presuppositions are called ‘plugs’ (Karttunen, 1973). In this context, Abels (2010) explains that “the presuppositions of the embedded clause are not necessarily inherited by the embedding structure” (Abels, 2010, p. 151). Examples of plugs for presuppositions include attitude verbs that express beliefs and reporting verbs that report speech.

Some linguistic items are intermediate between holes and plugs because they allow some presuppositions and block others from projecting. These linguistic environments are called ‘filters’ (Karttunen, 1973). Filters for presuppositions can be defined as “environments like disjunction and conditionals, where a presupposition of one clause can be prevented from projecting by material in the other clause” (Abels, 2010, p. 151-2). For instance, conditional sentences act as filters for presuppositions that are triggered by expressions in their consequent, like in “If I have a wife, then my wife is blond” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 131). The presupposition, triggered by the expression ‘my wife’, is blocked because it is stated in the antecedent of the conditional (Karttunen, 1973; Marmaridou, 2000). In addition to the projection problem, one has to focus on an important presupposition property, mainly defeasibility.

2.1.4.3 Defeasibility

Some presuppositions may disappear in certain linguistic environments, or be defeasible (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 125). In other words, “they are liable to evaporate in certain contexts either immediate linguistic context, or the less immediate discourse context, or in circumstances where contrary assumptions are made” (Levinson, 1983, p. 186). Another problem is that background knowledge shared by interlocutors concerning a given event or a
state of affairs could block presuppositions in spite of the presence of presupposition triggers (Levinson, 1983, p. 186). Generally, presuppositions “are defeasible whenever background assumptions about the world or a particular situation are not compatible with their content” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 126). Subsequently, a linguistic feature may trigger a presupposition, but this latter does not survive because the interlocutors’ knowledge blocked it. The following example, provided by Marmaridou (2000, p. 125), illustrates this linguistic phenomenon.

(a) I don’t know that Mary passed her driving license.
(b) Mary passed her driving license.

As stated by Gazdar (1979), (a) denies the speaker’s knowledge of (b), and thus denies what should be presupposed (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 125). The speaker evokes two contradictory presuppositions, one triggered by ‘know’ and the second by ‘not’. It is generally assumed, in this regard, that when “the speakers do not know something, they cannot be taken to verify its truth” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 125). In other words, the non-knowledge of the speaker leads to presupposition defeasibility because the propositional content is refuted.

Another example is ‘before-clauses’, where presuppositions are generally expressed. If the speaker says “Sue cried before she finished her thesis”, what is communicated is that Sue finished her thesis (Levinson, 1983, p. 187). However, the statement “Sue died before she finished her thesis” does not presuppose that Sue finished her thesis. Instead, it conveys that Sue never finished her thesis (Levinson, 1983, p. 187). The presupposition, therefore, drops out because it is abandoned in this context or set of background beliefs; hence presupposition defeasibility (Levinson, 1983, p. 187). This example reveals that presuppositions are defeasible due to contrary beliefs in a given context (Levinson, 1983, p. 190). Apart from defeasibility, accommodation is another prominent presupposition property. It is examined in the following sub-section.

2.1.4.4 Accommodation

Generally, accommodation is a presupposition property that is linked to common ground. Accommodation is defined as “the process by which something becomes common ground in virtue of one party recognizing that the other takes it to be common ground” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 711). The presupposition of an utterance has to be part of the context’s common ground, or the participants’ shared knowledge in order for the utterance to be considered felicitous (“Presupposition”, n.d., para. 21). Thus, the addressee has to assume that
the presupposition is true, even if information about its truthfulness is not explicit or absent, hence presupposition accommodation (“Presupposition”, n.d., para. 21). For instance, if the speaker says “My wife is a dentist” after being introduced to someone, the addressee must assume that I have a wife to be able to interpret the addressee’s utterance (“Presupposition”, n.d., para. 21). The definite expression ‘my wife’ triggers presuppositions and allows such accommodation.

One of the properties of presupposition is other participants’ accommodation. Apart from the speaker’s commitment to accept the presuppositions of her utterances, other discourse participants also have to accept these presuppositions, even if they did not accept them before the utterance (Simons, 2006, p. 21). This process of accommodation is caused by the willingness of discourse participants to be cooperative by coordinating their beliefs, or accepting presuppositions (Simons, 2006, p. 21). Accommodation is, consequently, “a matter of discourse participants coordinating their first beliefs, [while] second order beliefs about the common ground are a consequence of this first order coordination” (Simons, 2006, p. 21). First, the addressee recognizes that the speaker believes some proposition p to be common ground (Simons, 2006, p. 21). Second, he infers that the addressee herself believes or accepts p. Since the addressee is considered an authority with respect to p, the addressee or interpreter accepts the same belief.

Accommodation is based on the knowledge of both the speakers and hearers. Based on Heim’s (1983) views, Simons (2006) points out that “accommodation is triggered by the hearer’s knowledge of the semantics of S, including the definiteness conditions on context update” (p. 17). It is a conventional fact about a sentence that the hearers can use to update the existing context only if they engage in accommodation (Simons, 2006, p. 17). Similarly, while reviewing Stalnaker’s (2005) view, Jäger (2006) assumes that “natural language expressions have a conventionalized meaning that is common knowledge between the interlocutors” (p. 78). According to Stalnaker (as cited in Jäger, 2006), both speaker and hearer want the speaker to share with the hearer as much private knowledge as possible. Presupposition accommodation is relevant to the current research because it can work as a path for knowledge and reflect the speaker’s common ground. Another related property is acceptance, which is clarified in what follows.
2.1.4.5 Acceptance

Acceptance is another common property of presupposition. *Acceptance* can be defined as “a category that includes belief, but also some attitudes (presumption, assumption, acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an inquiry) that contrast with belief and with each other” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716). Accepting a proposition is simply to treat it as true for some reason, sometimes, because one believes that it is true, and, sometimes, to facilitate communication by accepting propositions that one of the participants do not believe it is true (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716). In this case, we need a notion of common ground determined by a notion of acceptance that can actually be different from belief. More specifically, “it is a common ground that $\phi$ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that $\phi$, and all believe that all accept that $\phi$, and all believe that all believe that all accept that $\phi$, etc.” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 716). This definition identifies the common ground with the common belief about what is accepted. After reviewing acceptance and other properties of presupposition, it is essential to highlight the commonly used presupposition triggers.

2.1.5 Presupposition triggers

Presuppositions have been associated with the use of a large number of words, phrases and structures. These linguistic items are indicators of presuppositions that become actual presuppositions only if they are situated in context with speakers (Levinson, 1983). There are different presupposition triggers, namely definite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of state verbs, iterative, verbs of judging, temporal clauses, cleft sentences, comparisons, non-restrictive relatives, counter-factual conditionals and questions (Karttunen, 1973; Levinson, 1983). These presupposition triggers were collected by Karttunen (n.d.) and listed by Levinson (1983, p. 181-5).

Lexical presupposition triggers are linguistic expressions that encode presupposed meanings. First, the definite description ‘the man’, in “John saw the man with two heads”, presupposes that there exists a man with two heads (Levinson, 1983, p. 181). Second, the factive verb ‘realize’, in “John realized that he was in debt”, presupposes that John was in debt. Third, the implicative verb ‘forget’, in “John forgot to lock the door”, presupposes that John ought to have locked or intended to lock the door. Fourth, the change of state verb ‘stop’, in “John stopped beating his wife”, presupposes that John had been beating his wife (Levinson, 1983, p. 181). Fifth, the iterative ‘again’, in “The flying saucer came again” (Levinson, 1983, p. 182), presupposes that the flying saucer came before. Sixth, the verb of

Structural presupposition triggers are related to the structure of sentences. First, the temporal clause, in “Before Strawson was even born, Frege noticed presuppositions” (Levinson, 1983, p. 182), presupposes that Strawson was born. Second, the cleft sentence “What John lost was his wallet” (Levinson, 1983, p. 183) presupposes that John lost something. Third, the comparison, in “Carol is a better linguist than Barbara”, presupposes that Barbara is a linguist (Levinson, 1983, p. 183). Fourth, the non-restrictive relative clause “The Proto-Harrappans, who flourished 2800-2650 B.C., were great temple builders” (Levinson, 1983, p. 184) presupposes that the Proto-Harrappans flourished 2800-2650 B.C. Fifth, the counterfactual conditional, in “If Hannibal had only twelve more elephants, the Romance languages would not this day exist”, presupposes that Hannibal did not have twelve more elephants. Finally, the question “Who is the professor of Linguistics at MIT?” (Levinson, 1983, p. 184) presupposes that someone is the professor of Linguistics at MIT.

It is worth noting that any word or expression, that has the same meaning as the above mentioned examples, triggers the same presupposition. These presupposition triggers are lexical features, or linguistic constructions responsible for enacting mutually shared assumptions (Karttunen, 1973; Levinson, 1983), as well as the speaker’s mental spaces (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 146). This is the focus of the present study that aims to uncover factive, presupposed knowledge and ideological beliefs of speakers in discourse. After considering some commonly known presupposition triggers, identifying the different types of presupposition seems to be a focal step to further study this linguistic phenomenon and distinguish between factive or epistemic presupposition and other types of presupposition.

2.1.6 Types of presupposition

Although the aim of the present research is uncovering the epistemological aspects of factive presupposition, a brief overview on the different types of presupposition seems to be necessary to distinguish the differences between these categories. Consequently, the following sub-sections focus on six types of presupposition, mainly existential, factive, lexical, structural, non-factive and counterfactual.
2.1.6.1 Existential

Existential presupposition is the most common type of presupposition. It is the assumption of the existence of the entities named by the speaker (Marmaridou, 2000). Referring to the example “The king of France is bald”, the existence of an individual is “a background assumption that is to be taken for granted in order for the foregrounded assertion to make sense” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 122). The existential presupposition is triggered from the world knowledge shared by interlocutors, or the pragmatics of the sentence, hence pragmatic presupposition (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 123). For instance, in “Mary’s dog is cute” (Yule, 1996, p. 26), one can presuppose that Mary exists and that she has a dog. As far as existential presupposition is concerned, the question of its truthfulness or falsity does not arise (Stubbs, 1983, p. 204).

2.1.6.2 Factive

Factive presupposition is defined as the assumption that something is true or factual (Yule, 1996, p. 27). This kind of presupposition is triggered by epistemic factive verbs, like ‘know’, ‘realize’, and ‘prove’, emotive factive verbs, such as ‘regret’, ‘be surprised of’ and ‘amazed’, transitional or change of state verbs, like ‘continue’, ‘stop’, ‘forget’ and ‘discover’ (Levinson, 1983, p. 181). Apart from verbs that trigger factive presuppositions, there are some constructions, such as cleft constructions, WH-questions, nominal relative clauses, adverbial clauses with ‘since’, ‘when’, ‘while’, non-restrictive clauses and iterative particles, like ‘again’, ‘another’, ‘anymore’ (Levinson, 1983, p. 181-185). The following examples, mentioned by Partee (2004, p. 8), illustrate factive presupposition:

(a) John knows that Bill is a spy.
(b) John doesn't know that Bill is a spy.
(c) Does John know that Bill is a spy?
(d) If John knows that Bill is a spy, Mary will be unhappy.

For appropriate use, all these sentences necessitate that the speaker takes for granted that Bill is a spy (Partee, 2004, p. 8) (See section 2.1.7 for more details). In (b), the speaker does not deny the proposition that Bill is a spy, but confesses lack of knowledge about p. As such, the presupposition that ‘Bill is a spy’ persists under negation and implies a factual proposition p (Partee, 2004, p. 8). Since the proposition cannot be refuted or doubted, p is presented as factive presupposition or factual, presupposed knowledge.
2.1.6.3 Lexical

*Lexical presupposition* is the assumption that in using one word, the speaker can act as if another meaning is understood. For instance, “*He stopped smoking*” (Yule, 1996, p. 28) presupposes that the man used to smoke. Indeed, ‘stop’ presupposes another unstated concept or idea (Yule, 1996, p. 28). Definite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of state verbs, iterative particles and verbs of judging are examples of lexical items that indicate background knowledge or taken for granted information by the speaker (Levinson, 1983; Yule, 1996). As such, any lexical feature in text or talk that embeds presupposed meaning is a lexical presupposition trigger, hence triggers lexical presupposition.

2.1.6.4 Structural

*Structural presupposition* is the assumption associated with or embedded in the use of certain sentence or phrase structures, such as WH-questions (Banjar, 2009, para. 10). The interlocutors, for instance, interpret the information after the WH-form as already known or true. For example, following Katz & Postal’s (1964) thoughts, Fitzpatrick (2005) points out that “*When did Harry stop beating his wife?*” presupposes that Harry used to beat his wife before (p. 138). The receiver perceives the information as necessarily true and not presupposed by the person asking the question. Similarly, structural presupposition can also be triggered by temporal clauses, cleft sentences, comparisons, non-restrictive relative clauses and counterfactual conditionals (Levinson, 1983, p. 184).

2.1.6.5 Non-factive

*Non-factive presupposition* is an assumption that something is not true (Banjar, 2009, para. 11). This kind of presupposition is triggered by verbs, like ‘dream’, ‘imagine’ and ‘pretend’ (Yule, 1996, p. 29). Other verbs are ‘believe’, ‘say’, ‘hope’, ‘deny’, ‘claim’ etc. Non-factive predicates are therefore anti-factive.

(a) *The fact that the dog barked during the night is significant.*

(b) *Gregory is aware of the fact that the dog barked during the night.*

(c) *The fact that the dog barked during the night is likely.*

(d) *Gregory believes the fact that the dog barked during the night.*

In these examples provided by Kiparsky & Kiparsky (as cited in Abels, 2010, p. 146), ‘significant’ and ‘be aware of’ are factive predicates, while ‘likely’ and ‘believe’ are anti-factive counterparts (Abels, 2010, p. 145).
2.1.6.6 Counterfactual

Counterfactual presupposition is the assumption that what is presupposed is not only untrue, but it is also the opposite of what is true and in stark contrast with facts (Yule, 1996, p. 29). Such counterfactual presuppositions are triggered by some conditional structures, or counterfactual conditionals, that presuppose that the information in the if-clause is not true at the moment of uttering the statement. For instance, “If you were my friend, you would have helped me” (Yule, 1996, p.30) presupposes that the information in the ‘if clause’ is not true at the speaking time (Yule, 1996, p.29). These counterfeit presuppositions can be used by a communicator for purposes of propaganda, deception and the manipulation of others so as to serve hidden agendas (Levinson, 1983; Marmaridou, 2000).

In view of the above, presuppositions may be factive and uncontroversial, based upon knowledge which is common to all participants, or unfair, counterfactual or controversial built upon the basis of covert knowledge by the speaker (Yule, 1996; Banjar, 2009). Some presuppositions may have major consequences on our behavior, thoughts and actions. In other words, speakers are unconsciously using presupposition to affect our perception of the world. The listener decodes meaning using clues in both syntax and context to grasp the meaning of a given utterance (Levinson, 1983, p. 177).

Distinguishing factual presupposition from counterfactual or other types of presupposition, such as existential or non-factive, serve the aim of the present research since it helps to focus on factive presupposition only and avoid confusion or misinterpretation while analyzing discourse. This seems to be the objective of the current research paper that sheds light on factive presupposition, the cognitive mechanisms employed to decode these presuppositions, as well as the hidden knowledge and agenda of the speaker. This study also aims to uncover the speaker’s epistemological perception of the events, entities and concepts tackled in discourse. Factive presupposition is explained further in the following sub-section.

2.1.7 Epistemics of factive presupposition

This sub-section sheds light on epistemology, epistemological presupposition, factivity and presupposition as well as factive presupposition triggers.
2.1.7.1 Epistemology

*Epistemology* is the branch of philosophy that focuses on the nature, scope and limits of human knowledge (Adigun & Malachy, 2010, p. 9). A piece of information must be justified in order to be knowledge. Being justified means that circumstances must assure interlocutors that what they are learning is true and cannot be false; except new information is available to falsify or alter it. However, Gettier (1963) attacks (as cited in Adigun & Malachy, 2010, p. 9) justified true belief (JTB), and some scholars, namely Quine (1969), propose the abandonment of certainty in epistemology in favor of studying cognition in our brains, or what is called naturalized epistemology. Other scholars opted for contextualism in the pursuit of knowledge. In this regard, Zagzebski (as cited in Eflin, 2003, p. 50) rejects the idea of an idealized knower and favors an agent who is motivated to be epistemically virtuous.

Studying epistemology is pertinent since the focus of the current research is on epistemic presupposition and epistemic modality, which both convey the epistemological state of the speaker and her back-grounded and fore-grounded knowledge. Uncovering the epistemological world of the speaker helps to understand her discourse and knowledge background, as well as her ideological drives. Subsequently, the following sub-section focuses on epistemological or factive presupposition.

2.1.7.2 Epistemological presupposition

Epistemological presupposition is related to beliefs and knowledge. Indeed, *epistemological presuppositions* are defined as “deep, and often unstated, beliefs that form the foundation of a particular system of knowledge” (Dilts, 1998, para. 7). Epistemological presuppositions are also presented as fundamental assumptions upon which other ideas are built and proven (Dilts, 1998, para. 7). They are “the primary ideas and assumptions from which everything else in the field is derived” (Dilts, 1998, para. 18). In other words, they are the basic beliefs upon which other concepts are based.

An epistemic theory is, therefore, needed to understand what is true and what is wrong. Such an epistemic theory has to be experienced by any human being who works from particular desires, skills and goals (Eflin, 2003, p. 48). Such goals can be epistemic virtues that are justified beliefs and knowledge (Zagzebski, 1996). According to Zagzebski’s (1996) epistemological approach, ‘rightness of act’ goes in parallel with rightness of belief so as to reach the level of a justified belief. So, we only reach knowledge by being intellectually
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virtuous, and the obtained knowledge is of reality (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 241). Zagzebski’s (1996) conditions of a justified belief are as follows:

\[ S \text{ has a justified belief that } p, \]
\[ S \text{ is motivated by intellectual virtues,} \]
\[ S \text{ knows the relevant information that a virtuous person would know, and} \]
\[ A \text{ virtuous person would believe } p \text{ in circumstance } c \] (p. 241).

In this regard, two points have to be highlighted. First, cognitive contact with reality nearly means an accurate description of reality. It is, according to Zagzebski (1996) a "conception of reality which does not misperceive so that the right action is taken" (p. 264). In other words, the perceptual world coincides with the real world. Second, Zagzebski (1996) points out that "knowledge is used to cover a variety of states, from the simplest case of ordinary perceptual contact with the physical world, requiring no cognitive effort or skill whatever, to the most impressive cognitive achievements" (p. 262). Consequently, our perception of the world may be conceived as justified and varied frameworks of beliefs.

In view of the above, an epistemic account of factive presupposition evokes the cognitive mechanisms that internalize aspects of reality via the analysis of certain lexical expressions. These cognitive mechanisms may invite cognitive frames working as ‘Idealized Cognitive Models’, or ICMs (See section 2.1.8.3 for more details), that may correspond to mental spaces, or representations in discourse (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 118). Similarly, from a cognitive perspective, presuppositions make the hearer feel they are already given or known before and therefore difficult to doubt or refute (Fauconnier, 1985, p. 108). Likewise, they may transmit ideological content and serve persuasive aims (See section 2.3.3.5).

2.1.7.3 Factivity and presupposition

Factivity and presupposition are related pragmatic and linguistic phenomena. The relationship between factivity and presupposition is stressed by Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1968). Factive sentences presuppose the truth of the embedded clause, but non-factive sentences do not. This idea is illustrated by Kiparsky & Kiparsky (as cited in Nylander, 1985, p. 324) in the following examples:

(1)  
\[ a- \text{ I regret that it is raining.} \]
\[ \rightarrow \quad b- \text{ It is raining.} \]
The factive (1a) presupposes (1b), whilst the non-factive (2a) does not presuppose (2b). According to Karttunen (as cited in Nylander, 1985), true factive verbs, such as ‘regret’, ‘forget’ and ‘resent’, and semi-factive verbs, like ‘discover’, ‘find out’ and ‘realize’, have to be distinguished since the latter loses its factivity in conditionals. Similarly, according to Givon (as cited in Nylander, 1985, p. 325), a distinction has to be made between cognition verbs or ‘C-verbs’. Indeed, the difference between factive verbs, like ‘regret’, negative-factive verbs, like ‘pretend’ and non-factive verbs, like ‘decide’, has to be taken into account. Factive verbs presuppose the truth of the embedded clause, while negative-factive verbs presuppose the falsity of the complement clause (Nylander, 1985, p. 326). Non-factive verbs, however, do not presuppose the truthfulness of the embedded clause. Givon (1973) illustrates (as cited in Nylander, 1985, p. 326) this idea as follows:

(1) a. I regret that she was hurt.
   > b. She was hurt.
(2) a. She pretended that she was sick.
   > b. She was not sick.
(3) a. She decided to go.
   * > b. She went.

(1) is an illustration of factive verbs that trigger factive presupposition. (2) is an example of negative factive verbs since 2 (a) falsifies 2 (b). (3) is, however, an illustration of non-factive verbs because 'decide' does not presuppose the truthfulness of the embedded clause or 'going'. As such, factive presuppositions are detected by lexical expressions (Clausen & Manning, 2009). The following sub-section sheds more light on the different lexical features that trigger epistemic presupposition.

2.1.7.4 Factivity triggers

The present sub-section identifies the different lexical features that trigger factive presupposition, mainly factive verbs and factive noun phrases.

2.1.7.4.1 Factive verbs

Factive verbs are divided into epistemic and emotive verbs. First, epistemic or cognitive factives describe the mental state of affairs of the agent, like in “John knows/doesn’t know
that Baird invented television” (Iwanov, n.d., p. 1), where it is presupposed that Baird invented television. Second, emotive factives describe the emotional state of affairs, or the feeling of the agent, like in “Martha regrets/doesn’t regret drinking John’s homebrew” (Iwanov, n.d., p. 2), where it is presupposed that Martha drank John’s homebrew.

As stated in section 2.1.6.2, factive verbs trigger epistemological presuppositions. Factive verbs are ‘know’, ‘be sorry that’, ‘be proud that’, ‘be indifferent that’, ‘be aware that’, etc. (Iwanov, n.d., p. 1-2). These verbs seem to reveal the speaker’s background knowledge since they trigger factive presuppositions, hence factual information. Since information is factual, the speaker seems to show strong commitment to the truth value of her propositions. A distinction, however, has to be made between ‘know’ and ‘believe’. The use of “I believe that p” reveals the speaker’s uncertainty about p, hence anti-presupposition (Chemla, 2008, p. 6). Apart from factive verbs, including epistemic and emotive predicates, noun phrases also trigger factive presupposition.

2.1.7.4.2 Factive NPs

Factive presupposition may also arise from noun phrases or NPs (Iwanov, n.d., p. 2). Presenting personal beliefs as factual information is stronger when nouns that topicalize epistemic certainty of propositions are utilized by the speaker (Schmid, 2001, p. 1544). Such nouns are ‘fact’, ‘reality’, ‘truth’ and ‘certainty’ which can be used as markers of strong epistemic claims (Schmid, 2001, p. 1544). By using nouns in ‘that-clauses’, for instance, the speakers may sell their own views and personal opinions as objective truths and irrefutable facts (Schmid, 2001). Speakers, in such constructions, give the impression that their views-disguised-as-truths represent given and shared knowledge by all discourse participants (Schmid, 2001, p. 1545).

After providing a brief account of presupposition theories, approaches, properties, types and triggers, and after introducing epistemic presupposition, one can, at this stage, proceed to study more complex pragmatic phenomena relating to presupposition.

2.1.8 Presupposition and cognition

The present sub-section highlights the cognitive structures of presupposition and the concepts of common ground and ICMs.
2.1.8.1 Cognitive structures of presupposition

At this level of the study, the cognitive structures of presupposition have to be tackled. Cognitive mechanisms take part in internalizing aspects of reality as they are built via the speaker’s discourse (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 118). More specifically, focus has to be on the cognitive structure of presupposition that makes the hearer think they are already known, and hence unchallengeable or irrefutable (Fauconnier, 1985; Marmaridou, 2000). According to Strawson (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 122), in “The king of France is bald”, the existence of a king of France is, for instance, background information, and it is presented as taken for granted. The foregrounded assertion that someone is bald cannot make sense unless background information is taken into account.

The link between what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded, along with the related linguistic expressions, categories as well as structures, is likely to convey the real meaning of presupposition (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 122). Such links depend on the cognitive structure of presuppositions. In this respect, Marmaridou (2000) points out that “interlocutors can derive presuppositions from the utterance of a sentence in a specific context, while handling chunks of information and accommodating socially inscribed intentions” (p. 141). This idea allegedly necessitates both a cognitive explanation and a grammatical description (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 141). The cognitive approach to presupposition is more promising in addressing various issues that are relevant to discussing its nature and communicative role (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 161).

In a similar vein, presuppositions are related to culture, knowledge and ideology. They are defined as “simply the set of tacit cultural knowledge that makes discourse meaningful” (van Dijk, 1995c, p. 273). Presupposition may introduce ideological propositions whose truth is controversial (van Dijk, 1995c, p. 273). Indeed, presuppositions pertain to non-asserted beliefs or knowledge whose truth is assumed by the speaker. Reminding is, for instance, an in-between case between asserting and non-asserting or presupposing since it belongs to shared and, thus, presupposed knowledge. According to Schank (as cited in van Dijk, 1995c, p. 274), such knowledge has to be activated by the addressee first. In this regard, van Dijk (1976) states that “the total set of propositions of ‘previous knowledge’ or ‘retrieved information’ necessary to derive correctly or to produce adequately a given sentence is thus a ‘presupposition base’ for this sentence” (p. 77). As such, presupposition embeds already known, non-asserted knowledge or taken for granted ideologies.
In sum, understanding what is backgrounded or foregrounded, what is grammatical or cognitive, and what is asserted or not asserted in a communicative event helps to grasp the cognitive mechanisms and structures of presupposition. At this level, decoding what is back-grounded necessitates the analysis of the concept 'common ground'.

2.1.8.2 Common ground

The common ground concept is closely related to knowledge, beliefs and presupposition. Common ground is defined as “common knowledge between discourse participants (or, more subtly, knowledge that the speaker believes to have in common with the audience)” (van Eijck & Unger, 2007, p. 235). Based on Gricean (1989) views, Stalnaker (2002) defines common ground as “the mutually recognized shared information in a situation in which an act of trying to communicate takes place” (p. 704). When a speaker asserts a sentence presupposing p, this shows that he believes that p is common ground. If the hearer also believes that p, this makes it common ground that p (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 704). For instance, by announcing the birth of a child to the world, his/her parents assert that with an epistemic effect. Common knowledge is thus created since the readers know about the baby’s name, gender, date of birth as well as the happiness of the couple. They also know that other readers also know all this information (van Eijck & Unger, 2007, p. 237). This idea is illustrated in the following theorem, provided by Schlenker (2006), and adapted and cited in Chemla (2008, p. 150):

If a speaker s and her addressee a both believe that p,
if furthermore it is common ground that the speaker believes that both of them believe that p,
then p is common belief.

Therefore, a presupposition p of a sentence S becomes common ground after an utterance of S. The authority of S is also important for p (Stalnaker, 2002). In a similar vein, it has been stated that given information that the speaker considers as known or uncontroversial comes before new information (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 203). However, presupposed or given information does not always come before new information, like in “On MONDAY it rained”, or in “It is John-Paul the SECOND who is the present Pope” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 202). Such “given-new” or “focus-presupposition” distinctions are considered as part and parcel of linguistic as well as pragmatic theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 217). Such distinctions are relevant in that they help the addressee distinguish presupposed from asserted information.
The link between common ground and presuppositions has to be considered. Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 2002) defines presuppositionality in terms of constraints on the beliefs of the speaker. Indeed, Simons (2006) explains Stalnaker’s view “for a sentence to have a presupposition is for its appropriate utterance to require the speaker to believe that the presupposition is entailed by the common ground” (p. 9). Stalnaker (2002) criticizes the simplistic view that the presupposition of a sentence cannot be allowed unless it is entailed by the conversational common ground at the utterance time (Simons, 2006; Stalnaker 2002). In some cases, the addressee may act as if certain propositions belong to the common ground though she knows that they are not (Simons, 2009, p. 9). She may communicate a proposition in an indirect way and accomplish this by presupposing it so that the auditor could infer that it is presupposed. In this case, the speaker tells his addressees something by pretending that his addressees already know it (Stalnaker, 1974, p. 202).

As such, to presuppose is to take something for granted, or pretend taking it for granted, as background information, or common ground among the participants of a given conversation (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 701). In “I want to call my sister” (Simons, 2006, p. 10), Bob does not know Ann before. He has just met her. Before Ann’s utterance, Bob has no prior knowledge that Ann has a sister. Ann, as well, does not think that it is common ground between them that she has a sister. This can be considered the result of a process of accommodation (Simons, 2006, p. 10). Subsequently, it is not common ground that Ann has a sister. This leads to another distinction, mainly between non-defective and defective contexts. First, a non-defective context can be identified as a context in which the beliefs of participants about the common ground are correct beliefs, and therefore speakers and hearers presuppose the same thing (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 717). Second, a defective context is when the participants’ beliefs about the common ground in a conversation are not correct. In this case, the defectiveness can either go unnoticed because all participants believe that the context is non-defective, or can be recognized by one or more parties who are expected to intervene and ask for correction (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 717).

Two examples can be provided in this context. The first example is that Bob is holding his baby daughter. However, Alice says: “how old is he?” Bob notices that Alice is speaking about something and taking it as common ground though it is not true. As a reaction, Bob may correct Alice by saying “it’s a girl”. He may also show that he presupposes that the baby he is holding is a girl by saying “she is ten months old”, expecting Alice to accommodate (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 717). Another example is when Alice talks to Bob at a cocktail party “the
man drinking a martini is a philosopher” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 717). Bob may correct Alice by saying that the man is drinking Perrier, not a martini, or may decide to tacitly accept what Alice presupposes just to facilitate communication and avoid disrupting it. Bob accommodates by accepting Alice’s false presupposition. This type of accommodation “brings about a divergence between the common ground and common belief” (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 718). In short, when context is defective, it can be remediable by correction or accommodation.

After studying the cognitive structures of presuppositions and the speaker’s common ground, it is crucial to uncover the participants’ mental spaces as well as their cognitive abilities to construct ICMs within the framework of presupposition.

2.1.8.3 Idealized Cognitive Models

In language learning process, people associate the scenes they experience with linguistic frames (Fillmore, 1977, p. 62). A frame is defined as prototypical instances of scenes associated with any system of linguistic choices, like words, rules, structures and categories (Fillmore, 1977). Thus, a word’s meaning can be defined in terms of an Idealized Cognitive Model, a cognitive model that is idealized, and hence does not need to fit the world in a perfect way (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 144). For instance, in “You didn’t spare me a trip to New York – you deprived me of one”, the idea that what is spared is bad for that person is evoked by the ICM of ‘spare’ (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 145). However, the ICM of ‘deprive’ embeds the idea that a person is deprived of something good or positive. The above example highlights the idea that the ICM of ‘spare’ is not applicable in the addresser’s opinion, whereas the ICM of ‘deprive’ is suitable in the above context (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 145).

In this context, it is important to examine the figure-ground mental model. It is stated that ICMs and mental space configurations are constructed both semantically and pragmatically at the same time in on-going discourse when people interact (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 146). What is presupposed is back-grounded, while what is asserted is fore-grounded. For instance, the adjective ‘stingy’ can be used to describe a person and foreground her quality of character. Spending too little money is back-grounded as a negative social value (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 147). Likewise, the use of ‘regret’ foregrounds the person’s feelings, whereas it backgrounds what has caused such feelings, or what is presupposed (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 147). In order to analyze presupposition in terms of ICMs, one
has to enhance the figure-ground distinction in sentences including lexical frames, like ‘regret’. The image-schematic structure of ‘regret’, thus, determines figure-ground relations in an utterance (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 148).

Likewise, the theory of mental spaces has to be highlighted since it relates to ICMs and presupposition. This theory is used by Fauconnier (1985) to show how presupposition can be inherited or blocked in complex sentences (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 149). The theory focuses on “the linguistic creation of worlds by building mental spaces, in which presuppositions may or may not be satisfied and may or may not be inherited from one world to another” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 149). Fauconnier’s (1985) space-builder (SBм) establishes a mental space, whereas the proposition (Prop) creates relations between the different elements within the space (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 150). For instance, in “Mary believes that Oscar stopped smoking”, ‘Mary believes’ constructs the space of Mary’s beliefs. The Prop “Oscar stopped smoking” creates the relation between Oscar and smoking within that mental space that is Mary’s belief-world (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 150). Consequently, the Prop can be divided into an asserted proposition A “Oscar doesn’t smoke now” and a presupposed proposition P “Oscar smoked before” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 151).

Fauconnier also introduces (as cited in Marmaridou, 2000, p. 152) the terms ‘parent space’, ‘explicit presupposition’ and ‘implicit presupposition’. ‘Parent space’ is a space that involves another space. For instance, the space created by “Mary believes” is the parent space of ‘Oscar stopped smoking’ (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 152).

(a) Mary believes that Oscar has a car.
(b) Mary believes that Oscar's car is red.
(c) Oscar has a car.

That “Oscar has a car” is an explicit presupposition in the space, constructed by “Mary believes that Oscar has a car” as background information created before discourse time \( t \), i.e. Oscar had a car before Mary believed it (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 152). The same utterance is an implicit presupposition in the space constructed by “Mary believes that Oscar’s car is red” at time \( t \) on the basis of some grammatical constructions, but was not created in that space before time \( t \). As a result, implicit presuppositions, built in a space \( M \) at \( t_o \) are explicit presuppositions in \( M \) at any time after \( t_i \) (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 152). The most important aspect of the presuppositions’ communicative value is that it “confers on the speaker the power to create realities and directly involve the addressee in them” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 160). Hence, it can be stated that language builds the world via mental spaces and ICMs.
It is worth noting, that in cognitive linguistics, particular grammatical constructions should be associated with space-building instructions (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 160). Cognitive mechanisms are, consequently, important in constructing reality (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 161). Presupposition triggers can, for instance, be analyzed as “framing scenes of experience corresponding to idealized cognitive models, parts of which are cognitively backgrounded while others are foregrounded” (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 161-2). Such a background-foreground connection is established via certain words and constructions that create or cancel presuppositions (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 162). Mental spaces establish worlds where presuppositions may be inherited or blocked. More importantly, the cognitive approach sheds light on how presupposition constructs reality as well as aspects of the interlocutors’ knowledge (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 162).

In a similar vein, nouns build mental spaces and ICMs. Indeed, mental nouns “encapsulate propositions as mental states or activities” (Schmid, 2001, p. 1531). First, general mental nouns foreground the propositional content of mental states and background the human conceptualizer (Schmid, 2001, p. 1531). For instance, ideas and theories are likely to exist autonomously and independently of the mind that conceives them. Second, creditive mental nouns represent ideas as objects of mental activities done by individuals (Schmid, 2001, p. 1531). Third, emotive mental nouns involve the speaker’s description of the emotional state of the conceptualizer of a given idea (Schmid, 2001, p. 1531). Finally, nouns contain three degrees of epistemic modality, namely epistemic possibility, epistemic probability, and epistemic certainty (Schmid, 2001, p. 1531). The latter is one of the main concerns of the current research paper since it studies not only epistemic presupposition, but also epistemic modality.

2.1.9 Modality

As the present PhD research studies factive, presupposed knowledge in political discourse, it is primordial to study epistemic modality since it describes the epistemological state of the speaker. Likewise, it is important to highlight the link between epistemic modality and evidentiality, on the one hand, and epistemic modality and epistemic presupposition, on the other hand. Other related concepts, such as context sensitivity, subjectivity, the speaker’s attitude and information reliability, are elaborated in the following sub-sections since they help to study modality.
2.1.9.1 Evidentiality

The meaning of evidentiality goes beyond semantics. It has to be analyzed within pragmatics (Song, 2009, p. 21-2). Evidentiality is a new arena for investigating the effect of language on thought (Papafragou, Li, Choi & Han, 2007, p. 257). It conveys the speaker’s degree of knowledge, as inferred by the analyst or hearer, by processing the traces in her utterance (Triki, 2014, p. 1). People can reason or think about the kind of evidence that made them believe something, such as directly seeing an event taking place, being told something by someone, or inferring the occurrence of that event on the basis of available evidence (Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 255). Such source monitoring ability “builds on the understanding that people stand in different and variable informational relations to the world - hence their beliefs may vary and be modified or updated as new evidence becomes available” (Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 255). This idea evokes the theory of mind that is based on attributing mental states to the self and others so as to reason, explain and predict behavior.

According to Chafe & Nicholas (as cited in Triki, 2014, p. 1), languages offer a variety of linguistic devices to reveal different attitudes toward knowledge. Different sources of information are encoded via various evidentiality markers or evidential devices (Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 255). Evidential markers are expressions that indicate or signal the speaker’s source of evidence for a prejacent claim (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 39). The following are examples of lexical evidentials.

(a) I saw John sing.
(b) I heard John sing.
(c) John was allegedly singing.
(d) John was apparently singing.

In (a) and (b), the speaker reveals that she directly perceived the event that John was singing. In (c) and (d), she conveys indirect access or evidence via hearsay in (c), or a non-specified source, like in (d) (Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 255). According to Willet (as cited in Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 256), there are three basic categories of information sources, mainly direct access or perception, reports from others and reasoning. The first category is direct access and it can be divided into subcategories involving auditory, visual as well as other kinds of sensory perceptions. The second category is reported information or general hearsay. The third category is reasoning, based on non-concrete evidence. For Chafe (as cited in Triki, 2014, p. 1), such markers are well-rooted in different modes of knowledge, mainly belief, hearsay, deduction, induction etc.
More specifically, six subcategories of evidentials have been highlighted by Aikhenvald (2003, p. 65) in a scale ranging from the most personal to the least personal:

1- Visual: relating to optic evidence.
2- Non-visual sensory: relating to auditory, olfactory and tactile evidence.
3- Inferential: relating to the act of deriving, act of speculating or drawing of conclusions.
4- Assumed: relating to supposition or hypothesis.
5- Hearsay: relating to unofficial information received by word of mouth, and
6- Quotative: relating to reporting or citing other people’s words.

According to Frajzyngier (1985), there are various degrees of certainty about the truth of a proposition. This can be explained by the connection between the interpretation of direct and indirect evidence when the truth value of a sentence is to be considered (de Haan, 1999, p. 6). The following scale schematizes such a link:

![Evidential Hierarchy](image)

*Figure 1. Evidential Hierarchy, adopted from de Haan (1999, p. 6)*

Evidentials form a scale that is determined by the reliability of the sources of information (Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 257). According to figure (1), direct evidence, like visual and auditory evidence, is more believable or reliable than indirect evidence, such as inference or hearsay. In other words, such a scale considers direct access as more reliable than indirect access. Perceptually grounded beliefs are assumed to be related to the structure of reality by a causal effect (Dancy, 1985, cited in Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 257). In this context, Papafragou, et al. (2007) state that "evidential meanings require grasp of abstract and unobservable source concepts and subtle reasoning about the reliability of different sources of information” (p.257). Evidentiality, therefore, provides a good testing ground to investigate the connection between language and people’s 'conceptual\intentional systems' (Papafragou, et al., 2007, p. 257).

In this context, it is important to note that evidentials do not add to or change the propositional content of an utterance. Indeed, in the descriptive typological literature,
“evidentials do not contribute to the proposition expressed, but only add the indication of the speaker’s type of source as a non-truth-conditional meaning component” (Schenner, 2008, p. 205). This suggests that, like epistemic modals, evidentials can only take place in root clauses’ (Schenner, 2008, p. 207). As such, evidentials only portray a degree of commitment to the truth of the statement (de Haan, 1999, p. 19). It is worth noting that evidentiality is often connected to epistemic modality since it also indicates the commitment of the speaker to the truth of the proposition. The following sub-section examines this kind of modality since it serves the aim of the present study, mainly uncovering the epistemological and perceptual worlds of the speaker as well as factive vs. ideological knowledge in political discourse.

2.1.9.2 Epistemic modality

Epistemic modality is an indicator of the source of information. Epistemic modals are interpreted by analysts on the ground of “a body of information or evidence, which is frequently referred to as the so-called what is known” (Song, 2009, p. 1). Epistemic modality expressions highlight the necessity/possibility of a proposition, or a prejacent, depending on some evidence or knowledge (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 33-34).

(a) John must be rich.
(b) John may be rich.

Based on the visual evidence, knowledge or observation of John spending too much money, one can produce 'a strong conjecture', like in (a) or 'a weak presumption', like in (b), that John is rich. As a result, ‘must’ and ‘may’ are both epistemic (Song, 2009, p. 1). Epistemic modality is, therefore, “closely related to the speaker’s attitude toward the truth of the proposition under the scope of the modal” (Song, 2009, p. 2). Although the word ‘epistemics’ is derived from the Greek term ‘epistemé’, or knowledge, epistemic modality reveals the state of lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker. More specifically, such an incomplete body of knowledge seems to reflect the different attitudes of the speaker toward the embedded proposition, or the speaker’s degrees of certainty (Song, 2009, p. 2-3). Such degrees of certainty can be expressed by different modal verbs:

A. Someone is at the door.
   B. a) That would be Mary.
   b) That must be Mary.
c) That will be Mary.
d) That should be Mary.
e) That may be Mary.
f) That might be Mary.

The above uses of modals are interpreted as epistemic because they reflect varying degrees of certainty from the highest degree in (a) to the lowest level of certainty in (f) which is expressed by the modal ‘might’ (Song, 2009, p. 3). The epistemic variability can be even within one type of meaning, like the following examples provided by von Fintel & Gillies, (2007, p. 34):

a. As far as Bill knows, John might be the thief.
b. Given what we knew at the time, John might have been the thief.
c. Given the results of the DNA tests, John might be the thief. But if we take the eyewitness seriously, John can’t have been the thief.

In short, simple modal expressions, like can, might and have to, have various sub-flavors, such as ‘what Bill knows’, ‘what we knew’, ‘what the DNA tests reveal’, etc. (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 35).

It is worth noting that unmodalized sentences express a stronger degree of commitment than epistemically modalized sentences (Karttunen, 1972; Kratzer, 1991; Lyons, 1977; Perkins, 1983; Song, 2009). For instance, following Karttunen’s (1972) thoughts, von Fintel & Gilies (2007) point out that “It is raining” is felicitous, whereas the modalized sentence “It must be raining” is not felicitous ( p. 38). By uttering a non-modalized utterance, the speaker commits herself to the truth of the proposition since she has visual evidence that it is raining outside (Karttunen, 1972; Song, 2009). Due to the absence of available direct evidence, the speaker in the modalized utterance makes use of logical inference from a body of evidence that people are entering the building carrying a wet umbrella (Karttunen, 1972; Song, 2009). Consequently, epistemic modals signal the speaker’s assessment of the likelihood that this is the right explanation of the proposition under consideration (Song, 2009, p. 5). In other words, the speaker relies on direct visual evidence and inference to come to the conclusion that it is raining outside.

Epistemic modality encompasses epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility. Based on Kratzer’s (1979, 1981, 1991) views, Song (2009) states that epistemic necessity modals, such as ‘must’, convey that “the proposition p under the scope of a modal operator is true in a
world w iff p is entailed from what is known” (p. 7). Following Kratzer’s line of thought, Song (2009) also points out that epistemic possibility modals, such as ‘may’ and ‘can’, assert that the proposition is true in w if p is compatible with what is known (p. 7). For instance, that John never leaves the lights on when he is not in his office makes “John must be in his office” compatible with what is known. Seeing the lights on is interpreted as John being in his office (Song, 2009, p. 7).

Similar to evidentials, epistemic modality does not affect the truth conditionality of an utterance (Papafragou, 2006, p. 1688). Epistemic modality is, therefore, a comment on the proposition expressed in the utterance. It is “the speaker’s assessment of probability and predictability” (Halliday, 1970, p. 349). It is something external to the content and a part of the speaker’s attitude towards his own speech role as ‘declarer’ (Halliday, 1970, p. 349). It also signals the presupposition’s status in terms of the speaker’s commitment to it (Palmer, 1986, p. 54-55). Since epistemic modals are considered as indicators of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition, the following sub-section reveals the degree to which epistemic modality is context-dependent or context sensitive.

2.1.9.3 Context sensitivity of epistemic modality

Epistemic modals are context sensitive. These modals play the role of “quantifiers over sets of worlds, just which sets being a function of context” (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 46). The contextualist approach to epistemic modality is based on getting rid of the idea that there is only one contextually determined proposition expressed by a judgment of epistemic modality (Willer, 2013, p. 2). Inspired by von Fintel & Gillies (2008), this idea is illustrated by Willer (2013, p. 2) as follows:

(a) Mary: where are my keys?
(b) Alex: they are in the car.
(c) Mary: no, they are not. I still had them with me when I came in.

In this case, Mary does not accept Alex’s judgment depending on what she knows. She knows that the keys cannot be in the car, and hence denies what is asserted by Alex. Different knowledge leads to different assessments of Alex’s claim. Alex evaluates it as right, while Mary assesses it as wrong. Hence, this has a pragmatic effect on discourse (Willer, 2013, p. 2).
That what one knows determines how one assesses a judgment of epistemic modality is considered as a naïve and simplistic interpretation (Willer, 2013, p. 3). New contextualists argue that Alex may also make a wrong judgment about Mary’s epistemic situation, thus legitimatizing Mary’s rejection of Alex’s claim on the basis of what she knows (Willer, 2013, p. 3). Indeed, since linguistic expressions are context sensitive, the kind of proposition expressed by the assertion may be determined by context (Willer, 2013, p. 4). This evokes Stalnaker’s (1978) view that assertions express propositions in a context, and that context and what is said affect each other (as cited in Willer, 2013, p. 4). Indeed, assertions affect context by adding the assertion’s proposition to context. Epistemic modality is, thus, context-dependent. This leads to investigating the links between epistemic modality and evidentiality in the following sub-section.

2.1.9.4 Evidentiality and epistemic modality

A distinction has to be made between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Evidentiality is the coding of the source of information, while epistemic modality is the coding of the degree of commitment on the part of the speaker to her statement (de Haan, 1999, p. 1). Semantically, evidentials enhance the nature of the information evidence in a statement. However, epistemic modals evaluate the speaker’s degree of commitment to the statement (de Haan, 1999, p. 1). More specifically, epistemic modality “evaluates evidence and on the basis of this evaluation assigns a confidence measure to the speaker’s utterance” (de Haan, 1999, p. 4). In other words, they entail different meanings, mainly the source of information and the attitude towards that information (de Haan, 1999, p. 8). Indeed, the evidential component signals the source of information, whereas the epistemic component is committed to assessing or judging this source of information (Song, 2009, p. 14).

We are, subsequently, facing two distinct categories. The first is evidentiality which deals with the evidence the speaker has for her proposition (de Haan, 1999, p. 25), while the second is epistemic modality which evaluates the speaker’s statement and adds a commitment value to it (de Haan, 1999, p. 25). Similarly, evidentiality is defined as referring to grammatical expressions that designate a source of information that the speaker has for her statement (Song, 2009, p. 9). More specifically, evidentiality encodes sources of direct or indirect evidence. However, based on the work of Dendale and Tasmowski (2001), Song (2009) points out that epistemic modality, embedded in necessity and possibility with respect to what is known or available evidence, conveys the speaker’s attitude toward the
prejacent, or the judgment of the truth of the prejacent (p. 11-12). This can be illustrated by the following examples provided by Song (2009, p. 19):

(a) *It may be raining outside.*
(b) *It must be raining outside.*
(c) *It is raining outside.*

In these examples, the ‘may-modalized’ sentence (a) is a weaker claim than the ‘must-modalized’ sentence (b). The latter is in its turn weaker than the ‘unmodalized’ sentence (c).

The speaker, thus, expresses different degrees of confidence in the proposition by relying on inferential evidential source, mainly seeing people holding a wet umbrella (Song, 2009, p. 19). This highlights the speaker’s evaluation of indirect evidence and how it is encoded and judged. Subsequently, the choice of epistemic modals will be influenced by her attitudes toward and assessment of the evidence. This can be done by selecting ‘must’ if the speaker believes that the evidence is strong enough, or ‘may’ if she believes that the evidence is weak (Song, 2009, p. 20). In other words, such varying degrees of confidence are determined by the way she assesses such evidence (Song, 2009, p. 20).

The epistemic modal ‘must’ is an example of how evidentiality and epistemic modality are interrelated. Many scholars think that the English modal ‘must’ has possible evidential readings (de Haan, 1999, p. 8). Such an evidential interpretation does not, however, mean that it is grammatically a full evidential (de Haan, 1999, p. 8). ‘Must’, like other English epistemic modals, incorporates an indirect evidential, or more precisely, an inferential evidential (Song, 2009, p. 15). As an epistemic modal, it plays “the role of signaling the sources of information, evidence, or knowledge on which the speaker bases her statement or conclusion” (Song, 2009, p. 15). This can be illustrated by the following examples:

(a) *John must be in his office.*
(b) *John is in his office.*

These two examples illustrate the idea that a semantic analysis of the epistemic modal ‘must’, or what is known, is not enough to interpret the epistemic use of ‘must’ (Song, 2009, p. 15). It is, therefore, necessary to incorporate evidentiality into the semantics of ‘must’ to resolve the problem. The modal ‘must’, as an evidential, plays the role of “encoding a source of information or evidence on which the speaker makes a statement” (Song, 2009, p. 15).
Reviewing Westmoreland’s (1998) examples, Drubig (2001) concludes that epistemic modals do not contribute to the informative proposition, but entail the information source (p. 3). Indirect knowledge, based on logical inference, is valued less highly than ‘direct’ knowledge that involves no reasoning (Karttunen, 1972, p. 13). In short, epistemic modals have both epistemic and evidential aspects. After studying the relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality, it is relevant to uncover the link between epistemic modality and presupposition.

2.1.9.5 Epistemic modality and presupposition

While uttering a statement, the speaker has evidence that leads her to use an epistemic modal. Therefore, the use of epistemic modals has strong links with presuppositions (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007; Song, 2009). More specifically, the use of epistemic modality presupposes that the speaker has evidence that proves the content of the proposition. This idea is summarized by Song (2009, p. 22) as follows:

\[ EM \varphi \text{ presupposes that the speaker has evidence for } \varphi, \text{ where } EM \text{ stands for an epistemic modal operator.} \]

In this regard, presuppositions triggered by epistemic modals are compatible with the speaker’s Evidential Judgment List (or EJL) (Song, 2009, p. 22). EJL refers to the inferring principles that uncover what the speaker believes about evidence. In case the presupposition is felicitous in a given context, the evidence explaining the use of a modalized sentence is added to the EJL of the speaker (Song, 2009, p. 22). As a result, “the fact that the presupposition triggered by the epistemic modal holds suggests that the speaker has appropriate evidence for her conclusion expressed by the prejacent” (Song, 2009, p. 23). If this takes place, it is a proof that the evidence is compatible with the EJL of the speaker.

The epistemic modal base is, conventionally, considered as a set of propositions that are known to the speaker (Song, 2009, p. 28). Such an epistemic modal base evokes Stalnakerian (1974) Common Ground, or CG, which is defined by Song (2009) as “a kind of a background of beliefs or assumptions commonly accepted by the speaker and her addressee as true” (p. 28). CG plays a significant role in the choice of relevant possible worlds, where participants evaluate a set of propositions that they believe to be true (Song, 2009, p. 29). Subsequently, CG and EJL are closely related to each other since epistemic modality and evidentiality are
associated semantically (Song, 2009, p. 29). In a similar vein, Kratzer’s (1977, 1978, 1981, 1991) ‘conversational backgrounds’ are considered contextual parameters to which the interpretation of a modal is relative (Kratzer, 1981, p. 43).

After highlighting the link between epistemic modality and presupposition, it seems necessary to shed light on the degree of subjectivity and objectivity of epistemic modality. Focus has to be on subjectivity and its connection with evidentiality and epistemic modality.

2.1.9.6 Subjectivity as an evidential dimension of epistemic modality

Traditional theories state that epistemic modals assert the truth value of propositions. Reviewing classical theories (Kratzer, 1981, 1991), Wolf (2012) points out that epistemic modals are “truth-conditional and within the propositional content of assertions” (p. 331). Traditional theorists, like Halliday (1970) and Palmer (1986), however, perceive epistemic modals as modifiers of assertion whose effect or impact is beyond the content (Wolf, 2012, p. 331). Evidence supporting traditional theories is retrieved in epistemic modality behavior in embedded clauses or environments, like conditionals, factives or verbs of reporting (Papafragou, 2006; Wolf, 2012). The following examples illustrate this idea:

(a) ? If Max must/might be lonely, his wife will be worried.
(b) ? It is surprising that Superman might/must be jealous of Lois.
(c) ? Spiderman told me that Superman might/must be jealous of Lois.

In these examples, epistemic modals resist being embedded, which seems to indicate that they are beyond the semantic bounds of the propositional content (Wolf, 2012, p. 331). Context can guide the reading toward subjectivity or objectivity, and this affects felicity conditions and the truth value of propositions (Wolf, 2012, p. 334). In other words, this may result in a subjective or objective reading of epistemic modals. In short, such a dual nature of epistemic modality classifies epistemic modals into two types, objective and subjective (Lyons, 1977; Wolf, 2012).

Based on Lyons’ (1977) views, the example “Alfred may be unmarried” can be interpreted in two different ways (Wolf, 2012, p. 334-5). The speaker either conveys her uncertainty about Alfred’s marital status, or her certainty that there is a possibility, or chance that Alfred is unmarried (Wolf, 2012, p. 334). If the speaker has an idea about some facts that show that Alfred is unmarried, like Alfred not wearing a wedding ring, or Alfred never mentioning that he has a wife, the subjective reading becomes clear. Subsequently, the speaker asserts that she is not sure about Alfred’s marital status and that (Wolf, 2012, p. 335).
However, if the speaker knows that Alfred belongs to a community where one third of men are not married, there is a chance that Alfred is unmarried, hence an objective reading of context (Lyons, 1977; Wolf, 2012).

In a similar vein, the difference between the subjective and objective readings can be analyzed by applying other conversational backgrounds (Kratzer, 1981; Wolf, 2012). An example of the subjective use of epistemic modals is “Probably, the boat will sink”. An example of the objective use of epistemic modals is “It is probable that the boat will sink” (Kratzer, 1981, p. 57). The subjective interpretation evokes a subjective ordering source, while the objective interpretation highlights an objective ordering source (Wolf, 2012, p. 336). In this regard, Wolf (2012) argues that an “objective stereotypical ordering source will contain commonly held conceptions about the normal course of events that are acceptable in a world reigned by science and technology” (p. 336). This means that a subjective stereotypical ordering source may involve superstitions, non-factual information, personal opinions and biased attitudes.

Subjectivity is considered an evidential dimension in epistemic modal expressions (Nuyts, 2001, p. 384). Based on Lyons (1977), Nuyts (2001, p. 384) highlights that the underlined expressions imply an evidential qualification:

- **Modal adverbs:**
  
  John *probably* made it to the bakery before closing time.

- **Modal adjectives:**

  It is *probable* that John made it to the bakery before closing time.

- **Mental state predicates:**

  I *think* John made it to the bakery before closing time.

- **Modal auxiliaries:**

  John *may* have made it to the bakery before closing time.

These examples express the speaker’s involvement or commitment to the epistemic expression. The speaker’s evaluation is made at the time of speaking. This means that “at ‘utterance time’ the speaker subscribes to and accepts responsibility for the epistemic evaluation underlying it” (Nuyts, 2001, p. 385). Unlike objective epistemic modality, which indicates an objectively measurable chance that the proposition is true or not, subjective epistemic modality includes subjective guesses related to its truth (Lyons, 1977, p. 808). If the speaker does not have any evidence about a state of affairs, she cannot evaluate or assess its
probability (Lyons, 1977; Nuyts, 2001). Individuals often express epistemic judgments that are not supported by reasonable evidence. When speakers express judgments, they give the impression that they have evidence for their statements. This, however, leads to insincerity because they are misleading the listeners (Nuyts, 2001, p. 386).

Subsequently, the quality or nature of the evidence on which an epistemic judgment is based can vary. Reframing Lyon’s (1977) distinction, Nuyts (2001) suggests that “an epistemic evaluation based on better (more reliable) evidence would probably be experienced as being ‘objective’, while one based on shaky evidence would rather be considered more ‘subjective’” (p. 386). This analysis has two semantic dimensions; the first includes the speaker’s evaluation of the state of affairs’ probability, hence the epistemic qualification; the second focuses on the speaker’s assessment of the evidence quality for such a qualification under the umbrella of evidentiality (Nuyts, 2001, p. 386). Hence, the distinction, based on how good the evidence is for the speaker’s evaluation, has to be reconsidered.

As a result, the link between subjectivity, epistemic modality and evidentiality is made clear. More specifically, subjectivity dimension may not be “a distinction within the epistemic domain, but within the evidential domain” (Nuyts, 2001, p. 386). Hence, this leads to an interaction between an epistemic and evidential qualification. This also enhances the idea that subjectivity is considered as an evidential dimension of epistemic modality. For instance, in English, expressions, like 'may', can be utilized by the speaker to show that she is providing strictly subjective information (Nuyts, 2001, p. 387). This occurs even if any other qualification expressions, whether epistemic or deontic, are absent in the utterance, like in “if you ask me, John did not go to the bakery at all” (Nuyts, 2001, p. 387). This confirms that subjectivity is related to evidentiality.

After studying the link between epistemic modality and evidentiality, and after stressing that subjectivity is an evidential dimension of epistemic modality, one can proceed to shed light on the different epistemic modals. Focus is on the subjective vs. objective readings of these modals.

2.1.9.6.1 Modal adverbs

Modal adverbs are basically neutral, but in certain contexts, they may imply subjective or non-subjective evaluations (Nuyts, 2001, p. 389). Jackendoff (1972) states (as cited in Drubig, 2001, p. 9) that modal or evidential adverbs, such as ‘probably’, ‘supposedly’, ‘evidentially’,
‘obviously’, cannot occur in negation scope. This can be illustrated in the following example cited in Drubig (2001, p. 9):

(a) John probably never ran so fast.
(b) *Never did John probably run so fast.

Other modal adverbs, like ‘necessarily’, occur in the negation scope, but lack epistemic interpretations (Drubig, 2001, p. 9). Epistemic adverbs of certainty involve ‘certainly’, which is a neutral adverb that expresses that the state of affairs is certain (Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008, p. 1531). According to Grice (as cited in Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008, p. 1531), the common assumption is that speakers say things they are sure about their truthfulness and for which they have evidence. In short, epistemic modal adverbs can be subjective, objective, or neutral depending on evidence and context.

2.1.9.6.2 Modal adjectives

Modal adjectives can steer subjective, objective or neutral readings. Subjectivity is also “systematically involved in adjectival expressions of epistemic modality” (Nuyts, 2001, p. 389). Indeed, adjectival constructions can express, depending on the form of the construction, both objective and subjective meanings (Nuyts, 2001, p. 389). For instance, when a speaker uses the standard form ‘it is probable that’, she expresses non-subjectivity via the impersonal subject ‘it’ and the copula ‘be’, which asserts the modality expressed (Perkins, 1983, p. 67). In sum, like epistemic modal adverbs, epistemic modal adjectives can reveal the subjectivity, objectivity or neutrality of the speaker. One, however, inquires if the same properties apply to mental state verbs.

2.1.9.6.3 Mental State predicates

Mental state predicates are systematically subjective. Consequently, such predicates “typically and predominantly occur in contexts in which the speaker voices personal opinions, very often about topics in the realm of strictly individual experiences or concerns, or also in contexts involving antagonism between the views of speaker and hearer” (Nuyts, 2001, p. 390-1). Since they are inherently subjective, mental state predicates are used to mitigate or hedge. This idea is illustrated by Nuyts (2001, p. 391) as follows:

(a) Well, I thought that I had already said that a minute ago, didn’t I?
(b) I think now I have to say something after all worthy colleagues.
In (a) and (b), speakers are clearly sure about what they say. However, when they use the mental state predicate, they express a tentative and personal opinion. Such an opinion can be wrong, hence allowing other opinions or reactions on the part of the addressees (Nuyts, 2001, p. 391). In short, mental state verbs are only subjective.

2.1.9.6.4 Modal auxiliaries

Modal auxiliaries are neutral, but can only be interpreted as subjective or non-subjective when the context necessitates that. Based on Lyons’ (1977) views, Nuyts points out that “the modal auxiliary meaning unavoidably ‘absorbs’ the flavor of [the] context” (p. 392). However, the majority of modal auxiliaries' occurrences seem to be perfectly neutral, just like adverbs (Nuyts, 2001, p. 392). Hence, a subjective or non-subjective effect is often caused by syntactic structures chosen by epistemic lexical items (Nuyts, 2001, p. 392-3). Subjectivity leads to questioning the reliability of information as well as thinking about the attitude of the speaker and her agenda. This is clarified in the following sub-section.

2.1.9.7 Attitude of the speaker and reliability of information

Clearly, the attitude of the speaker affects the reliability of information. It has been contended by many linguists that “epistemic markers for source-of-information also encode the speaker’s assessment of the reliability of that information” (Fitneva, 2001, p. 401). The reliability of information they express can be qualified in two ways. The first way is highlighting its source, like direct perception, hearsay, or inference. The second way is expressing their degree of certainty about its truth, like expressing confidence or doubt (Fitneva, 2001, p. 401-2). This can be illustrated in the following examples:

(a) *I heard* John cursing.
(b) *Someone said that* John failed the class.
(c) *I therefore conclude that* John has failed the class.

The reliability of information can be qualified through various lexical devices, like in (a), (b) and (c) (Fitneva, 2001, p. 402). These devices determine the origin, nature and limits of the speaker's knowledge (Fitneva, 2001, p. 402). They are categorized as epistemic devices and the conveyed information as epistemic information.

Epistemic devices can be referred to as speaker-attitude or source-of-information markers (Fitneva, 2001, p. 402). Indeed, based on the works of Lyons (1977), Kratzer (1981, 1991) and Palmer (1986), Fitneva (2001) explains that speakers “convey their degree of
confidence in the information not only by using markers that directly express confirmation, certainty or doubt, but also by using markers that reveal the source of information” (p. 402). The source of information is the mode of creating and acquiring information, such as hearsay, perception and deduction (Fitneva, 2001, p. 402). Since the reliability of information is related to the reliability of speakers, four factors are provided by Du Bois (1986) in this regard. They are namely the evidence for what they say, the speakers’ interests, their sincerity and fallibility (as cited in Fitneva, 2001, p. 403). Subsequently, referring to Du Bois (1986), Fitneva (2001) points out that in case the speakers’ interest and sincerity are doubted, whatever they say will be evaluated as untrustworthy and filtered out (p. 403). When speakers are competent, reliable, trustworthy and truthful, hearers will trust the speakers and rely on their evaluation of information (Fitneva, 2001, p. 403).

Other factors may affect the reliability of information. Following Gilovich’s (1991) reasoning, Fitneva (2001) mentions stereotypes, prejudices and expectations that “determine not only how strongly we believe or disbelieve a piece of information, but also what we believe and what not (and thus what becomes represented in one’s mind and what is said)” (p. 404). For instance, the degree of certainty in inference validity may be determined by previous exposures to the same issue or situation and by how many times such inference has been useful or right, hence inductive reasoning (Fitneva, 2001, p. 404). This leads to ’graded modality' when some speakers’ attitudes are stronger than other attitudes (Kratzer, 1991; Fitneva, 2001). For example, by using the modal ‘must’, or the modal ‘might’, one knows which information is more reliable than the other (Fitneva, 2001, p. 404).

It is important to clarify the idea that modality does not add to the propositional content of utterances. In fact, modality is treated as “an expression of the speaker’s attitude towards the prejacent proposition, rather than giving rise to a complex proposition with its own distinct content” (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 41). This idea can be traced back to Kant (1781) who thinks (as cited in von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 41) that “the modality of judgments is a very special function thereof, which has the distinguishing feature that it does not contribute to the content of the judgment”. Indeed, when the speaker says that a proposition is necessary, she indicates or signals the grounds for her judgment. The following example, provided by von Fintel & Gillies (2007, p. 41), clarifies this idea:

**Q:** Why isn’t Louise coming to our meetings these days?

**A:** She **might/must** be too busy with her dissertation.
The answer to the question is provided by the prejacent. The speaker’s assessment of the likelihood that this is the right answer is offered by the epistemic modal. As such, the epistemic modal is an expression of the speaker’s attitude and does not add anything to the content of the judgment or proposition (von Fintel & Gillies, 2007, p. 41).

To recapitulate the main points, the current section has studied presupposition and its theories, based on the thoughts of linguists and philosophers, like Frege (1892), Russel (1905), Strawson (1952), Stalnaker (1973, 1974), Karttunen (1974) and van Dijk (1976, 2003). It has also focused on presupposition approaches, properties, lexical triggers and types. More attention has been given to epistemological presupposition, factivity and factive triggers, as well as the cognitive dimension of presupposition, including the cognitive structure of presupposition, Common Ground and ICMs. The last part of the present section has shed light on the link between epistemic modality, presupposition and evidentiality. Other issues, like context sensitivity, subjectivity, information reliability and speaker attitude, have been tackled because they may uncover the speaker’s knowledge state and her attitude in discourse. At this stage, one can shift focus on discourse analysis, more specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis, which is another framework of analysis.

2.2 CDA

First, this section is devoted to discourse, discourse genres and discourse analysis. The second part studies CDA, its history, the most important approaches to CDA, its principles and its aims. It also deals with the link between CDA, Cognitive Linguistics and presupposition. The third part focuses on politics, political discourse, ideology and political cognition.

2.2.1 Discourse

This sub-section sheds light on discourse definitions and genres, as well as discourse analysis and its social dimensions.

2.2.1.1 Definitions

Different definitions to discourse can be provided. Generally, discourse is commonly defined as a form of language use (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 1). More specifically, people communicate ideas or beliefs via language in a social context, and hence discourse can be defined as a communicative event (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 2). Discourse is also presented as “a
specific form of language use, and as a specific form of social interaction, interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation” (van Dijk, 1990, p. 164). This enhances the three dimensions of discourse, mainly language use, the communication of beliefs or cognition and interaction in social situations (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 2).

First of all, the linguistic dimension of discourse has to be considered. In fact, discourse is defined as a unit of language that is above the sentence, and a particular focus, mainly on language use (Schiffrin, 1994, p. 20). Discourse arises as a collection of inherently contextualized units of language use (Schiffrin, 1994, p. 39). Unlike a sentence, which is a string of words put together by the grammar rules of a language, an utterance is, for many linguists, ‘context-bound’ (Schiffrin, 1994, p. 39-40). More specifically, discourses are “ways of behaving, interacting, valuing, thinking, believing, speaking, and often reading and writing that are accepted as instantiations of particular roles (or ‘types of people’) by specific groups of people” (Gee, 1996, cited in Locke, 2004, p. 7). In other words, discourse goes beyond the text.

Second, the social dimension of discourse has to be highlighted. A deeper overview defines discourse as a type of social practice (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 28). Discourse constitutes the social, which involves three dimensions, namely knowledge, social relations and social identity (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 8). Therefore, discourse defines groups’ interests, their positions in society and their relations with other groups (van Dijk, 1997b; Wodak, 1996). Language users engage in text and talk as individuals as well as members of multiple social categories. They build, achieve and display social identities in discourse (van Dijk, 1997b). This also highlights the convergence of several disciplines in the study of discourse, like linguistics –since it is the study of language, psychology – focusing on beliefs and how they are transmitted or communicated and social sciences – since it is the analysis of interactions in social situations (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 2).

The socio-cultural and political dimensions of discourse are also important. Indeed, discourse is relative to political, social and cultural aspects since it reflects and shapes social order as well as individuals’ interaction with society (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 3). Language users speak to communicate ideas and be understood by recipients. They do so as individuals or as group members in society “in order to inform, persuade or impress others or in order to accomplish other social acts in social situations, institutions or social structures” (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 16). Discourse studies are thus about text and talk in context (van Dijk,
Discourses are ways of expressing oneself and knowing, valuing and experiencing the world (McGregor, 2003, p. 2). In short, for better understanding of discourse, the linguistic, social, political and cultural dimensions have been highlighted. Studying the different genres of discourse is also important to understand and analyze discourse.

2.2.1.2 Discourse as genre

Discourse genres vary depending on different factors. Discourse genres and orders vary across cultures (Fairclough, 1989, p. 47). Discourse involves several types and subtypes of text and talk (van Dijk, 2007, p. 27). This includes politics, media, education, science, law, business, parliamentary speeches, news reports, editorials, textbooks, classroom lessons, phone calls, annual reports, meetings, bureaucratic forms etc. (Bhatia, 1993; Lemke, 1990, cited in van Dijk, 2007, p. 27). Genres, in this respect, are described according to their context, but not in terms of their structure. Consequently, a parliamentary debate, for instance, has a few exclusive structures, like its topics, its forms of rhetoric, its argumentation etc. (van Dijk, 2007, p. 27). However, according to van Dijk (2007), it needs to be identified in terms of “specific context categories, like political parties, government and opposition, constituents and voters, as well as in terms of political goals and processes, knowledge and ideologies” (p. 27).

Discourse genre involves sub-types or sub-disciplines. Genre analysis is simply a collective label for some sub-disciplines of discourse studies, like media discourse analysis, conversation analysis, political discourse analysis, narrative analysis, classroom interaction, argumentation analysis etc. (van Dijk, 2007, p. 27). Different ‘spheres’ of interaction generate their specific types of utterances (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 60). These types are called ‘speech genres’, and they serve particular functions, such as scientific, technical, commentarial and business purposes. The specific conditions for each sphere give rise to particular genres; that is certain relatively stable thematic, compositional, and stylistic types of utterances (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 64).

Specific text types or genres serve conventional social functions (Luke, 1997). Texts are considered as “social actions, meaningful and coherent instances of spoken and written language use” (Luke, 1997, para. 27). Therefore, genres and sub-genres, as conventional forms, both limit and enable meanings and social relations between addressers and addressees, speakers and hearers, writers and readers etc. (Luke, 1997, para. 27). The
analysis of such genres is based on the sequenced structures of their propositions and textual macrostructures. They are not stable or constant since they are continually subject to creativity, innovation and re-innovation (Luke, 1997, para. 27).

As such, analyzing discourse genre is a kind of CDA. For CDA, the basic unit of analysis is the text. The form or shape of the text is not arbitrary since certain text types or text genres serve traditional or conventional social functions and uses (Luke, 1997, para. 27). In other words, specific types of texts try to be delivered or written in social institutions with expected material and ideational effects. These particular kinds involve written texts, like business letters, forms, policies, lessons, textbooks, clinical exchanges, and visual, electronic and gestural texts, like internet home pages (Luke, 1997, para. 27). In politics, opposing parties or political forces attempt to obtain general acceptance for their own discourse type “as the preferred and ultimately the ‘natural’ one for talking and writing about the state, government, forms of political action, and all aspects of politics” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 90). Hence, discourse genre and CDA are interrelated.

After defining discourse and identifying some of its genres and sub-genres, it seems necessary to devote the following sub-section to studying discourse analysis, before tackling Critical Discourse Analysis.

2.2.1.3 Discourse analysis

The present sub-section defines the concept of discourse analysis and unveils its different dimensions.

2.2.1.3.1 Definition of discourse analysis

Discourse analysis can be defined in various ways. Discourse analysis is a way of understanding social interactions (Fulcher, 2011, para.10). It examines how people use language to build their own versions of personal experiences. Moreover, it is based on the idea that “people draw on cultural and linguistic resources in order to construct their talk in certain ways to have certain effects” (Fulcher, 2011, para. 25). The objective behind discourse analysis is the description of the structures, functions, forms, patterns and practices of everyday text and talk. It also sheds light on the procedures and mechanisms through which participants allocate meaning and coherence to discourse (van Rees, 2007, p. 1455).
A distinction has to be made between discourse and discourse analysis. While discourse is presented as language in use for communication, *discourse analysis* is portrayed as “the search for what gives discourse coherence” (Cook, 1989, p. 6). Recognizing a stretch of language as a meaningful sequence can be via employing language or grammar rules, or via employing the knowledge of the speaker’s world (Cook, 1989, p. 9). In this respect, the receiver of a message is influenced by the situation in which messages are received, by her socio-cultural relations with participants, by what the receiver knows and what the sender or emitter knows (Cook, 1989, p. 10). This idea invites the analyst to think about the social dimension of discourse analysis, along with other dimensions.

### 2.2.1.3.2 Dimensions of discourse analysis

A brief historical overview seems to be necessary to understand discourse analysis and its various dimensions. Discourse analysis is an independent cross-discipline in human and social sciences that has emerged since the mid-1960s (van Dijk, 1990, p. 163). It has developed along with other new disciplines, like semiotics, pragmatics and sociolinguistics that stemmed from parent disciplines, such as linguistics, ethnography, sociology and poetics (van Dijk, 1990, p. 163). Cognitive psychology and Artificial Intelligence appeared to join these disciplines in the 1970s. However, discourse as a discipline, extended to involve social psychology in the 1980s (van Dijk, 1990, p. 163). Currently, discourse plays a significant role in “social perception, impression management, *attitude change* and persuasion, attribution, *categorization*, *intergroup relations*, *stereotypes*, *social representations* (SRs) and interaction” (van Dijk, 1990, p. 164) (See section 2.3.1.5 for more details about SRs). Such socio-psychological insights are of great importance to the evolution of discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1990, p. 164).

Consequently, discourse has socio-cognitive dimensions. Indeed, discourse is presented as a cognitive structure, including observable verbal and non-verbal features, social interaction as well as the cognitive representations and strategies involved in discourse production or understanding (van Dijk, 1990, p. 164). Since social representations are largely learnt and altered through text and talk, discourse analysis may be an effective instrument to uncover embedded contents, structures and strategies of SRs (van Dijk, 1990, p. 165). Similarly, some approaches to discourse analysis, like van Dijk’s (1997b), focus on discourse as social practice. Referring to analysts, like van Dijk (1997) and Burman and Parker (1993), Ainsworth (2001) states that they shed light on “how discourse users enact or resist social and
political structures, an attention to the ways in which social members interpret, categorize and construct their social experience and the use of interpretive and reflexive styles of analysis” (p. 30). This enhances the social and cognitive dimensions of discourse analysis.

It is worth noting that discourse analysis has basically a social dimension. Discourse analysis provides an instrument of exposing the social practices as well as the conventional meaning structures of social life (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 6). The motivation behind analyzing discourse is the interest in social inequality and power relationships between individuals or groups (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 6). In this context, all aspects of meaning-making are acts of construction. One of these acts of construction is social categorization since human language portrays people with various categories that seem ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’ (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 13). The attribution of meaning to discursive interactions is not a neutral or value-free process (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 13).

Discourse analysis has also political and cultural dimensions. Since language simultaneously reflects and constructs context or the situation in which it is used (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995), such situations involve political and sociocultural aspects. Based on the views of Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995), Gee (1996) and Luke (1995), Gee (1999) points out that the political aspect focuses on the distribution of 'social goods' in a communicative act, like power or status, or any other aspects that are considered by participants, as 'a social good' based on their cultural models (p. 83). As for the sociocultural aspect, and inspired by linguists, like Agar (1994), Gee (1992), Palmer (1996) and Sperber and Wilson (1989), Gee (1999) states that it involves “the personal, social and cultural knowledge, feelings, values, identities, and relationships relevant in the interaction, including, of course, sociocultural knowledge about sign systems, activities, the world, and politics” (p. 83). This unveils both the political and socio-cultural facets of discourse analysis.

At this level, it is worth noting that studies on discourse differ in their focus and approach, and hence they may be descriptive or critical studies. Discourse analysis may adopt a critical perspective of language in use, or Critical Discourse Analysis. After defining discourse, identifying its genres and emphasizing the social, cognitive, cultural and political dimensions of discourse analysis, it is relevant to focus on the critical facet of discourse, or CDA.
2.2.2 CDA

The present sub-section defines CDA, gives a historical account of CDA, highlights the different approaches to it, enumerates its principles as well as aims and uncovers the possible links between CDA and Cognitive Linguistics. It also reveals the connection between CDA, ideology and presupposition.

2.2.2.1 Definition

CDA can be defined in various ways and from different perspectives. Generally, CDA is not a method or a theory, but “a movement of - theoretically very different - scholars who focus on social issues and not primarily on academic paradigms” (van Dijk, 2004b, p. 26). More specifically, CDA is a special approach to the study of text and talk that emerged from Critical Linguistics, critical semiotics and, generally, from a socio-political way of analyzing language, discourse and communication (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 17).

CDA is also defined as a highly context-sensitive, democratic approach that analyzes discourse with an ethical stance that focuses on social issues and aims to improve society (Huckin, 1997, p. 87). It deals with written and spoken discourse to uncover the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias in social, political, historical and economic contexts (van Dijk, 1988; McGregor, 2003). CDA strives to uncover power imbalances, non-democratic practices and other injustices so as to stimulate recipients to corrective action (Huckin, 1997, p. 88). Wodak (2001) points out, in this respect, that it is “concerned with analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (p. 2). In short, CDA is analyzing discourse with a stance.

Similarly, CDA is defined as an interdisciplinary approach to language study with a critical point of view for the purpose of studying language behaviour in natural speech situations (Wodak, 1989, p. xv). Discourse analysis can critically evaluate communication within socio-cultural context (van Dijk, 1991). CDA thus treats language as a kind of social practice among other types of practices, such as visual images, gestures, music etc. (Kress, 1990; Dellinger, 1995). Indeed, CDA is “itself anchored in a discourse, a way of constructing the process of meaning-making in society” (Locke, 2004, p. 6). Such meaning-making is critical, interdisciplinary and context-sensitive (van Dijk, 2012; Wodak, 1996, 2001). After defining CDA, one can give a historical account of CDA and highlight the most important founding fathers who developed this field.
2.2.2.2 History of CDA

The development of CDA witnessed different important stages. In the mid-1960s, there was a noticeable shift in humanities and social sciences with the emergence of several new interrelated inter-disciplines, such as psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, semiotics, pragmatics and discourse (van Dijk, 2007, p. 19). Since discourse was stemmed from different disciplines in humanities and social sciences, one can speak about a new ‘cross discipline’ or a ‘trans-discipline’ (van Dijk, 2007, p. 19). Linguists found out that language use could not be reduced to abstract and isolated sentences, like in generative and structural grammars. Consequently, textual structure analysis went beyond the sentence. Such an approach merged with other approaches to pave the way for a more empirical analysis of actual language use (van Dijk, 2007, p. 19). Apart from discourse analysis and linguistics, the 1960s witnessed the appearance of a new inter-discipline, namely pragmatics. Such a discipline was based on the works of Austin (1962), Searle (1969) and Grice (1975) who focused on language use beyond grammar (van Dijk, 2007, p. 19).

At the beginning of the 1970s, cognitive psychology was developed by going beyond the limitations of the study of words and sentences. More focus was on the study of the understanding, production and memory of discourse (van Dijk, 2007, p. 20). The study of the cognitive basis of such discursive analysis became very known via the works of van Dijk (1972, 1977, 1980, 1989). An influential notion in this new research in cognitive psychology was ‘mental models’ which were introduced as “a representation of events and situations in ‘episodic memory’ (the record of all our personal experiences)” (van Dijk, 2007, p. 20). Similarly, Artificial Intelligence, or the role of knowledge in discourse processing, contributed to such achievements in the field. Knowledge was introduced in the form of mental scripts of prototypical episodes (van Dijk, 2007, p. 20). The work, carried out in cognitive science, widely affected research in linguistics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics and literature.

The period between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s was characterized by common interest in naturally occurring language use and focus on larger units instead of isolated words or sentences (van Dijk, 2007, p. 21). Likewise, it witnessed the extension of linguistics by focusing on the study of action and interaction and semiotics, or the non-verbal aspects of communication. It was also characterized by the focus on dynamic cognitive or interactional moves, the study of social, cultural and cognitive contexts of discourse and other linguistic
phenomena, like speech acts, anaphora, coherence, mental models as well as other discursive aspects (van Dijk, 2007, p. 21). In addition, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of a new form of discourse analysis that focused on the role of language in structuring relations of power in society (Wodak, 2001, p. 5). This new orientation of research in the study of discourse was introduced by Fowler, Kress, Hodge and Trew via their book *Language and Control*, that was first published in 1979 (van Dijk, 2007, p. 22).

In the 1980s, this focus on discourse, society and power relations was further developed by Fairclough (1989) in the UK, Wodak (1989) in Austria and van Dijk (1993) in the Netherlands (van Dijk, 2007, p. 22). The works of Kress and Hodge (1979), Fowler et al. (1979), van Dijk (1985), Fairclough (1989) and Wodak (1989) explained and illustrated the main principles and procedures of what was then known as Critical Linguistics (or CL). By the 1990s, CDA was used instead of CL, and Kress (1990) identified the different work criteria of critical discourse analysis paradigm. These criteria were further developed by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) who established ten basic principles of a CDA program (Wodak, 2001, p. 5). It is important to note, in this context, that Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar (or SFR) provided the theoretical groundwork of CL and CDA (Wodak, 2001; Chilton, 2005; Hart, 2011). In this regard, Wodak (2001) argues that “systematic grammatical devices function in establishing, manipulating and naturalizing social hierarchies” (p. 6). In other words, these grammatical devices can be used to uncover linguistic structures of power in texts.

The works of van Dijk and Fairclough represent landmarks in CDA. First, van Dijk’s (1977, 1981) prior works in text linguistics and discourse analysis revealed his interest in discourses as social practices (Wodak, 2001, p. 7). In addition, van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) highlighted the relevance of discourse to the study of language processing. In critically analyzing discourses that embed prejudice, van Dijk’s aim was “developing a theoretical model that will explain cognitive discourse processing mechanisms” (Wodak, 2001, p. 7). He shed light on racism and ideology in discourse (van Dijk, 1998, p. 200). Second, Fairclough (1989) elaborated the social theories, aims and methods of analysis on which CDA is based (Wodak, 2001, p. 6). Fairclough (1992, 1995) further developed his approach to CDA by explaining how the analytical framework can relate language to power and ideology. He also explained how the language of mass media “is scrutinized as a site of power, of struggle and also as a site where language is apparently transparent” (Wodak, 2001, p. 6).
Since the 1980s and to present, CDA has developed in a noticeable way. By the end of the 1980s, CL’s objectives, research interests, angles and methods of analysis became clearer than before (Wodak, 2001, p. 7). Wodak (1989) also listed and explained the most relevant characteristics of CL. Subsequently, a variety of research projects contributed to the development of an integrated theory of CDA (Wodak, 2001, p. 7). Studies by Wodak and van Dijk focused on discursive reproduction of racism and anti-Semitism in political discourse, the press and textbooks (van Dijk, 2007, p. 7). Nowadays, more critical approaches to language, discourse and interaction can be conducted in various disciplines (van Dijk, 2007, p. 22). CDA has recently been developed by van Dijk into Critical Discourse Studies (or CDS), as studies that describe and explain discourse in social and political contexts (van Dijk, 2015c, p. 3). Similarly, van Dijk’s term ‘Socio-Cognitive Discourse Studies’ (or SCDS) refers to a multidisciplinary type of CDA that links discourse structures to social structures via a cognitive interface (van Dijk, 2015c, p. 3). After defining CDA and reviewing its history, it seems to be important to distinguish the different schools of CDA.

2.2.2.3 Approaches to CDA

As far as methodologies are concerned, there are several frameworks of CDA analysis, mainly the discourse-historical approach, Frankfurt school, French school, post-structuralist school as well as the socio-cultural and socio-cognitive approaches to discourse.

2.2.2.3.1 Discourse-historical approach

In the discourse-historical approach, context is understood historically (Meyer, 2001, p. 22). Wodak’s approach is based on viewing discourse as a number of complex, simultaneous, sequential and interrelated linguistic acts (Meyer, 2001, p. 21). Wodak opts for developing conceptual instruments that are essential for specific social problems. Her approach tackles the field of politics by attempting to develop conceptual frameworks for political discourse (Meyer, 2001, p. 22). Wodak is strongly committed to a pragmatic approach. She highlights the challenge to explain the contradictions and tensions between nations and supranational entities at several levels, such as economy, technology, communication, science etc. (Wodak, 2001, p. 64). Committed to CDA, the discourse-historical approach joins the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory. It attempts to integrate a large amount of existing knowledge about historical sources and the social and political backgrounds embedded in discourse (Wodak, 2001, p. 64).
Like other approaches, the discourse-historical approach is inter-disciplinary, problem-oriented and eclectic. Indeed, several theories and methods are merged to understand and explain what is investigated (Wodak, 2001, p. 69). Inter-discursivity means “a hybrid mixture of different discourses and genres in a given text and can be established through lexical traces” (Koller, 2009, para. 14). As a problem-based approach, the discourse-historical analysis transcends, according to Reisigl and Wodak (2001), the purely linguistic dimension to focus on the historical, sociological, political or psychological dimensions in discourse analysis and interpretation (as cited in Koller, 2009, para. 8). Likewise, the approach is abductive since the movement back and forth between theory and empirical data is mandatory (Wodak, 2001, p. 70). In this respect, discourse is historical in the sense that it does not mean diachronic study of texts over a period of time, but it connects discourse to its context, or the historical moment of its production, distribution and reception (Koller, 2009, para. 8). That is why social theories are also integrated to explain context (Wodak, 2001, p. 64).

This approach seems to be relevant to the present study because it relates discourse to context. It also uncovers the social dimension, the ideological background as well as the historical moments that may influence the speaker’s discourse.

2.2.2.3.2 Frankfurt School

The Frankfurt School is also known as the Institute of Social Research, and it is situated in Frankfurt, Germany. The aim behind the foundation of this school was the development of Marxist studies in Germany (Corradetti, 2011, para. 1). Some linguists adhere to the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin and others (Corradetti, 2011, para. 3). Since the 1970s, the second generation of critical theorists has involved Habermas, Günther and many others, followed by a third generation represented in the influential work of Honneth. The fourth generation appeared at the beginning of the 21st century, and it was influenced by Forst (Corradetti, 2011, para. 3). The works of Adorno and Benjamin were initially read in literature and social sciences rather than in the new disciplines related to discourse (van Dijk, 2007, p. 21). Habermas (1981), however, was referred to in literature after discovering pragmatic theory (van Dijk, 2007).

The Frankfurt School is a philosophical movement of thought based on Critical Theory. The notion ‘critical’ can be understood as “having distance to the data […], taking a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research” (Wodak, 2001, p. 9). In 1930, Horkheimer suggested merging several methods of investigation to analyze
discourse (as cited in Wodak, 2001, p. 10). He presented the role of the theorist as helping to develop social consciousness (Wodak, 2001, p. 9). The main role of Critical Theory is to help remember the past, which is under the risk of being forgotten, strive for liberty, reveal the causes of struggle and identify the nature of critical thinking (Wodak, 2001, p. 9). New studies regarding text processing or discourse structures rarely focus on wider socio-political movements of opposition and counter-power that oppose social inequality (van Dijk, 2007, p. 21).

Critical Theory, thus, wants to quit naïve conceptions of knowledge-im partiality. In fact, “since intellectuals themselves are not disembodied entities reflecting from outside, knowledge can be obtained only from within a society of interdependent individuals” (Corradetti, 2011, para. 28). Likewise, Critical Theory distinguishes itself as a method that does not ‘fetishize’ knowledge, but considers it as functional to ideology critique and social emancipation (Corradetti, 2011, para. 29). Horkheimer and his followers refuted the notion of objectivity in knowledge since the object of knowledge is itself embedded into an historical and social process (Corradetti, 2011, para. 28). Whereas scientific theories produce a kind of objective knowledge, Critical Theory’s aim is human emancipation via self-reflection and consciousness (Corradetti, 2011, para. 32).

In short, the role of Critical Theory in understanding CDA is important since it highlights the importance of notions, like critical analysis and multidisciplinarity in processing discourse. The approach of the Frankfurt School can be relevant to the present research since it considers knowledge as non-objective and functional to ideology critique.

2.2.2.3.3 French School

Discourse analysis was developed in France in the 1960s. Pêcheux (1969) and Foucault (1969) were the pioneers who established French discourse analysis (Maingueneau, 2007, para. 4). In the 1970s, Pêcheux gathered a number of discourse analysts to form what was called the French School of Discourse Analysis (Angermüller, 2007, para. 6). The French discourse analysis is heterogeneous, highlighting two main trends, mainly Foucault’s archeology and Pêcheux’s discourse analysis. The school’s researchers are Marxists who were influenced by Althusser’s thoughts (Maingueneau, 2007, para. 7). Althusser’s doctrine studies how ideology is invested by language (Maingueneau, 2007, para. 8). Pêcheux’s approach has married Althusser’s Marxist theory of ideology (1971), and has stressed the ideological nature of language use (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 30).
Pêcheux rejects the idea of language neutrality or transparency. Words, therefore, change their meaning depending to the positions of language users (Pêcheux, Haroche, Henry & Poitou, 1979, p. 33). In addition, discourse meaning emanates from social struggle or discursive formations that are ideologically based and inter-discursively shaped and structured (Pêcheux, 1979, 1982). The text, according to Maingueneau (2007), “was considered to be a deceptive totality: its continuity had to be broken up to uncover the ‘other’, hidden discourse” (para. 10). In the 1970s, Pêcheux developed computer software that identified ideological processes in corpora, namely 'Automatic Discourse Analysis' (Maingueneau, 2007, para. 9). In a similar vein, and based on the thoughts of Pecheux (1969, 1982) and Guespin (1976), van Dijk (2001a) states that discourse studies are often presented as corpus-based since there is a clear orientation towards formal, quantitative, and automatic analysis of data, often intertwined with critical ideological analysis (p. 360).

At present, according to the French School, the analysis of any discourse is politically oriented. A few aspects are shared with current CDA (Maingueneau, 2007, para. 11). The French School is largely influenced by Marxism and psychoanalysis, whereas CDA is widely and deeply influenced by cognitive theories and concerned with issues, like ethnic prejudice and gender (Maingueneau, 2007, para. 11). The French School approach seems to be relevant because it rejects the idea that language is transparent or neutral. It is also important because it focuses on politically oriented discourse and the hidden agendas of language users.

2.2.2.3.4 Post-structuralist School

The post-structuralist school has its own views regarding language neutrality and discourse nature. Reviewing Foucault’s line of thought, Larsen (1997) emphasizes the all-pervasive nature of discourse since it pervades and shapes all social aspects (p. 18). In fact, Luke (1997) points out that, for Foucault, language and discourse are not neutral means, but they “effectively construct, regulate and control knowledge, social relations and institutions” (para. 8). Consequently, discourse represents independent impersonal power (Foucault, 1989; Larsen, 1997). In addition, discourses are both disciplinary and ’disciplining’ since they enable and precise the fields of knowledge and investigation, and control what can be thought, said or done in these fields (Foucault, 1989; Luke, 1997). For poststructuralists, ideology is part of discourse, and it is penetrated by discursive mechanisms.

Foucault sheds light on a social theory that emphasizes the relationship between discourse and power. This theory also stresses the role of discourse in transforming and changing society (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 39). Indeed, Patterson (1997) states that “the idea that something resides in texts awaiting extraction or revelation by the application of the correct means of interpretation is precisely the assumption that post-structuralism set out to problematize” (as cited in Locke, 2004, p. 35). Likewise, the relation of discourse to reality is described as active rather than passive because language constructs meanings for reality (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 41-2). In other words, according to Foucault, discourses make the world meaningful (Fairclough, 1992b; Locke, 2004). Reality, that is preceding language and shaping it, has changed to language preceding and shaping reality. Meaning is recognized as socially constructed through language and other sign systems (Foucault, 1989; Locke, 2004).

Discourse is largely used in social theory and analysis, especially by linguists, like Foucault, Althusser and Pêcheux. Discourse is used to demonstrate how language shapes and structures societal processes (Larsen, 1997, p. 14). Althusser connects discourse with power relations, more specifically class struggle. According to Larsen (1997), discourse is viewed by Althusser as “a direct reflection and communication of the state of the class struggle” (p. 14). Language is related to power in society, and discourse plays a central role in constituting identities as well as social beliefs (Foucault, 1989; Larsen, 1997). In addition, discourse is not only an entity derived from social power, but also –itself- an expression of social power (Larsen, 1997, p. 14).

In short, Foucault’s project can be relevant for the present research paper since it highlights the importance of ideology and discourse in social struggle, and offers an epistemological account of how discourse embeds knowledge that constructs reality.
2.2.2.3.5 Fairclough’s socio-cultural approach

Fairclough’s approach to CDA is socio-cultural. Fairclough’s approach introduces a middle-range theory focusing on social conflicts and their linguistic manifestations in discourse, like dominance, difference and resistance (Meyer, 2001, p. 22). CDA is the analysis of dialectical relationships between semiosis and other components of social practices (Fairclough, 2001, p. 123). This approach focuses not only on structure, but also on action. It is a problem-oriented framework that sheds light on the problems facing particular non-privileged categories under particular forms of social life (Fairclough, 2001, p. 123). It is, therefore, a theory or method that is interrelated with other social theories and methods. It should engage with them in a ‘trans-disciplinary’ rather than just inter-disciplinary way (Fairclough, 2001, p. 121).

This approach focuses on the social dimension of discourse. In fact, discourse is introduced as various representations of social life made by differently positioned social actors (Fairclough, 2001, p. 123). In other words, different perspectives of different social actors result in different discourses. Social order is constituted by social practices established or networked in a particular way (Fairclough, 2001, p. 124). For instance, some discourses are dominant while others are marginalized or categorized as oppositional or alternative discourses. Subsequently, the political concept of hegemony or dominance can be effectively used to analyze discourse orders (Fairclough, 2001, p. 124). CDA can, therefore, be categorized as a form of critical social science envisaged to solving the problems of people (Fairclough, 2001, p. 125). Likewise, CDA has emancipatory aims targeting poor people and socially excluded, marginalized or oppressed groups (Fairclough, 2001, p. 125).

These social aims can be reached via oscillating between a focus on structure and a focus on action (Fairclough, 2001, p. 126). It is worth noting that this version of CDA is based on Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics, which allocates importance to the virtue of being functional. Hallidayan grammar (1994) analyses language as formed and shaped by the social functions it has come to serve. This shows how social analysis categories connect to linguistic analysis categories (Fairclough, 2001, p. 126). For instance, the social practices performed by social actors establish a social order. This social order is based on power and hegemony according to class, gender, cultural and ethnic bases. The role of discourse is, therefore, uncovering relations of domination (Fairclough, 2001, p. 124). In this respect, CDA is defined as the “analysis of how texts work with socio-cultural practice” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 7). This enhances its socio-cultural dimension.
Fairclough’s approach is also important since it focuses on social practices, social order, power and dominance in discourse. Discourses delivered by Hillary Clinton, the representative of a superpower, may reflect her country’s hegemonic perception of weak non-democratic nations, in this case the Arab countries that took part in the Arab Spring.

2.2.2.3.6 Van Dijk’s socio-psychological approach

Van Dijk focuses on the socio-psychological side of CDA. He relies on a socio-cognitive theory and deals with linguistics from structural and functional perspectives (Meyer, 2001, p. 21). CDA should be based on a theory of context, along with different disciplines, hence CDA should be essentially diverse and multidisciplinary (van Dijk, 2001, p. 96). Unveiling its critical perspective, CDA is defined as discourse analysis with an attitude (van Dijk, 2001, p. 96). Cognition is given great importance in the analysis of interaction, communication and discourse (van Dijk, 2001, p. 97). Like the discourse-historical approach, the socio-cognitive approach is problem-oriented. Indeed, it focuses on social problems and the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse and dominance (van Dijk, 2001, p. 96).

Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach to discourse is multidisciplinary. Since social problems are complex, CDA needs a “historical, cultural, socio-economic, philosophical, logical or neurological approach, depending on what one wants to know” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 97). Reviewing van Dijk and Kintsch’s (1983) work, Beaugrande (1991) points out that the study of discourse needs “an interdisciplinary background and diverse scientific approaches: linguistic analysis, psychological laboratory experiments, sociological field studies, computer understanding of text and so on” (p. 265). Indeed, a range of analytic methods, involving textual, pragmatic and cognitive approaches, have been applied to political discourse and the critique of racist discourse in media and other areas (van Dijk, 1989, 1994; Chilton & Shäffner, 1997). Moreover, CDA has to take into account some structures, strategies and functions of text and talk, such as grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narrative, etc. (van Dijk, 2001, p. 97).

More specifically, the socio-cognitive approach stresses the cognitive dimension of CDA. Indeed, this approach enhances the idea that modern power has a major cognitive dimension (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 257). The management of the public mind is conceptualized in terms of social cognition. Socially shared representations and mental operations, like interpretation, thinking, arguing, learning, determine social cognition (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 257). According to Schank & Abelson (1977), knowledge plays a crucial role in such
cognitive processes via knowledge structures or ‘scripts’ (as cited in van Dijk, 1993b, p. 257). A little, however, is known about the structures and operations of social cognition, like opinion, ideologies, attitudes, norms and values (van Dijk, 1993b).

In short, van Dijk’s theories of ideology and knowledge, based on the discourse analytical approach, are multidisciplinary. They are manifested within a conceptual triangle that links society, discourse and cognition in the framework of critical discourse analysis. At this level, one has to explain the main principles on which CDA is based. These principles are clarified in the following sub-section.

2.2.2.4 Principles of CDA

The following criteria govern the field of CDA. First, CDA is problem-oriented because any approach has to effectively shed light on relevant social problems, like gender, racism and colonialism (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 17). Second, CDA is an explicitly critical position, approach or stance of analyzing discourse. It is not a school or a field or sub-discipline of discourse analysis. Third, CDA is mainly interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary focusing on socio-discursive relations, involving social cognition, politics and culture (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 17). Fourth, CDA is a sub-discipline of critical studies in the field of humanities and social sciences, like in political science, research on mass communication, law, literature, sociology and psychology (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 18). Fifth, CDA takes into account all levels and dimensions of discourse, mainly grammar, including phonology, syntax and semantics, rhetoric, style, speech acts, pragmatic strategies and schematic organization, as well as all dimensions of interaction, including semiotic aspects, such as gestures, music, sound, films, pictures, etc. (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 18).

Sixth, CDA is related to discursive structures and strategies of dominance and opposition in social relations of race, gender, ethnicity, class, language, age, religion, nationality and world-region (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 18). Seventh, much work in CDA highlights the role of ideologies in the reproduction of dominance and inequality as well as the production of resistance and counter-power. Eighth, CDA pays attention to discursive strategies of manipulation, legitimating and other methods to control minds and actions of the public to serve the interests of the dominant group. Ninth, CDA supports dominated groups by the enactment of counter-power or counter-ideologies in the form of challenge and resistance (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 18). These criteria draw the major lines of an approach that makes CDA different from other work on discourse (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 18). These principles explain the
bases on which CDA is built. They also give some clues about CDA goals, which are tackled in more details in the following sub-section.

2.2.2.5 Aims of CDA

The aim of CDA is not primarily contributing to a given discourse theory, school or discipline. CDA’s primary concern is stressing social issues so as to be better understood via discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 252). Most work on theories, descriptions and methods are elaborated for the achievement of this social objective. In this respect, critical discourse analysts often take a clear sociopolitical stance. They explicitly express their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within society at large (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 252). Their critical targets unveil the practices of power elites who support, legitimate, or neglect social inequality and injustice (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 252). Their goal is to reveal the real serious problems that endanger the lives of many people. This means that critical discourse analysts or scholars should be social and political scientists, social critics and activists (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 253). Based on Gee’s (1996) work, Locke (2004) states that the primary purpose of CDA is to make explicit the discourses embedded in texts, or what is implicit and invisible in discourse (p. 51).

Critical discourse analysts do not only focus on the imminent, serious or urgent issues. Analysts have more general insights, deeper understanding and indirect, long-term analyses of the reasons, circumstances and results of problems (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 253). Their main goal is to uncover the crucial role of discourse in the reproduction of inequality and dominance. In this respect, CDA’s success depends on its effectiveness and relevance through its contribution to change. This can be made clear through the large processes of change, like class struggles, movements of decolonization, the Civil Rights Movement and Women’s Movement (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 253). Critical discourse analysts carried on these movements in the 1990s by revealing persistent problems and social issues, like oppression, injustice and inequality. For instance, nowadays, critical discourse analysts focus on immigrants, refugees and other minorities who are subject to racism, discrimination and prejudice. They also evaluate the situation of women who suffer from male dominance, violence and sexual harassment (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 253).

The role of CDA is both constructive and deconstructive. It is constructive because it is applied to develop the critical and analytical capacities of discourse and social relations (Fairclough, 1992a; Luke, 1997). It is deconstructive since it aims to disrupt the themes and

The two previous sub-sections have illustrated the main principles and goals of CDA. The following sub-section uncovers the connection between CDA and cognition, in general, and CDA and Cognitive Linguistics, in particular.

2.2.2.6 CDA and Cognitive Linguistics

Cognitive Linguistics is a particular branch of linguistics that adopts a number of theories connected by some common assumptions (Hart, 2013, p. 404). Such theories involve Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), Frame Semantics (Fillmore, 1982), Force-Dynamics (Talmy, 1988) and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991) (Hart, 2013, p. 404). These principles are based on the ideas that linguistic knowledge is conceptual in nature, that meaning is grounded in experience, and that other lexical and grammatical constructions constitute experience (Hart, 2013, p. 404). Cognitive Linguistics has not been largely tackled in literature (Chilton, 2005, p. 21). Such a branch of linguistics is pattern-focused and hearer-oriented (Hart, 2013, p. 404).

A Cognitive Linguistics Approach (or CLA) can be currently recognized (Hart, 2011, p. 72). The main goal of CLA is showing the conceptual import of ideological language choices (Hart, 2013, p. 404). Its goal is also determining the specific parameters along which ideological differences in text and conceptualization may take place. The CLA to CDA demonstrates how ideology is reflected by linguistic constructions (Hart, 2013, p. 404). It also reveals how ideology is reproduced in discourse and society (Hart, 2013, p. 404). One of the main advantages of CLA is that it is not a distinct theory, but a perspective combining a number of theories (Hart, 2013, p. 404). Cognitive Linguistics theories are not, however, used in van Dijk’s works, in spite of the similarities between CLA and the socio-cognitive approach to CDA (Hart, 2011, p. 72).

Indeed, some concepts and notions in Cognitive Linguistics may serve the goal of the present research paper. Notions, like ICMs, categorization, frames and schemas, are of
paramount importance to conduct a socio-cognitive analysis of discourse. As a result, the following sub-section demystifies the link between cognition and discourse, more particularly ICMs and discourse.

### 2.2.2.6.1 Idealized Cognitive Models as categorization strategy

According to Lakoff, the notion of *prototype* is, conceptually and linguistically, a central characteristic of human categorization (as cited in Nuyts, 1993, p. 274). Idealized Cognitive Models (or ICMs) are the basic structure in human categorization (Lakoff, 1987, cited in Nuyts, 1993, p. 274). Lakoff divides image-schematic models into four mental models, mainly propositional, image schematic, metaphorical and metonymic models. Metaphoric and metonymic models always include propositional and image schematic models. Based on Lakoff’s line of thought, Nuyts (1993) defines *metaphoric model* as a “mapping between a propositional or image-schematic model in a source domain and one in a target domain” (p. 278). *Metonymic model* is, however, a mapping between aspects of a propositional or image-schematic model (Nuyts, 1993).

In the field of Cognitive Linguistics, categories are part of ICMs (Hart, 2011; Lakoff, 1987). ICMs are relatively constant and stable structures in the semantic memory of the speaker. They are built via experience, discourse, and consequently called upon in conceptualization to construe experience (Hart, 2011, p. 77). They are referred to as idealized because they are abstractions. Categories classify actions, events, processes, objects and entities into certain types or kinds (Hart, 2011, p. 77). In this respect, categories are presented as 'conceptual structures' that serve to distinguish phenomena. Categories are built via discourse, and thus they may be ideologically constructed by repeated applications of a label by discourse users with vested interests (Hart, 2011).

Categorization can be influenced by prototype effects (Hart, 2011; Lakoff, 1987). Following Lakoff’s (1987) view, Hart (2011) states that “a given classification is likely to be the prototype concept within the category, which is itself discursively constructed through repeated predications” (p. 78). For instance, the concept elicited by the word ‘immigrant’ seems to be that of an illegal immigrant. Certain categorizations may frame experience by evoking concepts that activate scripts or frames that are evaluation-laden (Lakoff, 1990; Hart, 2011). For example, ‘economic migrant’ activates a different frame from that of a ‘refugee’ (Hart, 2011, p. 78). In this respect, CDA draws attention to stereotyped categorizations in daily discourse and elite text and talk (Chilton, 2005, p. 24). It demonstrates how language users categorize behavior.
Notions, like frames, scripts and schemata, are closely related to categorization and clearly useful to reach the current research goal.

2.2.2.6.2 Frame, script and schema

A distinction between frame, script and schema has to be made. A frame is “a representation of whatever can figure as a topic or ‘subject matter’, or ‘referent’ within an activity” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 158-9). Frames, in this regard, represent “the entities which can be evoked or referred to in the activities represented by schemata”, whereas scripts are the subjects involved in such activities as well as their relationships (Fairclough, 1989, p. 159). While schema is a mental representation of a given type of activity that represents modes of social behavior, a frame represents the entities that populate the natural and social world (Fairclough, 1989). Frame, script and schema are, thus, part of a highly intricate network of mental representations (Fairclough, 1989, p. 159).

Framing is a very important notion in cognition. Framing is how entities, events, actions and processes are predicated with more or less positive qualities via categorization (Hart, 2011, p. 85). Framing depends on the individual’s general cognitive ability to compare experiences, and hence frames are evaluative scripts (Hart, 2011, p. 85). Group or self-schemata can generally explain how people evaluate, perceive and interpret the actions of other people (van Dijk, 1988, p. 130). Framing strategies shed light on actions, actors, relations and processes that constitute events (Hart, 2013, p. 405). These strategies focus on how these aspects carry different evaluative connotations or entailments (Hart, 2013).

Knowledge is prototypically structured in terms of frames. For instance, people’s knowledge about cars, houses, towns and schools is assumed to be prototypically organized in frames (van Dijk, 1983, p. 189). Likewise, beliefs can have a frame-like structure about, for example, God which can be similar to people’s knowledge structure about the president (van Dijk, 1983, p. 192). As far as text is concerned, framing refers to how the content of a text is presented and what kind of perspective or angle the writer is taking (Huckin, 1997, p. 91). In this context, scripts are portrayed by Schank and Abelson (1977) as abstract ways on which individuals organize their knowledge about stereotypical events, like shopping (as cited in van Dijk, 2004b, p. 8). Indeed, following Schank and Abelson’s (1977) line of thought, van Dijk (1987) states that scripts are considered as more general knowledge-representation formats, like the clusters of information we have about eating in a restaurant, going to a party, or taking a bus ride (p. 170). Frames, scripts and schemas are different notions.
stemming from categorization. They are relevant to show how some countries are categorized in terms of political systems, ideological backgrounds and religious beliefs.

2.2.2.6.3 Scalar adjustment

Scalar adjustment is another important concept borrowed from Cognitive Linguistics. Scalar adjustment is based on classifying an entity or a process at a particular point on a scale (Hart, 2011, p. 78). It is a cognitive process that consists of focusing one’s attention on more or less inclusive level of meaning. Such an adjustment can be qualitative, based on a scale of specificity, or quantitative, based on a measurable scale (Hart, 2011, p. 79). Ideologically, discourse producers may choose categories at varying levels of specificity to include certain social actors and exclude others from the scope of the predication (Hart, 2011, p. 79). Consequently, this concept can be relevant to the present study in that it may be used to categorize Arab countries in terms of a scale or varying degrees from old democracies, to new democratic countries, to totalitarian regimes.

2.2.2.6.4 Epistemic modality

Epistemic modality is reconsidered in this section as one of the notions of Cognitive Linguistics that can consolidate the socio-cognitive approach to CDA. In Cognitive Linguistics, epistemic modality establishes a reality-unreality scale. Based on Langacker (1991) and Werth (1999) views, Hart (2011) points out that expressions of epistemic modality elicit “a deictic construal operation in which propositions are conceptualized as located at different points on a reality-unreality scale in a metaphorical model of ‘epistemic distance” (p. 83). According to the conceptualizer, reality always evolves, and what forms known reality increases in complexity (Hart, 2011, p. 84). Known reality is, therefore, the collective state of affairs accepted by the conceptualizer as real, while unreality is anything else (Hart, 2011, p. 84). The accepted as real states of affairs are the affairs accessed to by the conceptualizer (C) at the same time of the discourse event, hence the states of affairs in ‘immediate reality’, or situational context (Hart, 2011, p. 84). The following figure illustrates the reality-unreality scale suggested by Langacker (1991, p. 242):
Epistemic modality is important in political discourse. Indeed, in political discourse text readers rarely have real, perceptual access to the political situations and events they read about. This explains why they only rely on what is reported to them in text (Hart, 2011, p. 84). In this regard, and based on Chilton’s (2004) thoughts, Hart (2011) states that “representations only get reproduced and retained in memory as ideologies when they are accepted by text-consumers as real” (p. 84). Indeed, text-producers highlight their conception of what is considered as real theory via the modal system (Chilton, 2004; Hart, 2011). This depends on the perceived legitimacy of the speaker (Chilton, 2004), which is itself constructed through modality (Hart, 2011, p. 84). Consequently, it can be emphasized that epistemic modality is a significant feature in political discourse (Chilton, 2004; Hart, 2011).

In short, Cognitive Linguistics may consolidate van Dijk’s socio-cognitive framework of discourse analysis since it reveals the mental state of the speaker and the categorization of entities relying on frames and mental scales. Ideological and stereotypical framing in political discourse is the main concern of the following section.

2.2.2.7 CDA and ideology

CDA is viewed as tainted by and productive of ideology (Fairclough, 1995, p. 74). In fact, discourse analysis ranges from the description of meaning-making and understanding in certain situations via critically analyzing ideology and accessing to meaning-systems and discourse networks (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 7). In this regard, CDA comprises analyzing how discourse serves the ideological interests of certain speakers or participants (van Rees, 2007, p. 1455). Indeed, a critical approach to discourse “foregrounds its concern with social constructionism and with the construction of ideology in particular” (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 34). Ideological structures are focally based on
the analysis of social discrimination, power relations and social inequality (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 34). The important role of discourse is the capacity to 'naturalize' ideologies by gaining the audience acceptance for them as normal, common sense and non-ideological (Fairclough, 1995, p. 27). CDA, however, 'denaturalizes' them by showing how discourse determines social structures and vice versa (Fairclough, 1995, p. 27).

Our identities, knowledge, belief systems and social relationships are established and determined by discourse (Fairclough, 1989; McGregor, 2003). CDA sheds light on how social relations, knowledge, identity and power are built via spoken and written texts (Luke, 1997; McGregor, 2003). Consequently, CDA “is concerned with the ways in which the power relations produced by discourse are maintained and/or challenged through texts and the practices which affect their production, reception and dissemination” (Locke, 2004, p. 38). In other words, CDA deals with the relationship between discourse and power which is reproduced by text and talk (van Dijk, 2001a, p. 363). More specifically, ideologies play a crucial role in CDA since they are viewed as interpretation frameworks that organize attitudes towards others in society (van Dijk, 1991). Ideologies establish the cognitive foundation for the attitudes of various groups in societies, and the furtherance of their interests and goals (Dellinger, 1995; van Dijk, 1991).

The concept of ideology is generally used by social sciences and media. Based on Marx and Engels conception of ideology, van Dijk (2006d) points out that its use is negative since it refers to “the rigid, misguided or partisan ideas of others” (p. 728). Indeed, the notion of ideology has embedded negative connotations portraying it as the opposite of objective knowledge. Ideologies legitimize power abuse by dominant groups. Such dominance is maintained by the authority of those who produce discourse (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 729). Dominated groups may also have ideologies of opposition and resistance (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 730). Subsequently, CDA analysts attempt to unmask the practices of dominant forces and aim to defend the victims or oppressed groups (Huckin, 1997, p. 88). In other words, CDA attempts to legitimize the claims of the marginalized and unveil the hidden agendas and self-interests of those in power (McGregor, 2003, para. 5). As such, Wodak and van Dijk connect the aspect ‘critical’ to the notion of dominance.

Unlike other implicit political studies of discourses, CDA explicitly composes its oppositional stance (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 19). It seems evident that CDA has an overtly political agenda (Fairclough, 1995). The primary role of CDA is the analysis of written or oral texts that seem to be politically and culturally influential to society (Huckin, 1997, p. 89).
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CDA, thus, attempts to work out interesting text features from a critical perspective, especially textual manipulations serving non-democratic purposes (Huckin, 1997, p. 89). In this context, it is stated that “the politics of language is real politics” (Cameron et al., 1992, p. 143). Power is not only a way to control the actions of other people, but also to control their minds discursively (van Dijk, 2004b, p. 25). As such, discourse is ideology-laden or ideology tainted since it is based on power relations as well as dominant and dominated ideologies or discourses (Fairclough, 1995; van Dijk, 2004b).

In short, ideologies control the discourses and other social practices of group members. They do so by controlling the ideological and social mental representations of people. Such mental control of people’s minds can be performed via presuppositions in discourse. This idea is further elaborated in the following sub-section.

2.2.2.8 CDA and presupposition

Presuppositions are common in political discourse (Huckin, 1997, p. 92). The study of different forms of implicit or indirect meanings is interesting for CDA researchers. Such implicit forms can be implications, allusions, vagueness or, in this case, presuppositions (van Dijk, 2001c, p. 104). They may be sincere or manipulative (Fairclough, 1989, p. 154). They can be manipulative because they are difficult to challenge (Huckin, 1997, p. 92-3). In other words, recipients hesitate to doubt about statements that the emitter appears to be taking them for granted (Huckin, 1997, p. 93).

Presuppositions may serve ideological functions. Presuppositions are ideological if they serve power and dominance (Fairclough, 1989, p. 154). They also appeal to background knowledge since implicit information and inferences in discourse processing are represented in mental models (See section 2.3.1.5.1 for more details). This explains presupposition, or the discourse’s unexpressed propositions in a model (van Dijk, 2004b, p. 10). Indeed, implicit information may be inferred from a text without being expressed explicitly by the text (van Dijk, 2001c, p. 104). This means that this information is part of the language user’s mental model, but not in the text itself. It is not directly or precisely asserted for several reasons that may be basically ideological (van Dijk, 2001c, p. 104).

To sum up, the present section defined discourse, discourse analysis and CDA. Focus has been on the history of CDA, the different relevant approaches to it, its principles and aims. More concern has been about CDA’s connection with presupposition and ideology. The link between ideology, politics and political discourse is the scope of analysis of the following sub-sections of the current PhD thesis.
2.2.3 Politics and ideology

The present sub-section focuses on politics, ideology and language, on the one hand, and political discourse, on the other hand. While studying political discourse, it seems pertinent to examine its properties as well as the connections between political discourse, ideology and political cognition.

2.2.3.1 Politics

One has to identify the difference between politics, political cognition and political ideologies. Politics is a social domain whose practices are virtually exclusively discursive, while political cognition is by definition ideologically based. As for political ideologies, they are largely reproduced by discourse (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 728). The field of politics is socially organized in terms of ideological differences, similarities and alliances (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 732). For instance, political campaigns, elections, propaganda and other political phenomena are deeply ideological (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 732). Another example is the division of social beliefs into Left and Right, and the struggle between them that results in polarizing political ideologies, and thus society (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 732).

Like other social situations, we need a cognitive interface between political situations and discourse. In fact, mental models of the political situation determine how participants “experience, interpret and represent the for-them-relevant aspects of the political situation” (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 733). Political actors clearly do not take part in political situations without having political knowledge, sharing political norms and values and eliciting political ideologies (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 733). Likewise, political contexts may be defined by certain settings and locations, like a parliament building, or special events, like meetings or debates. As for political discourses, they have the same function of political acts, like legislation, governing, defending a bill etc. (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 733).

Politics is a large domain that focuses on various political issues. Politics may involve both official and unofficial political events, settings, actors, actions, encounters and discourses (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 15). More than that, it includes political processes, like democratization, political systems, like democracy and communism, political ideologies, like liberalism, and political relations, such as hegemony or oppression (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 15). Moreover, a discursive political process not only includes the official administration, such as legislation, bureaucracy and governing, but also the larger domain of politics, mainly propaganda, media interviews, campaigning, canvassing and both influencing and being influenced by public opinion (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 22).
2.2.3.2 Language and politics

Language and politics are two fundamentally linked disciplines (Cap, 2008, p. 18). Language is defined by linguists as “an innate part of all human minds” (Chilton, 2004, p. ix). In the past, the language faculty was identified with syntax and perceived as sealed off from other mental capacities (Chilton, 2004, p. ix). However, due to the generative revolution that was led by Chomsky and based on generative grammar, and due to the cognitive revolution that was led by Fillmore, Langacker, Lakoff, Fouconnier and Jackendoff, and based on cognitive and mental dimensions, the mental capacity of language was connected with other mental capacities (Chilton, 2004, p. x). In the 1960s, Chomsky postulated that the human language faculty was an autonomous module of mind (Chilton, 2005, p. 25).

Politics is manifested in discourse at different levels. At the micro level, Chilton (2004) notices conflicts of interests, struggles for dominance and efforts at cooperation between individuals, genders and different social groups (p. 3). At the macro level, Chilton (2004) identifies the political institutions of the state that attempt to resolve conflicts of interests and may serve to ensure the power of a dominant person, such as a tyrant, or a group of people, like capital owners. Like micro-level behaviors, which are viewed as kinds of linguistic actions, or discourses, the macro-level institutions deliver specific types of discourses, like parliamentary debates. As such, politics has linguistic, discursive and communicative dimensions (Chilton, 2004, p. 4). Doing politics is “predominantly constituted in language” (Chilton, 2004, p. 6). In other words, politics cannot be done or conducted without language (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 206).

The cognitive aspect of language has to be highlighted. Based on Chomsky’s (1966, 1968) view, Chilton (2004) defines language as “a form of innate knowledge, alongside other forms of innate knowledge, or knowledge schemata” (p. 24). Reviewing Chomskian views, Chilton (2004) also argues that language is a “genetically transmitted component of the human brain” (p. 25). Likewise, language is viewed as being closely co-evolved with social and political practices or behavior. It has developed the capacity for recursive or repetitive meta-representations (Chilton, 2004, p. 26). Chilton (2004) suggests two principles to understand the link between language and cognition. The first is that language and political behavior are based on the cognitive endowments of the human mind rather than as social practices (Chilton, 2004, p. 28-29). The second principle considers language and social behavior as closely intertwined in a form of innately developing mental mechanisms resulting from 'evolutionary adaptations' (Chilton, 2004, p. 29).
In sum, politics, ideology and language are interrelated fields that clearly affect each other. However, one should investigate the mechanisms that govern politics and language, manifested in political discourse which is the main focus of the following sub-section.

### 2.2.3.3 Political discourse

Political discourse can be defined in various ways. *Political discourse* is “primarily seen as a kind of political action and a span of the political process” (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 20). At a primary level, political discourse is not identified by topic or style, but rather by who the speaker is, to whom she is speaking, as what, on what occasion and with what goal (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 225). It is also defined as a class of genres defined by a social domain, namely that of politics (van Dijk, 1998, 2006). Political discourse is simply the discourse of politicians and a form of institutional discourse (van Dijk, 2002a, p. 20). It must be delivered by the speaker when she plays the role of a politician in an institutional setting. In other words, discourse is political when it performs a political act in a political institution, like electoral campaigns, parliamentary debates, legislation, governing, decision making etc. (van Dijk, 2002a, p. 20). It is political because of its function in the political process (van Dijk, 1997e, 2002b).

Political discourse is ideologically controlled by political actors. Political discourse is influenced by ideologies via general social attitudes, more personal mental models of concrete events and context models (See section 2.3.1.4.2) of the communicative situation (van Dijk, 2002a, p. 24). Consequently, reviewing Fiske’s (1994) work, McGregor (2003) points out that “our words are politicized, even if we are not aware of it, because they carry the power that reflects the interests of those who speak” (para. 4). The discourse of people in power is taken as true and evident, whereas the words of those who are not in power may be rejected and considered as inappropriate and irrelevant (van Dijk, 2000a; McGregor, 2003). Dominant discourses interpret conditions, problems and events in favor of the elites’ interest. The discourse of the marginalized groups is, however, considered as a threat to the ideological interests and propaganda efforts of the elite (McGregor, 2003, para. 5).

Political discourse is influenced by elite institutions and influences foreign policy. First, political cognition and political discourse are a product of complex inter-elite influences, or other elite discourses, such as those of the mass media, ministries, state agencies, scholars and other experts (van Dijk, 1997c, p. 34). In this context, the goals of political discourse involve clarifying the understanding of issues by citizens, helping citizens to reach a judgment about
how to solve problems, boosting citizens’ contribution in political life and urging the future generations to be active social actors (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 291). Second, political discourse constitutes a foreign policy line framework (Larsen, 1997, p. 22). It is one possible source of foreign policy (Larsen, 1997, p. 21). In fact, approaches to discourse may offer a mechanism or a 'transmission belt' by which the international impulses are transmitted into policy. Such international impulses are internally translated through text and talk (Larsen, 1997, p. 22).

Like discourse analysis and CDA, political discourse analysis seems to be an inviting and fruitful field of research. Since the corpus of the present study is Hillary Clinton’s political remarks, it is important to uncover the underpinnings of political discourse analysis.

### 2.2.3.3.1 Political discourse analysis

*Political Discourse Analysis* (or PDA) is a critical approach to political discourse (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 11). Critical political discourse analysis focuses on the reproduction of political power and power abuse via political discourse. This also involves dealing with the different forms of counter-power or opposition against discursive dominance (Fairclough, 1995; van Dijk, 1997e). Locke (2004) states, in this regard, that critical researchers “tend to align themselves with a political agenda that is committed to challenging the relative power bases of competing discourses” (p. 37). As such, antagonism between different discourses is central since struggles occur between discourses, hence 'discursive antagonism' (Larsen, 1997, p. 20). Doing discourse analysis of political discourse is different from doing political analysis (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 37). The role of political discourse analysis is “to relate the fine grain of linguistic behavior to what we understand by ‘politics’ or ‘political behavior’” (Chilton & Schäffner, 1997, p. 211).

Most studies of political discourse are about the discourse of professional politicians as well as political institutions, like presidents, prime ministers, other government officials and parliament, or political parties. They study political discourse at the local, national and international levels (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 12). It is crucial, in political science and PDA, to account for not only political ‘actors’ or ‘authors’ who participate in political practices, but also the different recipients in political communicative events, like audience, people, citizens, the public and other groups (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 13). After defining political discourse and political discourse analysis, it is relevant to highlight the different properties of the political domain.
2.2.3.3.2 Properties of political domain

The current sub-section focuses on the main characteristics or properties of the political context or field. It is adapted from van Dijk’s (1997e, p. 16-18) approach.

- **Societal domain or field**: politics is an overwhelming domain that encompasses different aspects of politics. It plays a crucial role in defining political actions and discourse.

- **Political systems**: the commonsense categories of the field of politics, such as communism, democracy, dictatorship, fascism, social democracy, are generally perceived as typically political. Such systems are often construed as referring to the distribution as well as the organization of power.

- **Political values**: shared cultural values may be considered by political systems, like freedom which may be a political relationship as well as a political value that organizes political ideologies and attitudes. For instance, freedom, justice, independence or equality may be the determining values of ideological groups or categories.

- **Political ideologies**: political ideologies determine the socio-cognitive counterpart of these systems. They represent the belief systems that organize the shared social representations of groups.

- **Political institutions**: they organize the political field, actions and actors, like the state, governments, parliaments, congress, city councils and state agencies.

- **Political organizations**: they structure political action, like political parties, Non-Governmental Organizations and political clubs.

- **Political groups**: political actors may lead socio-political movements by forming groups of opponents, dissidents, demonstrators, coalitions and crowds.

- **Political actors**: they are all the activists who are engaged in political action, such as strikers, lobbyists and demonstrators.

- **Political relations**: they define how the state relates to its citizens, and how political groups relate to one another. Typical relations in the field of politics are power, power abuse, hegemony, oppression, tolerance, equality, inequality, etc.

- **Political process**: it categorizes the sequences of political actions, such as governing, opposition, agenda-setting, legislation, decision making and policies.

- **Political actions**: they are the concrete acts and interactions that are typical for the field of politics, like meetings of political organizations and institutions, voting, campaigning, revolutions, passing laws and demonstrations.
- **Political discourse**: it is the most common way of doing politics since political actions are generally discursive.

- **Political cognition**: the evaluation and interpretation of societal and political macro levels, political actors, actions and discourse are made by the various forms of political cognition, like political attitudes, the socially shared knowledge and the knowledge models of political events.

In sum, the characterization of political discourse as a genre does not rely on discourse properties only. It also takes into account the contextual features in terms of relevant systems, organizations, actors, settings and cognitions, among others (van Dijk, 1997e, p. 19). The link between political discourse and political cognition is clarified in what follows.

### 2.2.3.4 Political discourse and political cognition

The study of political cognition sheds light on the mental representations that political actors share (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 203). It focuses on different aspects of political information processing. More specifically, it “essentially deals with the acquisition, uses and structures of mental representations about political situations, events, actors and groups” (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 206). The main topics of such political cognition are how political beliefs are organized, how political candidates are perceived and how political judgments and decisions are made (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 206-7). It also deals with stereotypes, political group identity, public opinion etc. It covers other topics related to memory representations and the mental processes involved in political comprehension and interaction (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 207).

#### 2.2.3.4.1 The social dimension of political cognition

Political cognition has social facets or dimensions. Social memory consists of representations about knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, values and norms (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 218). Some of such representations are schematically organized in the social mind. They represent political knowledge that is mostly group knowledge and is considered by opposing groups as mere political opinion (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 219). Unlike personal knowledge, which is stored in episodic memory, socially or culturally shared knowledge, however, has to be general and abstract (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 220). Hence, socio-political knowledge resides in the social memory of the human mind.

To comprehend political discourse, one has to unveil the underlying political cognition of participants in a political interaction (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 224). Both personal and socially shared beliefs may be organized in different “schematic formats, clustered and assigned a
theoretical place in the overall architecture of the social mind” (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 224). Models form the mental background of all social interactions, more specifically discourse production and understanding (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 224). After unveiling the link between political discourse and political cognition and after highlighting the social dimension of political cognition, demystifying the processing mechanisms of political discourse seems to be a focal step to conduct the present study.

2.2.3.4.2 Political discourse processing

A cognitive discourse analysis stresses the idea that mental processes are constructive. Indeed, “the mental representations derived from reading a text are not simply copies of the text or its meaning, but the result of strategic processes of construction or sense-making” (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 18). In discourse production, speakers generally begin with their personal mental models of a given situation or event. Such models establish the subjective beliefs of the speaker about the situation (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 211). However, one has to distinguish personal knowledge and opinions, and socially shared knowledge and beliefs. In other words, a distinction has to be made between representations in Social Memory and personal models in Episodic Memory (See section 2.3.1.3 for more details) (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 211). Speakers selectively use a part of their models, mainly the information that is relevant in the actual context or situation (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 212). The same applies to discourse understanding, and hence such discourse processing reveals clear relations between political discourse and political cognition (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 212).

It is important to note that the participants’ models may differ at any moment of an ongoing debate or interaction. In other words, the mutual perceptions of speakers and hearers or the mental models they form about one another may change during a discourse (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 215). Consequently, some aspects of a contextual model are constantly shared by all participants, while some others are unstable throughout the communicative event. They dynamically change during the ongoing interaction (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 216). Context models are, therefore, dynamic and changing in verbal communication in particular (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 216). Context models are thus crucial for the understanding and production of political discourse. They show how the social situation and its interpretation are important for discourse and interaction (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 216). The cognitive processes of discourse include the “construction, activation, uses or changes of both event models and context models” (van Dijk, 2002b, p. 217) (See sections 2.3.1.4.2 for more details).
Political discourse processing necessitates the use of general and specific knowledge. Just like people need knowledge to produce and comprehend discourse, Members of Parliament make use of both general and specialized knowledge so as to participate as competent members in parliamentary debates (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 100). MPs have also beliefs, like personal opinions, group attitudes and ideologies. Indeed, “what they express or presuppose as knowledge, may well be considered an ideological opinion by their political opponents” (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 100). Only cultural Common Ground is presupposed by all members, independent of their political or ideological orientation (van Dijk, 1999, 2003a). In parliament, professional and specialized knowledge is presupposed, just like all epistemic communities (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 100). Only when conflicts or problems appear, such knowledge will be made explicit in commentaries or normative argumentation (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 100).

At this level, one has to investigate how discourse producers control the mental state of audience and cognitively influence them to achieve their goals.

2.2.3.4.3 Mind control

Politicians control the minds of people via political discourse. For instance, this takes place when politicians or journalists deprive others from legitimate forms of discourse (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 21). The enactment of social as well as institutional power can be manifested in the control over discourse and access to it (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 21). Those who possess power allow certain social actors to take part in verbal and physical action, while they prohibit it to others. They may even oblige others to engage in text and talk, and thus constrain the freedom of the less powerful social or political actors (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 21). Such control over discourse can also limit meaning, interpretation and comprehension. This means that powerful or dominant social actors control not only communicative actions, but also the minds of recipients (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 21).

Controlling the mind via text and talk is not a straightforward process. Indeed, studies on discourse interpretation, memory storage and other forms of information processing have revealed that these aspects depend on discourse and context properties. They also depend on the previous knowledge, attitudes or ideologies of recipients (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22). For instance, political propaganda and news reports may influence readers’ and hearers’ minds by conveying knowledge, affecting opinions or altering attitudes (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22).
However, if recipients possess a given extent of knowledge and beliefs, they “may disregard, reject, dis-believe, or otherwise mentally act in opposition to the intentions of powerful speakers or writers” (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22). In other words, addressees can oppose hegemonic discourse by rejecting falsified information.

Discourse can play a manipulative role in society and politics. Powerful speakers or writers may lie, manipulate, persuade, or affect hearers or readers against their best interests to promote the interests of the more powerful (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22). In this respect, manipulation can occur when the addressees lack alternative sources of information, or do not master the rules and strategies of grammar or text and talk (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22). Manipulated people may also lack sufficient knowledge to detect manipulation, deception and lies. Furthermore, they may not have strong 'counter-opinions' or 'counter-ideologies' to reject and oppose dominant discourses (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22).

CDA, subsequently, analyses the socially or morally illegitimate control of minds. Such illegitimate control especially takes place when addressers control the minds of others in a self-serving or self-interest way (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 22). Political propagandists, advertisers and journalists, for instance, “know how to effectively change the knowledge and opinions of recipients, and what kind of social actions will typically result from such mind control” (van Dijk, 1995a, p. 23). In this sense, social power depends on access to socially valued resources, like force, position, status, income, wealth, education and knowledge (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 254). A valuable power source is the special access to different genres, contexts or forms of discourse.

In addition, power can be manifested in a group’s control or dominance over other groups. In other words, a powerful group may control action and cognition of other groups by limiting the freedom of others to think and act (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 254). Consequently, “modern’ and often effective power is mostly cognitive and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to change the mind of others in one’s own interests” (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 254). The mind management of others is elaborated via text and talk. In this respect, CDA has to focus on the discursive strategies that legitimate such control, or naturalize the social order which is based on inequality (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 254). Thus, the control of knowledge crucially shapes people's interpretation of the world, as well as their discourse and actions (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 258).
Hegemony is when dominated groups accept dominance and act in the interest of dominant groups. Their minds are successfully influenced by powerful groups out of their own free will (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 255). The main aim of dominant discourses is manufacturing consensus, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 255). This would, subsequently, result in a social, political and cultural organization of dominance which “implies a hierarchy of power: some members of dominant groups and organizations have a special role in planning, decision-making and control over the relations and processes of the enactment of power” (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 255). These powerful or dominant groups are most of the time the elites of a given society. They control context and have special access to discourse (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 255). Access to discourse is the main focus of the following sub-section.

2.2.3.4.4 Discourse and access

Access to discourse is determined by dominance and power relations. The dominant groups’ power is based on the privileged access to discourse and communication (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 255). Language users’ freedom may be more or less delimited when it comes to the use of special discourse genres or styles, or when it comes to specific debates (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 256). Likewise, contributors may have more or less control over the discursive properties and the circumstances and consequences of discourse, like the setting, the presence of other contributors, modes of participation, general organization, turn-taking, agenda, topic, style etc. (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 256). In this respect, the analysis of different discourse modes of access shows parallelism between discourse access and social power. More specifically, “the more discourse genres, contexts, participants, audience, scope and text characteristics they (may) actively control or influence, the more powerful social groups, institutions or elites are” (van Dijk, 1993b, 256). This applies to presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, editors, judges, professors, doctors or police officers (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 256).

Ordinary people, however, lack access to discourse. Dominated groups only have access to everyday conversations with members of the family, friends or co-workers (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 256). Likewise, they may have passive access to professionals, like teachers, police officers and doctors. They may also be influenced participants or mere consumers or users of discourse, such as media audience. Counter-power may exist through some forms of communication and discourse, such as letters to the editor or carrying slogans in marches (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 256). Members of less powerful groups can be immorally or illegitimately restricted in their communicative acts. Discourses may, therefore, be constrained in many
ways due to institutional power sources, such as positions, professional expertise, or due to group membership, like males and whites (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 260). Public discourse is, therefore, a means of the social reproduction of such power (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 362).

A fully-fledged theoretical explanation of the enactment of social power via discourse needs a cognitive dimension (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 262). To distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate mind control, one has to be more explicit about how discourse can affect the mind (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 365). For instance, the strategic understanding in Short Term Memory (See section 2.3.1.2.1 for more details) can be managed via specific features of text and talk, like its visual representation, so that readers focus on some pieces of information more than others (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 365). This occurs in news reports, textbooks and other genres (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 366). As such, dominance and power over discourse are cognitive by controlling the minds of less privileged groups or other ideologies and epistemic communities.

From a political angle, political control includes information control, and hence political discourse control (Chilton & Shäffner, 1997, p. 212). For instance, secrecy is a strategy of preventing audience from receiving or having access to information. It is different from censorship since the latter refers to preventing people from giving information (Chilton & Shäffner, 1997, p. 212). In addition, political actors behave in a coercive way via discourse in “setting agendas, selecting topics in conversation, positioning the self and others in specific relationships, making assumptions about realities that hearers are obliged to at least temporarily accept in order to process the text or talk” (Chilton & Shäffner, 1997, p. 212). Politicians, for example, exercise, confirm and reproduce their political power via public discourse. Likewise, power may be exercised via controlling others’ use of language by various kinds and different degrees of censorship and access control (Chilton & Shäffner, 1997, p. 212). In short, power and dominance are determined and measured by groups’ access or control over discourse (van Dijk, 1993b, p. 257).

In sum, access to and control of discourse depend on and constitute the power of a group. This may have an impact on limiting freedoms, threatening democracy and violating human rights. The following section highlights the main principles and aims of democracy and human rights in both democratic and non-democratic countries.
2.2.4 Democracy and human rights

Thomas Jefferson and other founding fathers of the American Republic think that political discourse is the heart of democracy (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 292). Indeed, political discourse is a method of decision making in a democratic system (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 292). Jefferson and the founders of the American democracy anticipated that the clash between political discourses of opponents would clarify issues for citizens and influence the quality of their collective decision making (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 292). Moreover, James Madison describes political discourse as containing “open-minded consideration of other points of view [and] keeping conclusions tentative by realizing that one’s current knowledge is not the whole truth” (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 292).

In 1748, Montesquieu explored the relationship between people and the various forms of government. Dictatorship is based on the fear of the ruled, while monarchy survives on the loyalty of the public. A third form of government is a free republic that survives on the virtue of people (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 293). Montesquieu established a moral bond according to which people act to boost the common good and decide on the destiny of their society. Such a moral bond necessitates the contribution of citizens in their own governance as well as 'a common set of values' (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 293). Contribution consists of both “engaging in political discourse and seeking out and valuing the participation of all other citizens, especially when their views conflict with one’s own” (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 293). These values were mentioned in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, such as justice, liberty and equality.

Democracy and human rights have become matters of political engagement. Developmental theorists, like Erikson, Lovinger and Piaget, suggested that “political commitments and the acquisition of a political ideology were key indicators of identity formation and cognitive growth” (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 295). Every generation has, therefore, to develop a commitment to democracy as well as a moral bond with other citizens to contribute and engage in political discourse. The aim is to emphasize the common good of their society and shape its destiny (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 294). Up to the present, democratic forms of government and equal rights have spread pervasively worldwide (Johnson & Johnson, 2000, p. 294).

After stressing the relevance of Presupposition Theory, epistemic modality and CDA to the present PhD research, it is necessary to tackle van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach. Focus has to be on the cognitive mechanisms, ideological representations and shared knowledge of discourse participants.
2.3 Cognition, Knowledge and Ideology

The present section studies the cognitive representations and mechanisms that govern discourse, the ideological background of discourse and how ideologies are represented via mental models and knowledge manifestations.

2.3.1 Cognition

The current sub-section focuses on the concept of Cognitive Pragmatics and describes the cognitive system and its components. More emphasis has to be on van Dijk’s (1995, 1998) cognitive framework. Social cognition, including mental and context models, is tackled within van Dijk’s framework. The intentionality of the speaker in communicative events is also studied.

2.3.1.1 Cognitive Pragmatics

Cognitive Pragmatics is one of the pragma-linguistic fields that studies language from a cognitive perspective. Cognitive Pragmatics focuses on the mental processes involved in intentional communication (Bosco, 2006, p. 71). To understand and uncover the actor’s communicative intentions, the addressee has to recognize and play a 'behavior game' proposed by the actor (Bosco, 2006, p. 72). The interlocutor has to recognize the difference between the explicitly expressed mental states of the actor and those implicitly hidden (Bucciarelli, 2003, cited in Bosco, 2006, p. 73). Agents or actors must be intentionally engaged in this communicative act. Such an analysis of the mental states of participants in communicative interaction is the main concern of Cognitive Pragmatics (Bara, 2011, p. 443). Cognitive Pragmatics is, therefore, related to pragmatic knowledge of language use.

Communication is defined as a cooperative activity, in which, two agents together consciously and intentionally construct the meaning of their interaction (Bara, 2011, p. 443). Participants share background knowledge or mental states, lying at both the surface and depth of language and thought (Bara, 2011, p. 443). These mental states are 'mental spaces' shaped by the interlocutors to map the world around them (Marmaridou, 2000, p. 118). As such, this pragmatic theory presents rules for pragmatic interpretation (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 213). Based on Bucciarelli’s (2003) thoughts, two cognitive factors may influence different pragmatic phenomena, mainly the 'inferential load' and the 'complexity of mental representations' involved in the understanding of a communicative act (Bosco, 2006, p. 72). After defining Cognitive Pragmatics, one can proceed to focus on the cognitive system and its main components.
2.3.1.2 The cognitive system

A description of the cognitive system and its operation in sentence parsing, understanding and processing is crucial as a first step to uncover the mechanisms of the human cognition (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 73). The information processing approach suggests that the perception and acquisition of linguistic input may be studied in terms of a series of steps during which certain mechanisms perform some elementary operation (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 73). Theories attempt to represent the flow of events in that cognitive system in terms of a flow diagram where blocks represent component processes, where each component is labeled according to its function (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 73). This can be illustrated in the following figure:

![Information-Flow Diagram of the Cognitive System](image)

*Figure 3. Information-Flow Diagram of the Cognitive System, adopted from Bower & Cirilo (1985, p. 74)*

The components of the cognitive system are classified into a sensory system, a response system, a Long-Term Memory (or LTM) and a central process, including a Short-Term Memory (or STM) and a working memory. The active processes of perceiving, memorizing, thinking and deciding occur in such a central processor (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 74). These components are studied in details in the following sub-sections.
2.3.1.2.1 Short-Term Memory

The first component of the cognitive system is the Short Term Memory (or STM). The STM is the active part of the central processor that holds the internal symbols currently in the focus of attention (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 75). There are many characteristics of STM. First, it is the active part of the memory system. Second, the processor can have access to STM items faster than LTM items. Third, STM opts for keeping the surface perceptual properties of the stimuli and their temporary order. A stimuli is a sequence that the memory system recognizes as a familiar single unit for which an internal code already exists in memory. Finally, STM has a very limited capacity, so it has to be emptied regularly (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 75).

The capacity of STM only deals with four to seven ‘chunks’ or stimulus patterns of information. The perceptual system captures the simplest highest level description of the input sequence (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 75). This kind of memory is, therefore, responsible for saving representations about the ongoing conversation and about participants’ knowledge about the actual communicative act (Bower & Cirilo, 1985; van Dijk, 1998). One, however, inquires about the function of the other components of the cognitive system, mainly the working memory.

2.3.1.2.2 Working memory

The second component of the cognitive system is the working memory. A working memory, or an intermediate-term memory, refers to memory structures that maintain information about the local context that is not the focus of active memory, or LTM (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 76). It builds and sustains an internal model of the immediate place and events of the past few minutes. Such an internal and local model helps as a context, or a framework, where dynamic changes can be recorded (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 76). In terms of text or discourse processing, working memory sets a list of foregrounded topics and a list of the referents previously mentioned in the text in order to find connections for new statements and expressions (Bower & Cirilo, 1985). After studying the function of working memory, one has to examine the LTM’s role in the human mind.

2.3.1.2.3 Long-Term Memory

The third component of the cognitive system is the Long-Term Memory (or LTM). LTM is considered “the repository of our more permanent knowledge and skills” (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 76). It mainly contains currently unused things in our memory. It includes our
knowledge about language, objects, people, events as well as our perceptual-motor skills (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 77). STM and LTM are two different states or levels of activation of the same memory schemata (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 75). How these components work together in discourse production and processing is clarified in the following sub-section.

2.3.1.2.4 Mind control system

Another component of the cognitive system is the mind control system. Its role is supervising the processing in STM, guiding effective search in LTM, activating episodic and semantic knowledge and situation models, collating higher and lower order information and coordinating strategies (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 290). Consequently, this control system runs strategies to produce information and representations that are consistent with the overall goals of understanding. It is important for incorporating all the information that the short-term buffer cannot save (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 291).

Memory is defined as “a by-product of processing”, and it retrieves things depending on the elaboration and depth of such processing (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 289). In this regard, there are three interacting memory systems, mainly the sensory register, text memory and long-term memory. The first briefly holds incoming perceptual information and makes it available to the central processor (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 290). The second involves the surface memory, the propositional text base, the macrostructure and the situation model. The third includes general knowledge and personal experiences. The central processor is surrounded by these three types of memory and connected to them by the control system (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 290).

All cognitive operations, except retrieval, occur in the central processor (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 291). According to the majority of discourse processing models, language users gradually build representations of the text in episodic memory during its comprehension, involving surface, semantic and pragmatic information and more complex schematic superstructures (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 290). The following figure illustrates the previously mentioned components of the cognitive system:
Figure (4) shows that general knowledge, episodic memory, lexicon, frames and goals are stored in LTM. Mental scripts are saved and stored in LTM, but STM retrieves and activates these mental models to be used in discourse (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 291). The mechanisms of the cognitive system are elaborated in the following section of the present thesis.

2.3.1.2.5 Mechanisms of the cognitive system

The main concern of cognitive psychology is to distinguish the different types of knowledge, how knowledge is accessed, represented, organized and used (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 77). In this context, two representational methods can be mentioned, namely associative networks and production systems. First, associative network is the most common method of representing information. The essential elements of the memory are concepts, or nodes and symbols and relations between these concepts (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 77). Concepts are, thus, represented as nodes, while relations between concepts are labeled 'arcs', 'arrows', or associations between 'nodes' (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 78). The representation of an event in memory takes place as a cluster of propositions that describe the features of that event. Such features are recorded and saved in memory by creating new associative connections among newly taken nodes of the concepts (Bower & Cirilo, 1985).
Second, production, is another representational mechanism that is based on an IF-THEN rule. It states that in case a specific condition arises, then a particular action has to be taken. For example, “IF you drive up to a stop sign at a road intersection, THEN brake your car to a stop” (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 77). So, the actions may be internal or external moves in the memory, like fetching a memory location, looking up referents from memory, or activating other concepts in STM. This leads to control the flow of thought, solve problems and follow plans (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 77). Production, therefore, forms the ‘motor’ that moves the knowledge engine through its skilled paces (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 77).

Consequently, the representation of knowledge, its use in text processing and the operation of the cognitive system are major topics in cognitive psychology. This theoretical framework within pragmatics seems to be relevant to the present research due to the clear relationship between Cognitive Pragmatics, factive presupposition and socio-cognitive discourse analysis. This latter is the main focus of the following sub-section.

2.3.1.3 Van Dijk’s (1988) cognitive framework

Van Dijk’s (1988) cognitive framework is summarized in the following points.

1- Cognitive representations and structures are relative to an abstract mental structure called ‘memory’.

2- The actual processing of information occurs in STM and uses the information stored in LTM.

3- A distinction must be made between Episodic Memory, which stores personal experiences resulting from information processing in STM, and Semantic Memory in LTM, which stores more general, abstract and socially shared information.

4- Information in LTM is arranged in terms of mental representations as scripts or schemas that consist of a number of fixed categories. Such schematically organized social knowledge may be knowledge about politicians, parliamentary debates, elections, political propaganda or political demonstrations.

5- Knowledge is the organized mental structures of shared factual beliefs of a group or culture. The truth criteria of such beliefs are verified by such a group or culture.

6- Group attitudes, ideologies, norms and values are other socially shared information. Unlike knowledge which is defined as factual objective true beliefs, attitudes are defined as evaluative and subjective.

7- Attitudes and ideologies are arranged in terms of characteristic schemas.
8- The architecture of Social Memory is based on Common Ground of socio-cultural beliefs. Each social group builds its group knowledge and opinions on the basis of such a cultural Common Ground.

9- Personal experiences are represented in mental models in Episodic Memory and organized in schematic structure.

10- Models are subjective because they are the personal interpretation (knowledge and opinion) of specific events.

11- Models are the cognitive basis of all individual discourse and interaction.

12- Models integrate new information, fragments of earlier experiences, instantiations of more general personal information and of socially shared information.

13- Models may form the basis for experiential social and political learning since social and political knowledge may be acquired from abstract and general discourse.

In sum, discourse production and comprehension can be cognitively analyzed according to this conceptual framework. Apart from its cognitive facet, cognition has a social facet.

2.3.1.4 Social cognition

Apart from being personal, cognition has a clear social dimension. Social cognition is defined as “a socially shared system of SRs; a system which [...] includes a set of strategies for their effective manipulation in social interpretation, interaction and discourse” (van Dijk, 1990, p. 166). The social nature of discourse is tackled within the framework of social cognition (van Dijk, 1988, p. 13). Indeed, cognitive representations and processes “are not ‘pure’ mental phenomena of individual people, but also have important social dimensions, which have been neglected in cognitive psychology” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 130). Such cognitive processes are socially embedded, which may influence not only their nature, but also both the contents and structures of mental representations (van Dijk, 1988, p. 130). Beyond knowledge, other forms of social cognition exist, like the schemata of socially shared opinions (van Dijk, 1995e, p. 15).

The social nature of cognition can be explained by many factors. Representations are social because cognitions are about social groups, classes, structures or social issues (van Dijk, 1990, p. 166). Following Brown and Turner (1981) and Moscovici (1982), van Dijk (1990) points out that representations are also social because “they are acquired, changed and used in social situations; that is, they are cognitions that are shared by all or most members of a group” (p. 166). Text and talk show their social embedding via the social positions of
language users, their categorizations as social group members, or their ideological backgrounds. Moreover, representations demonstrate such social embedding through the contextualization of language use in certain social situations and institutions (van Dijk, 1988, p. 132). In sum, the social dimension of cognition stems from its shared nature.

Social representations (or SRs), like attitudes about other groups, strategically control our construction of models. SRs also control our production and understanding of discourse as well as the contribution to other forms of social interaction (van Dijk, 1988, p. 143). The knowledge that discourse participants have about discourse rules and grammar is socially shared, so that mutual understanding is possible (van Dijk, 1997d). Apart from individual cognition, discourse encompasses socio-cultural cognition (van Dijk, 1997d, p. 17). Since discourse structures are analyzed, understood and produced cognitively, “the manifestation of discourse is also under the control of (social) cognition” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 149). In short, both discourse and cognition have personal and socio-cognitive facets.

Social cognition is the cognitive interface between society and discourse. Indeed, “the social power of dominant groups and their members can be expressed, enacted, or legitimated in discourse only through ideologically framed social cognitions” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 129). This means that power does not have direct access to discourse. It rather needs cognitive mediation, like ideology, social knowledge, attitudes as well as models of social situations. It is mediated by the strategies that connect all these various representations (van Dijk, 1988, p. 129). More specifically, the shared representations of power in social cognitions of group members provide the link that connects social power with social discourse (van Dijk, 1988, p.133). In short, social control presupposes cognitive control, which is mediated via discourse.

The socio-political dimension of cognition and discourse should also be emphasized. The cognitive structures we deal with are social, as is the case of knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values (van Dijk, 2005, p. 87). Cognitively monitored interactions are linked to other important social dimensions, such as those of group dominance and social structure (van Dijk, 1990, p. 165). Consequently, “the theory of social cognition should not only be about cognition, or about people as information processors, but also about society and people as social members” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 131). Likewise, studying political cognition and how citizens acquire and use political knowledge and beliefs in discourse is very important. Political cognition is the intermediate between discourse and political knowledge and beliefs activated during political situations, like elections or parliament speeches (van Dijk,
One cannot analyze cognition without studying mental models that people construct about the world.

2.3.1.4.1 Mental models

Mental models are cognitive constructs in the human mind. Mental models are defined as representations in personal memory of events, or episodes (van Dijk, 1998, p. 79). These models represent the personal experiences and their interpretation of the events by social actors. In other words, a model is a mental representation about an event that people see, take part in, or read about (van Dijk, 1995e, p. 14). In addition, models are the interface between episodic, personal knowledge of events and the socially shared beliefs of groups. Consequently, model building involves “fragments of instantiated socio-cultural knowledge” (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 190). These shared beliefs emanate from episodic models via generalization processes. The way how we construe, perceive or interpret daily life is determined via building or rebuilding, updating or changing these models (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 21).

Like ideologies, mental models seem to be subjective (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 21). People construct models to represent their knowledge of a given event. They also use such models to express their personal opinions, interpretation and evaluation of such events (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 192). Such evaluative dimensions of mental models suggest that different interpretations or models may involve different knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideologies and social cognitions (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 192). In fact, mental models are defined as subjective mental constructs that impact text and talk (van Dijk, 2006b, p. 168). These ideologically biased mental models are stored in episodic memory, and represent the mental constructs that control discourse, interaction, and other social practices (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 30).

In discourse production, mental models represent the input or the starting point of the discourse production process (van Dijk, 1998, p. 80). Ideologically biased models may represent that input of discourse production, and therefore highlight biased topics, lexical items and other semantic facets of discourse (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 17). From a cognitive point of view, a discourse is an expression or execution of models in episodic memory (van Dijk, 1988, p. 149). These models are the personal knowledge, experience, or opinion about an event, or an action (van Dijk, 1998, p. 80). In other words, they represent the events as people experience them or hear about them (van Dijk, 2012, p. 588). As such, speaking involves the expression of mental models, while understanding includes the construction or updating of such models (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 24).
The following figure illustrates how various types of cognition are related to discourse:

![Diagram showing the relationship between discourse and cognition]

*Figure 5. Discourse and Cognition, adopted from van Dijk (2000b, p. 25)*

In short, mental models play an important role in the understanding and production of discourse (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 24). They are the cognitive interface between social situations and discourse (van Dijk, 2005, p. 75). The following sub-section focuses on the mental representations about context, or context models.

### 2.3.1.4.2 Context models

Context models can be defined in several ways. Context is defined as “the mental representation of the participants about the relevant properties of the social situation in which participants interact, and produce and comprehend text or talk” (van Dijk, 2005, p. 75). As discourse is produced in a communicative event, the mental models of these events are called context models (van Dijk, 1998, p. 82). These models share the same structure of setting (time, location), circumstances, participants and their roles and the communicative action (van Dijk, 1998, p. 82). People “construe dynamic pragmatic models of (each moment of) the very communicative situation in which they participate themselves” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 589). Moreover, context models not only provide a knowledge device to perform epistemic strategies, but also embed the mutual intentions and knowledge of participants (van Dijk, 2012, p. 589). They are just a particular kind of mental models that define all our personal experiences and control all the interactions and situations in which we take part (van Dijk, 2005).
Context models share some properties with mental models. Actors form context models to construe the intentions in a communicative event. They distinguish between knowledge that is presupposed or known by participants and knowledge that has to be shared or explicitly communicated (van Dijk, 2012, p. 590). Such context models are “personal, subjective and possibly biased, and hence represent the personally variable interpretations and opinions of communicative events” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 82). They are fundamentally dynamic leading to permanently updated context models (van Dijk, 1997a, 2000b, 2006b). Context models are thus dynamic, ongoing interpretations and representations of the current situation (van Dijk, 2005, p. 75). Just like mental models, context models are evaluative and may feature conflicting opinions about text and talk (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 196). For instance, different participants may construct various models of the same situation, which may influence what participants say, write or think (van Dijk, 2005, p. 75). Hence, this may lead to misunderstanding and conflicts.

Context models are context-dependent. In text processing, discourse representations are gradually constructed by addressers and addressees. Such representations are affected by contextual factors, and also affecting context (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 197). A context model is, therefore, a representation of what is relevant or needed in a communicative situation (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 27). These models act as “a kind of overall control mechanism in discourse processing” (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 27). For instance, they control all levels of style of political discourse, like the choice of lexis, use of pronouns, syntactic structures and grammar features, depending on the political situation or political context (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 733). Likewise, they control the general schema of political discourse, such as turn taking, parliamentary debates openings and closings, political interview conversational structures, the organization of a party program, or political advertisement layouts (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 733). In short, context affects the structures and processing of discourse (van Dijk, 1999, p. 123).

Context models are the interface between discourse and society (van Dijk, 2009, p. 73). Indeed, “a mediating cognitive device that is able to represent the relevant structures of the social situation, both locally (micro) as well as globally (macro) [is needed]” (van Dijk, 2009, p. 73). All contextually variable discourse properties are by definition handled by such pragmatic context models (van Dijk, 1998, 2006c). In other words, context models determine the relevant genre and style of discourse (van Dijk, 2009, p. 73). For instance, political discourse accounts for the subjective ideological context models of participants (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 129). Such context models exercise the crucial overall and local control over
discourse production and understanding processes (van Dijk, 1999, p. 124). The following figure illustrates mental models:

![Mental Models Diagram](image)

Figure 6. Mental Models, adopted from van Dijk (1998, p. 87)

In short, it is mandatory for discourse analysts to clarify the social situation and how it is represented in the participants’ context models (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 129-130). Discourse processing is based on utilizing both internal and external information in understanding, hence context models. In the following sub-section, concern is about intentionality in communicative situations because it facilitates discourse processing.

### 2.3.1.5 Intentionality

Generally, intentionality is what the speaker intends to communicate by uttering a sentence (Noveck & Reboul, 2008, p. 425). In order to retrieve the speaker’s meaning of utterances, one has to attribute to her “the intention of producing a cognitive effect in an audience and of doing so by causing the audience to recognize that very intention” (Noveck & Reboul, 2008, p. 425). This encoding-decoding process can partly explain linguistic communication. This must also include the attribution of mental states to the speaker. Understanding the speaker’s meaning, therefore, underlies inferring conclusions, acceding
or giving consent to indirect requests and referring to objects in or out of view (Noveck & Reboul, 2008).

The communicative intention of the speaker is important in interaction. The communicative intention can be defined as “the intention to communicate something, plus the intention that that intention to communicate that particular something be recognized as such” (Bara, 2011, p. 448). A real communication requires that sharing information must be intentionally and explicitly proposed to the hearer (Bara, 2011, p. 449). This latter must as well recognize such a communicative intention. According to Scannel (1994), as cited in Kress & Leeuwen (1996, p. 379), audience can “recognize the substance of what is meant while refusing the speaker’s interpretations and assessments”. Recipients will, thus, construe these communicative intentions and the emitter’s values and attitudes as they are, even if they do not converge with their own values and beliefs (Kress & Leeuwen, 1996, p. 379).

The mental processes of the generation and comprehension of the communicative act can be elaborated as follows: if an actor A produces an utterance addressed to a partner B, five logically related steps in B’s mental processes are distinguished:

Table 1

Mental Processes of Communicative Acts, adopted from Bara (2011, p. 462)

Stage 1: Expression act, where A’s mental state is reconstructed by B starting from the locutionary act.

Stage 2: Speaker meaning, where B reconstructs A’s communicative intentions, including the case of Indirect speech.

Stage 3: Communicative effect, which consists of two processes:

(a) Attribution, where B attributes to A private mental states, such as beliefs and intentions; and
(b) Adjustment, where B's mental states concerning the topic of the conversation may be altered as a result of A’s utterance.

Stage 4: Reaction, where B produces the intentions he will communicate in his response.

Stage 5: Response, in which B produces an overt communicative response.

These mental processes can be further clarified by the following figure:
The present section has dealt with Cognitive Pragmatics, its definition and its history. More concern has been about the cognitive system, its components and mechanisms. Special attention has been paid to van Dijk’s (1988-1995) social cognition as well as mental and context models. The last sub-section has been devoted to intentionality since it plays a significant role in the mental processing of communication. The following section focuses on knowledge and its crucial role in discourse processing.

2.3.2 Knowledge

In this section, the concept of knowledge is defined, and its different types are identified. The socio-cognitive approach to knowledge is also reviewed. In addition, concepts, like belief, opinion and attitude, are examined to unveil the difference between them, on the one hand, and the difference between these concepts and knowledge, on the other hand. Moreover, the connections between knowledge, ideology, discourse and presupposition are highlighted since they represent the main concern of the present thesis. Finally, other relevant concepts are tackled, like schemata, Frame Theory and polarization.

2.3.2.1 Definition of knowledge

Knowledge can be defined in various ways. Knowledge is defined as “the consensual beliefs of an epistemic community, and shall reserve truth as a property of assertions” (van
Dijk, 2003c, p. 85). The truthfulness of such beliefs has no value except if it is asserted in discourse (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 85). Knowledge can, therefore, be defined as justified beliefs shared by an epistemic community and based on the epistemic criteria or standards of the knowledge community, also called 'k-community' (van Dijk, 2012, p. 587). Knowledge is relative to this k-community since what accounts as knowledge for one k-community may be evaluated as false beliefs by another community.

Knowledge is contextual because justified beliefs in one context may not be justified or asserted in another context (van Dijk, 2012, p. 587). Knowledge is also viewed as a form of social cognition. Indeed, knowledge is not defined as personal beliefs, but “as social beliefs certified, shared and hence discursively presupposed by the members of epistemic communities” (van Dijk, 2005, p. 87). Knowledge is certified as such depending on the knowledge criteria of the competent members of an epistemic community (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 95). After defining knowledge, one can distinguish its different types.

2.3.2.2 Types of knowledge

There are many types of knowledge, mainly personal and social knowledge. Personal knowledge is based on personal mental models or experiences about specific events (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 13). It is private, and thus not shared by others unless it is communicated (van Dijk, 2005, p. 78). Social knowledge, however, stems from general, abstract and socially shared representations. According to Tulving (1983), as cited in van Dijk (2005, p. 74), social knowledge is represented in semantic or social memory, while personal knowledge about specific events is stored as mental models in episodic memory. These various kinds of memories mutually influence each other.

Social knowledge is itself divided into interpersonal, group and institutional knowledge. First, interpersonal knowledge can be defined as the personal knowledge shared by two or more people and communicated in previous interpersonal, common experiences (van Dijk, 2005, p. 78). Second, group knowledge is “the socially shared knowledge, either of group experiences, or of general, abstract knowledge acquired by the members of a group, such as a professional group, a social movement or a sect” (van Dijk, 2005, p. 78). Third, institutional or organizational knowledge is the socially shared knowledge by the members of an organization or institution (van Dijk, 2005, p. 79). Such knowledge may be presupposed by the competent members who acquired it in the socialization process (van Dijk, 2005, p. 79).
In addition, social knowledge is divided into national, cultural and universal knowledge. First, national knowledge is the knowledge shared by the citizens of a country. It is learnt at school, via mass media and presupposed in all public discourses by all citizens in that country (van Dijk, 2005, p. 79). Second, cultural knowledge is the general knowledge shared and presupposed by the members of a culture. People identify themselves with a culture on the basis of language, religion, history, habits, origin or appearance (van Dijk, 2005, p. 79). As a result, cultural knowledge is presupposed in the discourses of competent cultural members, and hence represents the basic Common Ground for all other discourses and for all other kinds of knowledge (van Dijk, 2005, p. 80). Third, universal knowledge is shared by the international community or presupposed by the competent members of all cultures (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 90).

According to van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), knowledge can also be categorized as episodic and conceptual, or semantic (as cited in Beaugrande, 1991, p. 272). Following this line of thought, Beaugrande (1991) points out that the first is “construed or inferred from previous experience, [whereas the second is] derived through abstraction, generalization, de-contextualization and recombination” (p. 272). In other words, episodic knowledge consists of saved and stored memories or schemas about past experiences with the real world. Conceptual knowledge, however, stems from the abstract, conceptual world and is, therefore, general, stable, and useful for many cognitive tasks (Beaugrande, 1991). In sum, the type of knowledge depends on who shares it, and whether it is presupposed by a small number of people, a group, a culture, or all members of all cultures worldwide (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 90). Since the socio-cognitive approach to presupposition and CDA has been tackled in previous sections, focusing on knowledge from a socio-cognitive perspective seems to be a necessary step.

2.3.2.3 The socio-cognitive approach to knowledge

Knowledge is mainly accounted for in cognitive science and more specifically in cognitive and social psychology (van Dijk, 2003b, p. 22). Knowledge has to be examined in a multidisciplinary framework within which cultural, social, cognitive as well as discursive dimensions have to be studied and made explicit (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 94-5). A cognitive account of knowledge processes and structures is, thus, needed. A social account of the ways knowledge is used and communicated by groups and cultures is also primordial. More specifically, a discursive theory of how knowledge is mediated, manifested and reproduced in text and talk is necessary (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 95).
Knowledge is closely related to cognitive or mental representations. Indeed, since knowledge is a kind of belief, and since beliefs are considered as mental phenomena, knowledge may be analyzed as a mental structure, like representations (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 10). In this regard, the cognitive approach to knowledge highlights its mental structure. Psychology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) consider knowledge as mental representations in memory (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 86). Given the fact that knowledge is mandatory for both speakers and hearers, a complex mental model of the knowledge situation of a given communicative event is, thus, needed (van Dijk, 1999, 2004a).

Beliefs and knowledge are cognitively conceptualized as mental representations of the situational states of affairs (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 10). Knowledge is represented as a kind of script, frame or similar structure or format in LTM, but partly utilized and applied in STM (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 10-11). Because knowledge is schematically organized, this facilitates retrieving, activating and applying it. Discourse comprehension and production and other forms of interaction “presuppose the partial activation and ‘application’ of relevant fragments of knowledge” (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 11). Such activated knowledge can be 'instantiated' or 'specified' in representations of personal experiences and events, and hence mental models stored in episodic memory (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 11).

Discourse understanding consists of building mental models in episodic memory, where general knowledge is evoked during mental model construction (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 11). Depending on context, the speaker decides what fragments should be explicitly expressed in discourse and what knowledge should be left partially or wholly implicit (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 12). Consequently, we may need specific mental models to construct general knowledge, and we may need general knowledge to construe and understand specific mental models as well (van Dijk, 2004c, p. 74).

Knowledge is not only mental, but also social. Different social groups share a large amount of socio-cultural knowledge and several truth criteria (van Dijk, 1998, p. 115). This gives the members of different groups a chance to understand, communicate with and convince one another. Based on Clark’s (1996) views, van Dijk (2003c) states that common ground, consensus and commonsense are some of the many notions that may define the social aspect of knowledge (p. 86). As such, people’s knowledge of the world is “essentially a socially dependent cognitive structure” (van Dijk, 1983, p. 191). It is built and used in processes of communication and interaction in social situations (van Dijk, 1983, p. 101).
After highlighting the socio-cognitive aspects of knowledge, one has to distinguish it from notions, like beliefs, opinions and attitudes.

### 2.3.2.4 Beliefs, opinions and attitudes

Knowledge has already been related to beliefs, like opinions, attitudes or ideologies (van Dijk, 2004c, p. 75). Like knowledge, beliefs about situations or events are represented in the mental models or representations about events and the world. These mental models feature individuals’ points of view and feelings about such events (van Dijk, 2004c, p. 76). However, a distinction has to be made between beliefs, opinions and attitudes.

#### 2.3.2.4.1 Beliefs

People not only have knowledge about the world, but also have beliefs about this world (van Dijk, 1983, p. 191). Such beliefs are general and socially shared. Unlike knowledge, which has to be true, beliefs need not be true (van Dijk, 1983, p. 191). Like knowledge, beliefs are organized since there are “higher-order and lower-order beliefs” (van Dijk, 1983, p. 192). In other words, some beliefs presuppose others or have particular consequent beliefs (van Dijk, 1983, p. 192). In this regard, as cited in van Dijk (1983), a number of features distinguish beliefs from knowledge:

1. there is no consensus about beliefs,
2. beliefs are often about the existence of entities,
3. beliefs often involve “alternative worlds” (e.g., an ideal world),
4. beliefs involve affective or evaluative components,
5. belief systems are more open, including more personal experiences, and
6. beliefs can be held with varying degrees of certitude (p. 192).

As stated above, there are similarities and differences between beliefs and knowledge. Beliefs are “forms of subjective, individual knowledge”, while knowledge is “a form of justified, socially warranted belief” (van Dijk, 1983, p. 191). Unlike beliefs, knowledge is subject to a set of truth criteria that may be variable from one group to another, one culture or period to another (van Dijk, 1983, p. 191). The distinction between knowledge and mere beliefs is, thus, scalar. Similarly, the distinction between 'factive' and 'evaluative' beliefs is also scalar (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 100).
2.3.2.4.2 Opinions

Opinions are essentially evaluative. Evaluations are conducted on the basis of personal and social values (van Dijk, 1983, p. 193). Such evaluations of events or objects may lead to three outcomes, mainly good, bad or neutral. Similarly, opinions are not only derived from general, social values, but also from general norms. For instance, supporting the US intervention in Afghanistan is such a norm-based opinion. It emanates from a more general opinion that the US should interfere whenever her national interests are threatened (van Dijk, 1983, p. 193). Both value-based and norm-based opinions may yield to a system of preferences (van Dijk, 1983, p. 194).

Likewise, opinions are both personal and social. Opinions can be presented as a combination or mixture of “purely personal opinions, derived from personal experiences (old models), but more often than not they reflect more general opinions, stored in socially shared attitudes of sub-groups or social members” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 141). When people evaluate entities, they may construct different models representing different angles and different points of view of the same entity or event in spite of the fact that their general knowledge and general opinion are constant in different contexts (van Dijk, 1988, p. 141). This leads to an important concept, mainly attitudes.

2.3.2.4.3 Attitudes

Attitudes are different from beliefs and opinions. Attitudes are organizing systems of beliefs and opinions (van Dijk, 1983, p. 194). They have complex structures that dominate both opinion and belief propositions. Attitudes also have a more comprehensive nature since they are conventionally “outfitted with beliefs, opinions, and conations (i.e., action dispositions)” (van Dijk, 1983, p. 194). Attitudes are, therefore, more general and more organized than beliefs and opinions. They are based on general norms, values and beliefs. Likewise, attitudes are arranged around a core or a cognitive concept (van Dijk, 1983, p. 195). In fact, attitudes are ego-centered since individuals do not have an idea about what others think about a core concept. This core has to be cognitively and socially relevant (van Dijk, 1983, p. 195). Moreover, attitudes are about concepts, or the events or objects denoted by them. Such concepts arrange much of people’s thinking and social interaction.

Attitudes are important in communication. Attitudes are group-based since they are gradually formed via communication and interaction with other groups or same group members. Indeed, attitudes are “expressed, discussed, contested, argued for, defended,
attacked and in general normalized in many ways in different forms of discursive communication” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 141). Knowledge controls understanding, whereas attitudes influence and control evaluation (van Dijk, 1995e, p. 15). Consequently, “controlling attitudes may be a result of controlling the discourses of mass communication as well as their topics, meanings, style and rhetoric” (van Dijk, 1995e, p. 16). Since scripts are necessary for understanding processes, intricate structures of opinions and attitudes determine how we interpret texts and episodes as well as how we form new opinions (van Dijk, 1984, p. 190). Apart from beliefs, opinions and attitudes, knowledge is closely related to ideology and ideological beliefs.

2.3.2.5 Knowledge vs. ideology

The classical distinction between knowledge (épistémé) and belief (doxa) is tightly related to the distinction between knowledge and ideology (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 15). The debate on the difference between knowledge and ideology has started since Destritt de Tracy coined the concept of ideology in the 19th C (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 15). Unlike ideologies, which were described by Marx and Engels as ‘false consciousness' or wrong, misguided beliefs, the scientific aspect of knowledge is enhanced to highlight its factivity or truthfulness (as cited in van Dijk, 1998, p. 108). In epistemology, knowledge is presented as ‘justified true belief' (van Dijk, 1998, p. 109). In this regard, knowledge presupposes truth criteria based on justifications, or reliable evidence of true knowledge (van Dijk, 1998, p. 110). Ideologies, however, monitor evaluative beliefs, but cannot monitor knowledge (van Dijk, 1998, p. 112).

Ideologies are defined as socially shared representations by the members of a group (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 15). They are “general, abstract and fundamental, and organize other forms of social representations, such as attitudes” (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 15-6). Such ideologies determine people’s beliefs about the world and control the way the epistemic community evaluates knowledge (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 16). Ideologies, therefore, affect the socially shared group knowledge, like the specific knowledge shared by feminists, linguists and students (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 16). These social representations of a group are clearly ideologically biased. Based on Fairclough’s (1995) view, van Dijk (2004a) points out that the “socially shared knowledge cannot possibly ‘escape’ its ideological boundedness” (p. 6). Since ideologies are the basis of socially shared representations, it can, thus, be stated that our knowledge is ideologically biased (van Dijk, 2004a).
A distinction has, therefore, been drawn between knowledge and ideology. Knowledge is organized depending on the ideological parameters of the group, such as its goals and interests (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 16). In other words, reality is perceived, interpreted and represented according to that group convenience (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 16-7). Consequently, a distinction must be drawn between the ideology of a group and the knowledge of that group because knowledge may be biased. Such group knowledge may be mere beliefs, or opinions, by the members of the group (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 17). In interactions and discourse, however, they present these beliefs as facts and deal with them as knowledge (van Dijk, 2004a).

Culturally shared beliefs or ideologies can be taken as factive knowledge. In some groups, knowledge is not always ideological, but widely shared and presupposed in larger epistemic communities, like cultures. So, there are different kinds of beliefs that they consider to be the equivalent of facts as they perceive them (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 17). Beliefs thus function as 'the epistemic common ground' of such an epistemic or culture community. These indisputable facts can, however, be part of the approved or accepted knowledge that is shared and presented by ideological opponents or rivals (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 18). If ideologies determine the social representations of groups, they may also determine the knowledge learned and shared by groups (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 15). Consequently, the interface between knowledge and ideology has a cognitive nature (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 8).

Like ideology, knowledge can be relative depending on the shared beliefs of an epistemic community. In fact, what is presented as knowledge by a group member can be “false beliefs, half-truths, or one-sided true beliefs that favor specific groups, and that are directed against them” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 111). In addition, facts are always constructed, and therefore cognitively and socially relative. They depend on the conceptual and perceptual understanding of people (van Dijk, 1998, p. 109). Language, therefore, “ceases to be a neutral medium of or the transmission and reception of pre-existing knowledge” (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 4). Language unveils knowledge that is relative to conceptualizers, circumstances, cultures and ideologies.

To conclude, knowledge and ideology are interrelated, and they influence discourse production and comprehension (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 34). Instead of the conventional and epistemological definition of knowledge as justified true beliefs, we need a more sophisticated multidisciplinary theory of knowledge according to different kinds of beliefs typically shared by epistemic communities (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 33). The following sub-section enhances the link between knowledge and discourse.
2.3.2.6 Knowledge and discourse

A theory of knowledge is incomplete without a theory of discourse. Indeed, knowledge is quite essential for the production and comprehension of discourse (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 19). It fundamentally affects many aspects of text and talk (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 98). As such, the previously mentioned kinds of knowledge are manifested and managed in discourse uses and processing (van Dijk, 2004a). Much of our knowledge is typically construed and reproduced by discourse (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 8). In other words, such knowledge construction is usually mediated via discursive practices. Most of our practical knowledge about the world is built by our personal experiences or acquired from other people via discourse (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 13).

The interface between knowledge structures of the mind and discourse processing has to be managed by a knowledge device. Such knowledge device is called 'a k-device' or a special element in our context model of the communicative event (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 14). The k-device helps to guess how much knowledge is shared by our recipients, and how much knowledge we need to share or convey (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 14). It is constantly active to calculate what the recipients know at each moment of a communicative event or interaction (van Dijk, 2005, p. 76). It adapts the structure of text or talk to the dynamically changing common ground of knowledge. For instance, it selects definite or indefinite articles, presupposed that clauses, conversational markers, like “you know”, and reminding markers, such as “as I told you yesterday” or “as we reported last week” (van Dijk, 2005, p. 76).

The coordination of k-context interface is the task of k-device. Indeed, people tend to leave the knowledge we think that the recipients share implicit. This strategy may be floated or violated depending on context (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 99). Knowledge can be explicitly mediated in various ways by expressions, like “the fact is”, “I am sure that” etc. (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 106). In political discourse, specialized knowledge sources have to be frequently involved so as to legitimate or justify political action or decision, or to support arguments in political discourse (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 110-1). The following is a list of words that presuppose the speaker’s knowledge in text or talk:
Table 2

*Expressions Presupposing the Speaker’s Knowledge (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 112-3)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expressions presupposing knowledge</th>
<th>to acknowledge that …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Presupposition-preserving expression: “we (all) know that …”</td>
<td>- to admit that …- to be afraid that …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Emphasizing plausible inference: “We know …”</td>
<td>- to be confident that …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Facts: “the fact is …”</td>
<td>- to be conscious of …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Being sure: “I am sure that …”</td>
<td>- to be reminded of …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No doubt: “There is no doubt that …”</td>
<td>- to conclude that …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Agreeing: “We all agree that …”, “I agree”</td>
<td>- to have certainty about …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It is clear that …</td>
<td>- to realize that …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It is obvious that …</td>
<td>- to recognize that …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- It is right that …</td>
<td>- to remember that …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to understand that …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These verbs presuppose knowledge. They may be combined with the following presuppositions:

Table 3

*Explicit Expressions of Knowledge and their Meaning, adapted from van Dijk (2003a, p. 113)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Knowledge of events of the past</td>
<td>(to remember, remind, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Discovery of (new) knowledge</td>
<td>(to realize)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Certain knowledge</td>
<td>(to be confident that, it is obvious that, it is clear that, )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reluctant knowledge</td>
<td>(to be afraid that, fear that, to admit that, to acknowledge that)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inferential knowledge</td>
<td>(to conclude that, understand that)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above mentioned examples reveal that knowledge is about complex and different kinds of mental representations or propositional attitudes (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 113), that range from mere beliefs to absolute certainty. This depends on the knowledge of users, context and the strategies of their discursive manifestation. This knowledge may be about “past, present or future, about real, fictitious or abstract events, be old or new knowledge, and acquired by observation, experience, inference or more or less reliable sources” (van Dijk, 2003a, p. 113). In short, knowledge is not one type of belief, but a large field of mental experiences.

However, large amounts of knowledge are not available or expressed by the text. Based on van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), Beaugrande (1991) states that these amounts of knowledge...
have to be “accessed and retrieved to provide a framework for the text, organize it, understand it, and construct a mental representation in memory” (p. 272). Language users, not only need to have general knowledge of the world, or knowledge about the actual communicative event or situation, but also the shared knowledge with the recipient, or the mutual knowledge of both speaker and hearer (van Dijk, 2005, p. 72). This means that interlocutors must successfully manage the common ground knowledge they need in order to be mutually comprehensible (van Dijk, 2005, p. 72).

In this regard, a theory of knowledge management in discourse and interaction is necessary for CDA. Discourse production and comprehension is context-dependent (van Dijk, 2005, p. 71). Discourse processing should be done in terms of mental models of the relevant facets of the communicative event, called context models (van Dijk, 2005, p. 72). In short, an explicit theory of discourse necessitates an explicit theory of knowledge. Knowledge has also strong links with what is presupposed, implicit and indirect in discourse. This idea is elaborated in more details in what follows.

2.3.2.7 Knowledge and presupposition

One of the main features of knowledge management used during discourse production and processing is the use of presuppositions. Knowledge of the world is mostly general, abstract and shared by the members of a given culture. It is that kind of knowledge that is presupposed in the public discourses of that culture or community (van Dijk, 2005, p. 74). Presuppositions are propositions that have to be known and accepted by participants so that other propositions can be meaningful (van Dijk, 2012, p. 597). Propositions, which are already known to recipients, do not need to be “included in the semantic representation of the discourse, but may only be marked as presupposed” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 591). Consequently, what is known by the epistemic community does not have to be overtly and explicitly stated in the discourse of that community (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 14). For instance, knowledge shared by a specific group is presupposed by the members of that group, but not asserted in discourse (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 15).

Presupposed knowledge is social since it is shared between participants. Indeed, “it is this social nature of shared knowledge that defines presupposition and that allows discourse to be understandable without making all relevant knowledge explicit all the time” (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 86). The addressee has to be aware of what the addressees already know so that she can decide what propositions of social representations are known to them (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 15).
The same applies to recipients who must know the same about the speaker so that they can establish “what is actually intended in implicit, indirect, ironic or other non-explicit forms of talk” (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 23). In other words, whenever the discourse producer assumes that the interlocutor knows something, he does not need to assert such knowledge. Instead, it can be tacitly or implicitly presupposed, and hence the speaker may only remind the recipient if information is forgotten or not easily accessible (van Dijk, 2005, p. 76).

However, presuppositions are not always propositions that are assumed to be known by the addressees. Presuppositions may be indirectly used to express or manifest what is not already known or said before (van Dijk, 2012, p. 597). If specific knowledge or other beliefs are said to be presupposed and shared by speech participants, we, sometimes, need to make such knowledge and beliefs explicit to specify how such presuppositions affect the structure of discourse (van Dijk, 1998, 2005, 2012). Add to that, “expressing or presupposing knowledge not only depends on what we know that the recipients already know, but also on what we know they may want to know, e.g., because it is interesting or relevant for them” (van Dijk, 2005, p. 76). Consequently, the k-device of context models specifies whether event knowledge must be asserted, what kind of knowledge to be reminded and what kind of knowledge to be presupposed. In other words, the k-device decides on whether information is relevant, irrelevant, or can be inferred by recipients themselves (van Dijk, 2005, p. 76).

Knowledge in discourse is more implicit and presupposed than explicit. From a semantic angle, discourse is like the tip of an iceberg since its understanding needs only some explicitly expressed propositions, while most other propositions are implicit and has to be inferred (van Dijk, 2009, p. 77). Hence, implied or implicit propositions of discourse are part of the mental model, but not present or apparent in the semantic representation of that discourse (van Dijk, 2009, p. 77). Mental models, for instance, represent a good example of presuppositions, more specifically event model propositions that are implied, but not asserted by discourse. In this context, a belief is considered as knowledge in a community if it is presupposed in the public discourses of that community (van Dijk, 2005, p. 73).

In view of the above, the knowledge component is the basis of the pragmatic properties of discourse, like presupposition (van Dijk, 2001b, p. 23). Discursively, beliefs that are taken as undisputed facts function as the presupposed knowledge of the competent members of the epistemic community (van Dijk, 2004a, p. 18). Knowledge structures represent another important point to be emphasized since it serves the goal of the present paper. Schema, scripts and frames were previously tackled in section 2.2.2.6.2 as useful notions in Cognitive
Chapter Two

Linguistics. These notions are re-examined in the following sub-section to uncover the knowledge structures and image-schemas manifested in discourse.

2.3.2.8 Schemata

Knowledge, as a mental construct, is schematically represented in several forms. Such forms are scripts and socially shared schemas, like schemas for objects, people, events etc. (van Dijk, 2003c, p. 92). According to Rumelhart (1980), a schema is a data structure that represents concepts saved in our memory (as cited in Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 93). Moreover, schemata “represent knowledge at many levels of abstraction” (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 93). Indeed, image schemas are mental processes, or cognitive constructs (Pena, 2008, p. 1042). These schemas “are recurring patterns of experience, which are abstract and topological in nature” (Pena, 2008, p. 1042). However, scripts are defined as knowledge people have about stereotypical events, like birthday parties, or going to the supermarket (van Dijk, 1998, p. 58).

The schematic structure of knowledge is, therefore, evident. Indeed, recent research has highlighted information in memory as 'slots' or variables within a prearranged relation that accepts information via instantiations (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 273). In this regard, knowledge is conceived as “specific networks or schemata that might be related to the neurological structure of the brain” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 588). More specifically, knowledge consists of a system of concepts structured by categorical relationships and by more complex schemata or scripts (van Dijk, 2012, p. 588). For instance, a chair is a kind of furniture. Similarly, schema-based knowledge systems are real and capable to work as psychological units or 'chunks in memory' (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 274).

The use of general knowledge includes two phases. The first phase is the activation or instantiation of a schema, frame, or script through certain input. The second phase is the construction of the knowledge base needed for understanding the text (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 274). In this context, “long-term knowledge is frequently spoken of as stored ‘schemata’, or ‘plans’, ‘scenarios’, ‘scenes’, ‘conceptual models’, defined and distinguished by theorists in a variety of ways” (Chilton, 2004, p. 51). General models can be changed into social frames or scripts in semantic social memory by further generalization, abstraction and de-contextualization (van Dijk, 1985a, p.63). These frames have a categorical setup since the skeleton of a model is a schema consisting of a number of fixed categories (van Dijk, 1985a, p. 64). Beliefs can also be represented as propositions, or networks. These 'belief-clusters' may be structured by various schemata (van Dijk, 1998, p. 57).
Ideologies are also organized in terms of these schematic structures. Ideologies mentally represent the principal social characteristics of a group, like the group’s norms, values, goals, identity, position and resources (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 18). The ideology’s 'schema-like' nature allows people to quickly understand, construct, refute, or change an ideology (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 17). This schematic structure applies to relations between groups by representing themselves and others in terms of US vs. THEM, and by allocating positive properties to WE, while associating THEY with bad properties (van Dijk, 1995d, p. 139). Ideologies, therefore, serve a self-group schema that represents the self-serving interpretations of members of social groups (van Dijk, 1995d, p. 139). These group self-schemas or categories determine the fundamentals of their socio-cognitive identity (van Dijk, 2000a, p. 95).

Discourse understanding consists of constructing a schematic representation for text or talk. The general meaning of discourse is “organized by fixed, conventional categories that form an over-all text schema or superstructure” (van Dijk, 1993a, p. 119). According to Rumelhart (1977), schematic comprehension takes place by selecting schemata to account for a text to be understood and checking the appropriateness of such schemata (as cited in Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 95). The first step is the activation of high-level schema on the basis of something in the text. The second step is the activation of the subschema related to it (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 95). Such a conceptually-driven processing is based on retrieving stored traces in memory and utilizing the available schemata to rebuild the text and its interpretation (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 95-6). The traces must be retrieved, and what schema used to encode them must be determined. The schematic impact is manifested in both encoding and retrieval (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 97).

At the level of text schemas, every schema category accounts for one or more themes. Every theme is designated by an episode, and every episode is expressed by a sequence of sentences (van Dijk, 1986, p. 159). As for spoken discourse production, the speakers may begin their speech with a whole or partial schema. Such a schema manages the formation of relevant themes and the production of sentences that serve a given schema category (van Dijk, 1986, p. 159). Institutional and professional discourses, for example, show fixed categorical properties, which allow the production of these texts (van Dijk, 1986). In this context, schematic superstructures are conventional forms that characterize certain genres of discourse. Indeed, they organize textual sequences of sentences and allocate specific functions to these sequences (van Dijk, 1986).
Such conventionalized schematic patterns play an important role in spoken and written discourses. They are detrimental in the processes of discourse production and understanding (van Dijk, 1986, p. 156). In written discourse, the “schema provides readers with a basis for interpreting the text, and a ‘conceptual skeleton’ to which they can bind the semantic units derived from the textual input” (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 274). Given the social nature of discourse, many daily actions that enact, express or legitimate power relations have to be done so that social power can be reproduced. Such actions have to be planned, executed and understood. They require a cognitive basis, consisting of models, scripts, attitudes and ideologies organizing all these aspects (van Dijk, 1988, p. 147).

Demystifying the cognitive mechanisms that govern knowledge processing seems to be a tricky task. As we have highlighted the importance of schemas, frames and scripts as knowledge structures, it is necessary to shed more light on Frame Theory.

### 2.3.2.9 Frame Theory

Various definitions of the term Frame Theory can be provided. Frame Theory is defined as “a mental knowledge structure, which captures the typical features of the world units organized ‘around’ a certain concept” (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 215). This includes the typical necessary information related to this concept. A frame is a mental model of the world located in the human memory. It can be saved and retrieved when such models are stimulated (Bednarek, 2005, p. 689). As such, a frame is a cognitive phenomenon and a structure that is stored in the human mind (Bednarek, 2005, p. 690). According to Werth (1990), it can also be defined as an area of experience in a culture (as cited in Chilton, 2004, p. 51). In short, a frame theory consists of frames and sub-frames that share a number of features.

Frames are organized in a hierarchical structure. In the human memory, knowledge is stored in a form of several related frames (Bednarek, 2005, p. 689). Each frame is characterized by specific typical features. Indeed, a frame consists of cognitive components and their related elements. These features may supply ‘prototypes’, or central and typical instances, that represent a category. A frame is thus built upon categories and their interrelations (Bednarek, 2005, p. 691). Retrieving mental or cognitive representations consists of finding the stored traces in memory and utilizing the schemata to reconstruct the original interpretation or representation (Bower & Cirilo, 1985, p. 96). In other words, these frames can be organized in a hierarchy and inherit properties from super-ordinate frames (Beaugrande, 1991, p. 275).
Knowledge frames are part of a cognitive theory of language use. We use the term 'knowledge schema' to designate the expectations of participants about people, events and settings in the world in an interaction (Tannen & Wallat, 1999, p. 349). Such knowledge is organized in conceptual systems (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 214). One method to understand such an organization is frames because they may specify the characteristics or the typical features of a given culture. For instance, frames are the set of epistemic units we have about books, balls and bananas (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 215). These units organize not only our construal of the world, but also “our behavior with respect to the world, and the ways we interpret other’s behavior” (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 215).

Like knowledge, social contexts can be organized as social frames (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 219). For instance, the institutional context of a court can be chronologically ordered as “the charge-frame, the defense-frame and the judgment\conviction-frame” (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 220). Even social members within this institutional context are allocated certain properties, functions, ranks and relations. Such an analysis of a given context, according to concepts and frames, is only possible when associated with the general knowledge of social structure (van Dijk, 1977a, p. 220). Such cognitive representations, like image-schemas and social frames, may lead to categorizing entities and dividing the world into poles. As a result, polarization is the main concern at this level.

2.3.2.10 Polarization

Polarization is an important component in understanding the world around us. We can only have access to the other by actively organizing the other in terms of our categories (Falzon, 1998, p. 37). In other words, making sense of the world includes a process of ordering the world in terms of our categories. The world is organized and classified and actively brought under control accordingly (Falzon, 1998, p. 38). This means that when we encounter other people, we transform them in terms of our categories of understanding (Falzon, 1998, p. 38). This can be through the emergence of interpretations transformed during the interplay between us and the other. In fact, as humans, “we are both interpreted, shaped and organized by other human beings, and able to transgress imposed limits, to create new forms of thought and action, to shape and transform these others in turn” (Falzon, 1998, p. 41). As such, people's perception of each other and the world depends on categories.

We understand and evaluate the other in terms of our standpoint or thinking framework (Falzon, 1998, p. 42). Indeed, in discourse processing, “people ‘position’ other entities in their
‘world’ by ‘positioning’ these entities in relation to themselves along (at least) these axes: space, time and modality” (Chilton, 2004, p. 58). Based on Chilton’s (2004) scale, insiders are people who adopt or stand by our standards. However, outsiders are people who stay away or reject those standards (Chilton, 2004, p. 60). Such a scale is oriented to the self and directed to its authoritative position vis à vis the other. Based on epistemic modality, what is right is truth-conditionally, legally and morally ‘right’, and correspondingly for 'wrong' (Chilton, 2004, p. 60). The following figure illustrates Chilton’s (2004) Rightness- Wrongness scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIGHT</th>
<th>WRONG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self, near</td>
<td>remote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other realia</td>
<td>irrealia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deontic command</td>
<td>will, must, should, ought, can/can, may, needn't, oughtn't, shouldn't, mustn't, won't, can't</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prohibition</td>
<td>will, must, should, ought, can, could, might, may, shouldn't, oughtn't, mustn't, won't, can't</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>epistemic assertion</td>
<td>will, must, should, ought, can/can, may, needn't, oughtn't, shouldn't, mustn't, won't, can't</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negation</td>
<td>will, must, should, ought, can, could, might, may, shouldn't, oughtn't, mustn't, won't, can't</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8. Rightness-Wrongness Scale (Chilton, 2004, p. 60)*

Ideologies also have a polarized structure. This polarized structure reveals conflicting or competing groups and categorizes people according to in-groups and out-groups (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 734). Indeed, the speaker tends to associate good things to OUR group, while allocating bad things to THEIR group (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 734). The speaker may opt for other discursive strategies, like emphasizing OUR good deeds and THEIR bad deeds, while de-emphasizing OUR bad acts and THEIR good ones (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 734). Such an ideological categorization or polarization serves the interests, aims and goals of the in-group, but marginalizes the interests of the out-group. This can be made discursively explicit by 'positive self-presentation' and 'negative other-presentation' (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 734). Such categorization, for instance, takes place in parliamentary debates about immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees (van Dijk, 2006d).

The ‘We-Other’ categorization emanates from the difference feature which is negatively interpreted (van Dijk, 1983, p. 197). The cultural category, for instance, stores beliefs and opinions about language, habits, values, customs and other group features so as to form various types of prejudice (van Dijk, 1988, p. 145). In this context, dominant group interests and the conditions of everyday inter-group\ intra-group perceptions and interactions shape social representations about minority groups, like blacks or immigrants (van Dijk, 1988).
The discursive strategies of polarization can be further elaborated via the following methods of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

Table 4

*Polarization Strategies in Discourse, adapted from van Dijk (2006a, p. 373)*

- **Overall interaction strategies**
  - Positive self-presentation
  - Negative other-presentation
- **Macro speech act implying Our 'good' acts and Their 'bad' acts, e.g. accusation, defense.**
- **Semantic macrostructures: topic selection.**
  - (De-)emphasize negative/positive topics about Us/Them
- **Local speech acts implementing and sustaining the global ones, e.g. statements that prove accusations.**
- **Local meanings Our/Their positive/negative actions**
  - Give many/few details
  - Be general/specific
  - Be vague/precise
  - Be explicit/implicit
- **Lexicon: Select positive words for Us, negative words for Them.**

The present research focuses on the lexicon, which is one of the strategies of ideological discourse analysis. The lexicon divides social groups by denoting THEM or others with negative expressions (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 737). Lexicalization underlies mental models by deliberately choosing specific words depending on genre and context (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 128). The selection of the lexicon emanates from the idea that lexical features reveal the ideology of the speaker or writer. They seem to be both knowledge-laden and ideology-tainted.

In sum, the representation of knowledge and the operation of the cognitive system are focal topics in cognitive psychology. After dealing with knowledge, its types and its connections with presupposition, discourse and cognition, one has to investigate how knowledge about politics, politicians and elections forms ideologies. Similarly, one has to question the link between ideology and discourse, and ideology and cognition.

### 2.3.3 Ideology

The current section sheds light on ideology and the development of its conception. Like knowledge, this section highlights the socio-cognitive dimension of ideology as well as its connection with discourse, discourse processing and political discourse. The last part of the present section unveils the link between ideology and presupposition.
2.3.3.1 Development of the concept

The term ‘ideology’ has a wide range of definitions and meanings. It is primarily defined as “some kind of ‘ideas”, or “belief systems” (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 116). Ideology is generally defined as the science of ideas (Cassels, 1996, p. 1). It is a set of ideas that form a person’s objectives, expectations and actions (“Ideology”, para. 1). It may also be used to describe the shared beliefs of a group of people, like a nation, a religious sect, or a group of theorists (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 729). For instance, the ideological differences between Sunni and Shiite factions of Islam are a subject of great debate. In a similar vein, ideologies are defined as “political, or social, systems of ideas, values, or prescriptions of groups, or other collectivities” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 3). They are, however, false, misguided or misleading beliefs. These beliefs are typically related to our social or political opponents. Consequently, they may be evaluated as ‘false consciousness’ (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 7).

The concept has been developed through different stages. The term was born in the French Revolution era (Cassels, 1996, p. 1). The word was coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 to serve a sociopolitical objective (“Ideology”, para. 4). All the French Revolution ideologists, up to present day, have been secular focusing on the manipulation of power to create the perfect society in this world (Cassels, 1996, p. 2). The use of the word was, however, restricted by Napoleon who considered ideologies as unscientific and impractical visions. The concept of ideology was revived after two generations in 1846 by Karl Marx (Cassels, 1996, p. 2). According to the Marxist view, a society’s prevalent ideology is crucial to its superstructure. The word ideology was allocated by Marx to “the whole complex of intellectual assumptions and behavioral attitudes associated with the superstructure” (Cassels, 1996, p. 2). Ideologies represent to social and economic classes the economic interests of the dominant ruling class.

However, the new concept of ideology focuses on the relations between ideology and knowledge. The epistemological meaning of ideology is based on true, or false, beliefs that seem to be relevant for a specific group (van Dijk, 1998, p. 8). They reveal “a systematic set of beliefs - a world-view - characterized by conceptual schemes” (Corradetti, 2011, para. 33). The basic ideological beliefs organize the socially shared opinions and attitudes of a group. The general structure of ideologies is arranged in a form of a general schema that consists of essential categories, such as membership, goals, typical acts, intra-group relations and resources, including access to public discourse (van Dijk, 2009, p. 79).
Ideologies are, however, presented as forms of false consciousness. They are described as popular misguided beliefs used by the ruling class to legitimate the status quo and hide the real social and economic conditions of the working class (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 7). Political ideologies have recently emerged to be the basis for political parties, actions and programs. The concept of ideology has been closely related to issues of power and political struggle (Cassels, 1996, p. 7). Mass politics developed gradually along with ideologies. Due to popular participation in political affairs in the 19th C, ideologies were described by one scholar as universalistic and humanistic. Such mass politics reached maturation during the 20th C when ideologies or systems of beliefs are held with a new and fervent prescriptive conviction (Cassels, 1996, p. 8).

Similarly, ideologies have recently been presented on the basis of social practices of group members since they emerge from group conflicts (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 8). In this regard, ideologies are compared to “a shared framework of social beliefs that organize and coordinate the social interpretations and practices of groups and their members” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 8). They also organize power and other relations between groups in particular. This may result in polarization between in-groups and out-groups that presupposes another polarization between US, as having true knowledge and THEM, as holding mere ideologies (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 7). Like presupposition, discourse and knowledge, the socio-cognitive aspects of ideology are examined in the following sub-section.

2.3.3.2 Socio-cognitive dimension of ideology

The social aspects of ideology can be defined at the macro and micro levels of society. At the macro level, one can refer to groups of social actors, institutions, organizations, societies, states and their relationships (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 31). At the micro level, however, one may focus on social actors, as well as the social interaction between them in a given social situation, or context (van Dijk, 2000b, p. 31). Ideologies are, therefore, defined in terms of social groups, group relations, institutions at the macro level, and in terms of social practices at the micro level (van Dijk, 1998, 2000b). Ideologies are, thus, the basis for the social practices of group members.

Ideologies are the interface between the cognitive representations and society (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 18). Indeed, ideologies are presented as “basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of socio-cultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group” (van Dijk, 1995c, p. 248). Apart from their social role of promoting the interests of
groups, ideologies play a cognitive role by organizing the social representations, i.e. attitudes and knowledge, of the group. They also organize and determine the text and talk of group members (van Dijk, 1995c, p. 248). Indeed, ideology forms the essential building blocks of SRs. It also identifies the selection principles of group norms and values, as well as the structural organization of SRs (van Dijk, 1990, p. 177).

Given the fundamental role of discourse in the expression and reproduction of ideologies, many of our everyday social and discursive practices are ideologically laden. The levels of ideological discourse analysis are illustrated by van Dijk as follows:

Table 5

*Ideologies and Discourse: Levels of Analysis, adopted from van Dijk (1995b, p. 20)*

1. **Social Analysis**
   - Overall societal structures, e.g. parliamentary democracy, capitalism
   - Institutional/Organizational structures, e.g. racist political parties
   - Group relations, e.g. discrimination, racism, sexism
   - Group structures: identity, tasks, goals, norms, position, resources

2. **Cognitive Analysis**
   2.1 **Social cognition**
      - Sociocultural values, e.g. intelligence, honesty, solidarity, equality
      - Ideologies, e.g. racist, sexist, anti-racist, feminist, ecological …
      - Systems of attitudes, e.g. about affirmative action, multiculturalism …
      - Sociocultural knowledge, e.g. about society, groups, language, …
   2.2 **Personal cognition**
      2.2.1 **General (context free)**
         - Personal values: personal selections from social values
         - Personal ideologies: personal interpretations of group ideologies
         - Personal attitudes: systems of personal opinions
         - Personal knowledge: biographical information, past experiences
      2.2.2 **Particular (context-bound)**
         - Models: ad hoc representations of specific current actions, events
         - Context models: ad hoc representations of the speech context
         - Mental plans and representation of (speech) acts, discourse
         - Mental construction of text meaning from models: the ‘text base’
         - Mental (strategic) selection of discourse structures (style, etc.)

3. **Discourse Analysis**
   - The various structures of text and talk
Ideologies, therefore, organize social attitudes and structures. Based on Eagly & Chaiken’s (1993) thoughts, van Dijk (1995d) points out that ideologies “organize social group attitudes consisting of schematically organized general opinions about relevant social issues, such as abortion, nuclear energy or affirmative action” (p. 138). Each group may choose the social norms and values that achieve its objectives and serve its interests. Such a group may also use these selected values as 'building blocs' for its group ideologies (van Dijk, 1995d, p. 138). Depending on the speaker’s perspective, her group membership or ethics, ideologies can be evaluated positively or negatively (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 729). Since ideologies are part of social struggle, they are relevant in competitions, conflicts, dominance and resistance between groups (van Dijk, 2006d).

Like cognition and knowledge, ideology is the interface between discourse and society. More specifically, ideologies are the socio-cognitive interface between societal structures of groups, group relations and institutions, on the one hand, and individual thought and discourse, on the other hand. Given this combined cognitive and social approach to ideology, it can be stated that ideologies are built up by biased and subjective social or political values, and structured by group self-schemata. Categories, like identity, goals, norms, positions and resources, play a detrimental role in building a group's ideology (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 32). Like presupposition, cognition and knowledge, the link between ideology and discourse has to be revealed in the following sub-section.

2.3.3.3 Ideology and discourse

One of the social practices influenced by ideologies are discursive practices. Indeed, our discourse, as members of social groups, evokes ideologically based opinions (van Dijk, 2000b, 9). Ideologies are expressed in various structures of text and talk, and their reproduction often takes place in organizational and institutional contexts (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 17). Consequently, focus is to be on the ways ideologies articulate themselves at the level of discourse meaning (van Dijk, 1995d, p.135). In this respect, the ideologies of speakers or writers can be revealed by an understanding of the language users’ ideologies, and this can be feasible through language and communication (van Dijk, 1995d, p. 135).

Linking discourse to ideology is a complex process. Ideologies may be made explicit via discourse, and hence they are conveyed and normalized or legitimated (van Dijk, 1990, p. 177). However, persuasive ideologies may not be expressed explicitly, so we need some steps to show the implicit ideological control of discourse (van Dijk, 1995c). A multi-
disciplinary approach must, therefore, be applied to ideological discourse analysis to unmask such ideologically laden discursive practices (van Dijk, 1995c). The following

Figure 9. Schematic Representation of the Relations between Ideologies and Discourse Structures in Interactional and Societal Contexts, adopted from van Dijk (1995c, p. 254)
Discourses are textually mediated ideologies. Ideologies are most effective when their workings are least visible (Fairclough, 1989, p. 85). In this respect, ideologies manifest themselves indirectly via general attitudes as well as general opinions. This in turn affects the models that determine action and discourse (van Dijk, 1988). Discourses or texts “do not typically spout ideology, [but] position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts- and reproduces them in the process” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 40). Likewise, a discourse can be taken as textually mediated social actions, doing ideological work by representing and constructing society and by reproducing unequal relations of power (Wodak, 1996, p. 18). Discourse practices can, therefore, be seen as the deployment of dominant ideologies and acts of resistance to them (Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, p. 7).

Moreover, ideological struggle pre-eminently occurs via language. Such a struggle is over language because “language itself is a \textit{stake} in social struggle as well as a \textit{site} of social struggle” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 88). Struggle over language can demonstrate itself as a struggle between ideologically different kinds of discourses (Fairclough, 1989, p. 90). According to Gramsci (1971), power can be exerted in a hegemonic way by naturalizing ideologies and considering them as commonsense (as cited in Koller, 2009, para. 6). Based on Gramsci’s line of thought, Koller (2009) notices that ideologies are also construed as cognitive structures intertwining beliefs, values, norms and goals (para. 6). In this context, any hegemonic use of ideology is directly relevant to the study of language and power because texts act as 'carriers of ideology' (Koller, 2009, para. 6).

After highlighting the link between ideology, cognition and discourse, it seems primordial to unveil relations between ideology and presupposition.

\textbf{2.3.3.4 Ideology and presupposition}

Ideological analysis consists of detecting the expression of ideologically laden opinions and attitudes in text and talk (van Dijk, 2002a, p. 25). Ideologies are not usually explicit since they can be implicit, veiled, or disguised (van Dijk, 2002a, p. 25). In fact, “discourses are like the proverbial icebergs: most of their meanings are not explicitly expressed but presupposed to be known, and inferable from general sociocultural knowledge” (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 739). In this regard, presupposition is a discursive tool that may assume the truth of some propositions (van Dijk, 2006d, p. 739). Ideologies do not express themselves overtly and explicitly, but they may be mediated via intonation, lexical items or argumentative fallacies (van Dijk, 2002a, p. 32). Ideologies may be expressed via shared, presupposed and taken for
granted knowledge that facilitates discourse processing and understanding (van Dijk, 2006c).

Presupposition is a well-known semantic and pragmatic phenomenon. Presupposition indirectly emphasizes properties that are assumed to be well-known or commonsense (van Dijk, 1995d, p. 157). What is presupposed in discourse can, therefore, be ideologically controlled. This can be via the engendered presuppositions in the amount of knowledge and 'attitude-based inferences' shared between groups, such as racist and non-racist groups (van Dijk, 1995c, p. 263). For instance, racists may claim that blacks are inferior in terms of intellectual abilities. This idea may be knowledge for them, while it is considered as a prejudiced, racist belief by others. Such knowledge is clearly ideological emanating from the presupposed knowledge of racist groups (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 131).

To ideologically analyze discourse, one can look through texts with asserted or presupposed propositions which are presented as knowledge. Hence, such beliefs, generally accepted by the community members, are received and used as knowledge. Knowledge is, thus, presented as true, shared and taken for granted (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 122). However, what is presupposed can be construed as ideological beliefs by other critical analysts who belong to a different epistemic community. Indeed, other groups may consider that taken for granted knowledge as 'mere belief', superstition or ideological beliefs (van Dijk, 2006c, p. 122). So, ideologies specify how groups perceive, interpret and build social reality. To sum up, ideologies are transmitted via presupposed or explicit, factual or ideological knowledge.

To recapitulate the main points reviewed in literature, one can note that chapter two has been divided into three main parts, mainly presupposition, CDA and cognition, knowledge and ideology. The first part has been devoted to presupposition, the different theories and approaches to it and its common properties, triggers and types. It has also focused on epistemic modality and its link with evidentiality, along with important concepts, like context sensitivity and subjectivity. More emphasis has been on the cognitive and linguistic links between evidentiality, presupposition and epistemic modality, and how they may translate the thoughts and attitudes of the speaker in discourse.

In the second major part of the current chapter, discourse, discourse analysis and CDA have been tackled. Connections between discourse and ideology as well as discourse and presupposition have been highlighted. More focus has been on politics, language, political discourse, political discourse analysis, its properties and links with political cognition. The
third major part has shed light on three basic concepts, namely cognition, knowledge and ideology. More concern has been about van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive framework of analyzing discourse, more specifically social cognition, mental models and context models. Links between knowledge, ideology, discourse and presupposition have been unveiled. Important notions, like schemata, Frame Theory and polarization, have been examined since they serve to reach the goal of the present research paper that aims to analyze factive vs. ideological knowledge. This study is an attempt to uncover the speaker’s perception and conception of human rights and democracy in Hillary Clinton’s discourse regarding Tunisia in post Ben Ali period (2011-2012).
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Chapter three describes the corpus, mainly Hillary Clinton’s speeches, and specifies the research instruments used, mainly “AntConc” software as well as van Dijk’s (1995b) approach to discourse. It also explains the different stages of analysis to be implemented in order to reach the objectives of the current PhD research.

3.1 Corpus

The present section identifies the selection criteria of the corpus, mainly the topic, source of speeches, time span and focus. It also describes the selected speeches in terms of frequency and dates of delivery.

3.1.1 Selection criteria

Uprisings in Arab countries stimulated politicians and analysts worldwide. Scholars, politicians and journalists everywhere followed, with great concern, the Tunisian Revolution that was triggered on the 17th of December 2010. The revolution erupted when a young merchant set fire to himself in an act of protest against the government’s corrupt officers as well as their humiliating and degrading treatment of poor citizens. Tunisian youths marched in all Tunisian cities to support this young man. They also revolted against unemployment and corruption and called for democracy, dignity and employment. In this context, Hillary Clinton delivered speeches and press conferences on the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Being the US Secretary of State at that time, Clinton’s remarks reflected the American stand vis-à-vis Arab communities and its attitude towards what was going on in these Arab countries.

Since the present research is an attempt to examine factive presupposition and epistemic modality, Clinton’s political speeches seem to be a fruitful area of study because they may include a rich set of factive presuppositions and epistemic modals relating to democracy, human rights and liberties in the Arab world, more specifically in Tunisia. Moreover, Clinton’s remarks tackle an issue that represents the main concern of the world community, and whose outcomes are still affecting the whole Arab region. As a result, working on these speeches seems to be an inviting task that may uncover the cognitive mechanisms of Hillary Clinton’s mind as well as her perceptual and conceptual worlds. More emphasis will be on the degree of her commitment to the truthfulness of her utterances.
Chapter Three

Methodology

To reach this aim, Hillary Clinton’s remarks and speeches, that tackle the Arab Revolutions’ issue, have been downloaded from the following website: http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/index.htm (See Appendix III). Given the large amount of data, only the speeches relating to the Tunisian Revolution are selected for analysis. This choice can be justified by the attempt to limit the scope of analysis and allocate more importance to the quality of analyzed data. The time span is from January 2011 until January 2013. The choice of this period is justified by the fact that the first date dates back to the climax of uprisings in Tunisia and the departure of Ben Ali, the ex-Tunisian president, to Saudi Arabia. The second date represents the time by which Hillary Clinton finished her duties as the US Secretary of State.

It is worth noting that the questions of journalists or the remarks communicated by other interlocutors are deleted so as to concentrate on Clinton’s discourse only. Titles, sub-titles, time and place notes and reference remarks are also omitted to limit the scope of analysis to Clinton’s words only. The same applies to words, like ‘applause’, ‘laughter’ or ‘inaudible’. After selecting the speeches to be analyzed, a description of the selected remarks seems to be relevant to have a clear idea about the corpus to be analyzed.

3.1.2 Description of the corpus

The selected corpus consists of 27 speeches. 15 speeches regarding the Tunisian issue were delivered in 2011, while 12 speeches were released in 2012 (See Appendix A). The following chart illustrates the distribution of Hillary Clinton’s speeches per year and month:

Table 6

Frequency of Occurrence of Speeches in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of speeches</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

Frequency of Occurrence of Speeches in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of speeches</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

125
The links to the selected speeches are listed in Appendix B. These speeches are press statements, testimonies, remarks and interviews delivered by Hillary Clinton during the time span provided above and dealing with the Tunisian Revolution as well as its transitional process toward democracy.

3.2 Research methods

Creating a text file of the selected corpus, identifying the research instruments to be applied as well as describing the data collected for analysis are the main concerns of the present section.

3.2.1 Creating a Text File

After saving the 27 speeches in a Microsoft word file (See Appendix II), reference tags should be added to distinguish the different speech texts. The reference tag should be given to each text according to the date of delivery. It has to be placed before the speech text in a separate line. The reference form of the sample is, for instance, <D February25.12>. D refers to the date of delivery and is followed by a space, the month, date and year of the speech delivery. The date reference should be preceded and followed by the speech symbols < and >. The option ‘plain text’ should then be selected while saving the text so that the ‘.txt’ extension appears on the label of the file.

After creating and saving a Word text file with the extension ‘.txt’, the corpus has to be analyzed and processed by a concordance program due to the huge amount of data to be examined. “AntConc” software has been chosen to perform this task, and thus the project has been called “Speech.an.antconc” with reference to the selected concordance software. The next sub-section explains how this software works and what kind of options and functions it provides.

3.2.2 Tools

Given the complexity and length of the speeches, concordance software has been chosen to analyze the present corpus. The 3.5.0 “AntConc” version has been downloaded from the following website: http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/. The tutorial of an older version is available online from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3ukHC3fyuc. The 3.5.0 “AntConc” software is a concordance generator for Windows, Mackintosh OS X and Linux. This freeware corpus analysis tool was created in 2014 by Laurence Anthony. More
developed versions of this program have been produced with more sophisticated options since then.

This software includes seven tools for text and corpus analysis. Only three tools are useful for the analysis of the present corpus. First, the “Concordance” tool provides concordances of texts in the form of a list of certain words occurring in the text in a ‘KWIC’ (Key Word In Context) format. Second, the “Word List” tool calculates the number of all the words in a corpus and displays them in an alphabetically ordered list. It allows the analyst to find frequently used words in a corpus. Third, the “Keyword List” tool reveals the frequency of occurrence of given words and identifies their characteristics in a corpus. The lexical items to be analyzed by these research tools are specified in what follows.

3.2.3 Data collection

Epistemological or factive presupposition is the main focus of the current PhD study, along with epistemic modality. Factivity is to be analyzed within a combined framework. First, the classification of presupposition triggers is based on the works of Karttunen (1973), Levinson (1983), Yule (1996) and van Dijk (2003a). The data, that is subject to computational analysis, involves factive presupposition triggers, namely factive verbs, such as ‘know’, ‘prove’ and ‘recognize’, emotive verbs, like ‘regret’, ‘amazed’ and ‘be surprised’, and factive noun phrases, like ‘fact’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’.

Second, epistemic modality, mainly mental state verbs, like ‘think’, ‘understand’ and ‘acknowledge’, modal adjectives, like ‘certain’ and ‘sure’, modal adverbs, like ‘certainly’ and ‘obviously’, should be examined in the corpus to analyze factivity in epistemological presupposition. Therefore, only lexical presupposition is considered for analysis in the present study. These factive presupposition triggers and epistemic modals presuppose knowledge. These lexical items are illustrated in Appendix C. As a reminder, these discourse features may embed the following meanings, mentioned in section 2.3.2.6 and adapted from van Dijk (2003a, p. 113):
Table 8

Expressions Embedding Knowledge, adapted from van Dijk (2003a, p. 113)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meanings</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of events of the past</td>
<td>(remember, remind, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery of (new) knowledge</td>
<td>(realize)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain knowledge</td>
<td>(be confident that, it is obvious that, it is clear that)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant knowledge</td>
<td>(be afraid that, fear that, to admit that, to acknowledge that)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferential knowledge</td>
<td>(conclude that, understand that).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To analyze the collected data, the “Speech.an.antconc” file has to be processed by the “AntConc” software. Word frequency lists with KWIC concordances of the selected features should then be provided. The following is a KWIC frequency list of the mental state verb ‘think’ in a randomly selected sample:

![Figure 10. AntConc 3.5.0 Screenshot of the Frequency Distribution of the Mental State Verb ‘Think’ in the Sample](image)

KWIC concordance is helpful in that it provides the context in which a presupposition trigger occurs, and, therefore, allows the analyst to understand the meaning of epistemic presupposition and distinguish it from other meanings. However, the frequency of occurrence of a presupposition trigger, or the context in which it occurs, cannot allow a deep and appropriate understanding of the speaker’s view of the world, nor can it unveil her social or cognitive representations. This is the aim of the extra-linguistic analysis that goes beyond lexis and semantics to reach pragmatic and cognitive levels. The socio-cognitive analysis of the selected corpus is conducted within Dijk’s (1995b) triangular approach to discourse. This is clarified further in the following sub-section.
3.2.4 Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach

The framework of analysis is van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive approach to CDA. This choice is justified by the focus of the present study on factive and ideological knowledge scripts, constructed by factive presupposition and epistemic modality. Factive vs. ideological knowledge of the speaker has to be demystified via van Dijk’s (1995b) Discourse-Cognition-Society Triangle, which encompasses three stages of analysis. The following table, mentioned in section 2.3.3.2, summarizes these three analytical levels:

Table 9
Ideologies and Discourse: Levels of Analysis, adapted from van Dijk (1995b, p. 20)

1- Social Analysis
   - Overall societal structures, e.g., parliamentary democracy, capitalism
   - Institutional / Organizational structures, e.g., racist political parties
   - Group relations, e.g., discrimination, racism, sexism
   - Group structures: identity, tasks, goals, norms, position, resources

2- Cognitive Analysis
   a. Social cognition
      - Sociocultural values, e.g., intelligence, honesty, solidarity, equality
      - Ideologies, e.g., racist, sexist, anti-racist, feminist, ecological ...
      - Systems of attitudes, e.g., about affirmative action, multiculturalism ...
      - Sociocultural knowledge, e.g., about society, groups, language, ...
   b. Personal cognition
      i. General (context free)
         - Personal values: personal selections from social values
         - Personal ideologies: personal interpretations of group ideologies
         - Personal attitudes: systems of personal opinions
         - Personal knowledge: biographical information, past experiences
      ii. Particular (context-bound)
         - Models: ad hoc representations of specific current actions, events
         - Context models: ad hoc representations of the speech context
         - Mental plans and representation of (speech) acts, discourse
         - Mental construction of text meaning from models: the 'text base'
         - Mental (strategic) selection of discourse structures (style, etc.)

3- Discourse Analysis
   - The various structures of text and talk

The following sub-sections focus on implementing the three stages of analysis of van Dijk’s (1995b) approach on Hillary Clinton’s political discourse regarding human rights and democracy in the Arab world, more specifically Tunisia in post-Ben Ali era.
3.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation

The present sub-section is devoted to describing and interpreting the results of the sample analysis. The first stage tackles the discursive analysis of the collected data. The second stage focuses on the cognitive analysis of mental models, personal and social cognitions, mainly values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge. The third stage studies the social dimension of discourse.

3.3.1 Discursive analysis

The discourse stage of van Dijk’s approach consists of analyzing factive presupposition, based on an eclectic classification adopted from the works of Karttunen (1973), Levinson (1983), Yule (1996) and van Dijk (2003). This stage also sheds light on epistemic modality, based on the work of Nuyts (2001) on modal adjectives, modal adverbs and mental state verbs, and the work of van Dijk (2003a) on presupposed knowledge in discourse. At this level, these lexical items are analyzed in a randomly selected sample from the corpus (See Appendix D). To reach this aim, word frequency lists of factive presupposition triggers and epistemic modals are made.

Table 10

Frequency Distribution of Collected Data in the Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical features</th>
<th>Number of occurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certainly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 shows the frequency distribution of the collected data in the sample. Only the lexical items that trigger epistemic presupposition and epistemic modality are considered for analysis. More specifically, only the features used by Hillary Clinton and relating to the Tunisian democratic transition are taken into account. In other words, factive presupposition triggers that are not related to the Tunisian issue are deleted. For instance, items that occur in sentences that refer to Turkey or other topics than democracy and human rights are omitted, like in “And in fact, at the conference yesterday, the Turkish foreign minister representing the Islamist Party in Turkey spoke out in favor of all the minorities in Syria”. Although ‘in fact’ is a factive
presupposition trigger, it cannot be considered for analysis because it refers to Turkish-Syrian issues. It is also deleted because it occurs as a prepositional phrase, whereas the data collected for analysis does not involve this phrase category.

Such delimitations are justified by the requirements of the current research, which attempts to uncover factive and ideological knowledge in Clinton’s discourse about human rights and democracy in the Tunisian Revolution context. This has been made by both computational and manual handling of data. After the omission of irrelevant textual items, the data obtained is converted into the following table:

Table 11
*Frequency Distribution of Factive Presupposition Triggers and Epistemic Modals in the Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical features</th>
<th>Number of occurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certainly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>True</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table (11), the mental state verb ‘think’ (4) is the most dominant lexical item. Factive predicates are evenly distributed in the sample, mainly ‘know’ (1) and ‘recognize’ (1). The epistemic modal adverb ‘certainly’ (1) and the modal adjective ‘true’ (1) are also equally distributed in the sample. At this phase of analysis, mainly the discursive analysis of the sample, one has to study factive presupposition and epistemic modality. The following examples illustrate how the corpus will be analyzed at the discourse analytical stage of van Dijk’s (1995b) approach:

(1) *A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly and speech.*

The factive predicate ‘recognize’ presupposes that any individual is free to adopt the religion she believes in and that she has the right to association, assembly and speech. ‘Recognize’ presupposes the factuality of the complement which is presented as personal, presupposed knowledge of the speaker. The obligation set on religious parties presupposes that these parties do not recognize human rights.
(2) *I think that one of the biggest problems we have in the world today is people not respecting the views of others.*

The mental state verb ‘think’ reveals the speaker’s perception of people and her personal opinion about openness to other views. This verb unveils the presupposed knowledge in the utterance as well as the speaker’s foregrounded judgment.

(3) *And we think Tunisia is proceeding in the right direction, based on what we’re seeing.*

The proposition is expressed by both the mental state verb ‘think’ and the evidential predicate ‘see’ which trigger epistemic modality. The verb ‘think’ describes the epistemic state of the speaker and expresses an opinion based on evidence. Clinton uses a sensory evidential verb to make the information more reliable and give the impression of objectivity.

(4) *But then the people who are elected have to also respect their people. And that is true whether it is a Christian party, a Hindu party, or a Muslim party.*

The modal adjective ‘true’ in (4) enhances the truth conditionality of the previous proposition. The proposition P is that elected people have to respect their people. P is introduced as an unchallengeable or irrefutable fact. Hence, it encodes epistemic modality that commits the speaker to the truth of the utterance.

It is worth noting that verbs, like ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘watch’, ‘tell’ and ‘say’, are analyzed to enhance the factivity of presupposition and strengthen epistemic modality. These verbs have to be studied to convey the degree of the speaker’s commitment to the truth value of her propositions as well as the subjective/objective evaluation of her utterances. In other words, these verbs seem to be used as evidential markers to claim the objectivity of the propositional content of the utterances.

The discursive analysis of the sample (See Appendix E), however, cannot provide a fully-fledged interpretation of Clinton’s perception of democracy and human rights in Tunisia. Once the textual features in the sample have been examined, one has to tackle the second stage of analysis, mainly the cognitive interpretation of Clinton’s political discourse.
3.3.2 Cognitive analysis

At this level, the main concern is highlighting the cognitive processes of discourse production and comprehension, triggered by factive presupposition and epistemic modality, controlled by mental models and built upon the values, attitudes, knowledge and ideologies of participants. If personal mental models of political events (in this case Tunisia's Revolution and its democratic transition) and specific groups (Tunisians) of an influential person (the US ex-Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton) are shared with other groups or communities (democratic\non- democratic communities), these mental models may be generalized to build social representations about democracy, human rights and democratic transitions in the Arab world.

3.3.2.1 Personal and social cognition

Both personal and social cognitions are tackled at the cognitive level of analysis. The aim is highlighting the cognitive processes and representations involved in discourse production and understanding. As table (9) shows, personal cognition is divided into particular, context-bound mental models and representations, on the one hand, and general, context-free personal values, ideologies, attitudes and knowledge, on the other hand. It is worth noting that only the cognitive components relevant to the present PhD study are considered for analysis.

3.3.2.1.1 Particular context-bound models

Context models, text-base mental models and the cognitive mechanisms underlying them are the main focuses of the present sub-section.

3.3.2.1.1.1 Context models

Context models describe the constantly changing communicative situation in which participants are involved. Since only Clinton’s discourse is considered for analysis, focus has to be on how the US ex-Secretary of State understands and represents the communicative situation and how discourse is appropriate for this communicative event or context. The cognitive schemas of the basic categories are the setting, participants, including their identities, roles and relations, and action, involving goals. The time, place, participants and events in the selected sample are illustrated in the following chart:
According to table 12, Clinton’s speech was delivered in Baron d’Erlanger Palace in Tunis, Tunisia to address Tunisian youth, on February 25th, 2012. The context models of the communicative situation evoke images of a formal political discourse in a palace, within the context of an official visit to Tunisia. In this context, participants are represented as speakers and hearers, and the action is represented as verbal interaction. Since only Clinton’s remarks are selected for analysis, focus has to be on the speaker only and her role as the US Secretary of State in an official visit to a country that witnessed the awakening of the ‘Arab Spring’.

Context models represent the relevant features of the communicative situation as they control talk. Such context models have an epistemic component, mainly the k-device, which is necessary to explain the epistemic aspects of discourse, in this case factive presupposition and epistemic modality, and what is foregrounded or backgrounded during discourse production. This idea is elaborated further in what follows.

3.3.2.1.1.2 Mental models

Clinton’s personal experiences are supposed to be processed in Working Memory and represented and saved in Episodic Memory. In practice, Clinton’s mental representations, portrayed by discourse features, are analyzed in the following examples (See Appendix F for more details):

(1) *A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly, and speech.*

The mental models, inferred from (1), are generally related to human rights. Such a schematic categorization involves subcategories, like freedom of religion and freedom of speech. These mental categories and sub-categories seem to have a hierarchical structure, from general to specific. Another image schema is about religious parties that are presented as violators of human rights. These mental models may converge or diverge from the recipients' models.
(2) I think that one of the biggest problems we have in the world today is people not respecting the views of others.

In (2), Clinton’s mental models about respecting other views is based on her previous personal experiences. The cognitive representation that may be formed by the predicate ‘think’ and the first person singular ‘I’ is that the proposition is based on the speaker’s personal evaluation or judgment.

(3) And we think Tunisia is proceeding in the right direction, based on what we’re seeing.

The mental state predicate ‘think’ and the evidential verb ‘see’ in (3) construct personal image schemas about Tunisia. Clinton uses epistemic modality to build objective cognitive models that may not be refuted or challenged. Objectivity is claimed by the use of a sensory and direct evidential verb to give the impression that the information is reliable. However, mental models are basically subjective mental evaluations that can be challenged and rejected by recipients.

(4) But then the people who are elected have to also respect their people. And that is true whether it is a Christian party, a Hindu party, or a Muslim party.

The mental constructs in (4) are scripts related to election and mutual respect. Religion is mentally mapped in Clinton’s mind to involve image schemas about Christianity, Hinduism and Islam. More generally, cognitive representations are related to religious parties. The implicit, presupposed, idealized cognitive models (ICMs) collocated with these parties seem to be ‘not respecting different opinions or faiths’, hence intolerance and fanaticism.

The organizational structure of mental models seems to be hierarchical and categorical. The following figure illustrates the organizational structure of mental models relating to human rights in the sample:

![Diagram](image)

Figure 11. Diagrammatic Representation of the Organizational Structure of Human Rights in the Sample
In sum, the mental models, depicted by Clinton in the sample, reflect a personal state of affairs. They emanate from her personal experiences with ‘democratic election’, ‘political change’, ‘democratic development’, ‘freedom of religion’, ‘human rights’, ‘political parties’, ‘democratic values’, ‘religious faith’, etc. These mental models are what discourse is about, hence text-based mental models that may stem from socially and culturally shared representations.

3.3.2.1.2 General context-free models

To analyze general, context-free models, one has to study Clinton’s personal values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge expressed in her discourse. Personal values and attitudes are tackled simultaneously. Personal ideologies and knowledge are also analyzed together since the aim is unveiling the ideological background knowledge of the speaker vis a vis human rights and democracy in Tunisia.

3.3.2.1.2.1 Values and attitudes

Focus, at this stage, has to be on personal values and attitudes in Clinton’s discourse. The same examples in 3.3.1 are re-examined from a different analytical perspective.

(1) *A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly, and speech.*

The personal values, triggered by the factive predicate ‘recognize’ in (1), are the freedom of faith and the rights to association, assembly and speech. Clinton shows a positive attitude towards such human rights' values.

(2) *I think that one of the biggest problems we have in the world today is people not respecting the views of others.*

Respecting the opinions of others is an important value according to Clinton. The mental state verb ‘think’ reveals the addresser’s personal opinion about rejecting other views. Thus, Clinton shows a negative attitude towards this problem.

(3) *And we think Tunisia is proceeding in the right direction, based on what we’re seeing.*

In (3), Clinton expresses appreciation of Tunisia’s democratization process. The proposition after the verb ‘think’ embeds the speaker’s point of view, hence a positive evaluation of the Tunisian model in the region. Clinton implicitly promotes the values of democracy and freedom.
(4) *But then the people who are elected have to also respect their people. And that is true whether it is a Christian party, a Hindu party, or a Muslim party.*

Clinton highlights the values of mutual respect and religious tolerance. She invites elected people to respect people who elected them, hence moral ethics. To have a clearer idea about the human rights' values highlighted by Clinton in the sample, one has to work on the frequency of the lexis related to this concept. This is illustrated in the following figure:

![Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Human Rights Rhetoric in the Sample](image)

**Figure 12. Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Human Rights Rhetoric in the Sample**

According to figure (12), the word *religion(s)* is the most frequently used human right-related rhetoric in the sample with 6 occurrences. It is followed by its adjective ‘religious’ (4) and the noun ‘faith’ (4), which are evenly distributed in the sample.

In the sample, Clinton calls for religious tolerance and accepting others’ beliefs, even of those who do not adopt any religion. Clinton states that she is a strong Christian believer, but she respects other faiths. Apart from religious ethics, Clinton highlights the importance of democratic values for peaceful coexistence. Consequently, there are two repertoires in the sample: a repertoire related to some religious values and another one related to democratic values. Clinton’s ideological background is elaborated further in the following sub-section.
3.3.2.1.2.2 Ideologies and knowledge

At this level of analysis, Clinton’s personal interpretations of group ideologies are highlighted. More specifically, focus has to be on the personal schema of Hillary Clinton, as a member of particular social or political groups, such as democrats, humanists and feminists. In addition, Clinton’s presupposed, personal knowledge on the Tunisian issue, democracy and human rights has to be demystified. This is clarified in the following examples from the sample:

(1) A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly, and speech.

The use of the expression ‘freedom of speech, assembly and association’ reveals the ideological background of the speaker. The factive predicate ‘recognize’ presupposes the non-knowledge of politicians, who are members of religious parties. One can infer that religious parties do not respect people’s rights to adopt different religions, join associations, gather for political or religious reasons and express oneself freely. This may uncover Clinton's knowledge state and her ideological background as a promoter of democracy and human rights.

(2) I think that one of the biggest problems we have in the world today is people not respecting the views of others.

Respecting the opinions of people who are different from us is one of the pillars of democracy. ‘Think’ is used with the first person singular pronoun ‘I’ to reveal the speaker’s knowledge state and her personal, ideological perception of events and entities tackled in her utterance.

(3) And we think Tunisia is proceeding in the right direction, based on what we’re seeing.

Clinton’s ideological background is unveiled when she supports Tunisia’s democratic transition. This implies that she opposes dictatorship and fanaticism. The use of ‘we’ gives the impression that she shifts from expressing her personal knowledge to sharing group knowledge.

(4) But then the people who are elected have to also respect their people. And that is true whether it is a Christian party, a Hindu party, or a Muslim party.
Chapter Three

Methodology

The epistemic state of the speaker is reflected by the construction ‘that is true’. This latter uncovers Clinton’s ideological background and her certainty about the truth value of the proposition, which depends on the k-device of her epistemic community.

Clinton’s ideological background seems to be explicit when she tackles the issue of democratic transitions in North Africa and the Middle East. To unveil the speaker’s ideological background, one has to provide frequency lists of the rhetoric related to democracy in the sample. The results are illustrated in the following figure:

![Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Democracy Rhetoric in the Sample](image)

Figure 13. Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Democracy Rhetoric in the Sample

According to figure (13), words relating to democracy, political parties and elections are frequently used in the sample. One can clearly notice the dominant use of the noun ‘party’, with 19 occurrences. Other items relating to democracy are used, like ‘democratic’ (3 uses) and ‘elections’ (2 uses). The frequent use of the lexical item 'party' demonstrates that Clinton is concerned with plurality as one of the milestones of democracy in the Arab world.

The analysis of Clinton’s ideology in the sample leads to positive SELF-PRESENTATION, like accepting others who have different religious faiths or beliefs. Clinton gives a positive account of herself and her community. This presupposes the existence of ‘OTHER’ groups that do not share the same norms and ideologies. This also presupposes that these groups are not as good as ‘WE’, hence negative OTHER-PRESENTATION. This results in adversity between the ‘WE’ groups and ‘THEY’ groups. Clinton explicitly refers to ‘WE’ group as a democratic and tolerant group. It is in stark contrast with non-democratic, intolerant or religiously fanatic groups.
To better study ideology in the sample, one has to examine group identities, activities, goals, relations and interests. The following categories have been analyzed in the sample:

Table 13

*Group Ideological Identities, Activities, Goals, Norms, Relations and Interests in the Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Norms</th>
<th>Groups Relations</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WE</td>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>Fostering democracy</td>
<td>Democratize the Arab world</td>
<td>Support and assist pro-democracy</td>
<td>Democracy, human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries in transition</td>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>Implementing democracy</td>
<td>Complete democratic transition successfully</td>
<td>Friends with democratic countries</td>
<td>Democracy, human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEY</td>
<td>Arab non-democratic countries</td>
<td>Opposing democracy</td>
<td>Control revolutions and transitions</td>
<td>Dictatorship, oppression, fanaticism, intolerance</td>
<td>Enemies of democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This leads, first, to polarization that divides the world into democratic and non-democratic poles and, second, to an ideological square that characterizes our relations with other groups.

- Emphasize Our Good Things
- Emphasize Their Bad Things
- Mitigate Our Bad Things
- Mitigate Their Good Things

As far as knowledge is concerned, one can notice that Clinton’s opinions and evaluations of events and entities seem to be presented as factive knowledge. She seems to introduce propositions as unchallengeable and irrefutable real facts. The use of the verb ‘recognize’ and ‘that is true’ construction shows a strong personal involvement on the part of the speaker and her commitment to the truth value of p. This seems to reveal her perceptual and conceptual worlds as well as her epistemological state while evaluating the world. After examining personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge, one has to study the social aspect of Clinton's cognition in the randomly selected sample.
Chapter Three

3.3.2.2 Social cognition

While mental models are personal and unique, social cognition is socially shared with other members of the same epistemic community. Social communities, groups and organizations are not only defined by social parameters, like social practices and membership in society, but also by the cognitive representations shared by their members.

3.3.2.2.1 Socio-cultural values and systems of attitudes

Clinton’s personal values seem to be selections from the socio-cultural values of her community. Respecting others, being tolerant and being a strong believer are some of the many values that are shared by social, national and even international communities. Such values stem from the socio-cultural heritage of any society or culture. They may have broader national and international dimensions.

Personal attitudes are influenced by others’ attitudes. Others may be a group, a community, a nation, or the international community as a whole. The cluster of individuals’ personal attitudes forms systems of attitudes within an epistemic community about, for instance, immigration, euthanasia, abortion or cloning. In Clinton’s remarks, her personal opinions and attitudes seem to be built on western norms and attitudes. More specifically, Clinton seems to share positive or negative attitudes from an American perspective. Being the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton transmits the American perception and attitude towards religions, democracy and human rights in Arab countries, in this case Tunisia.

It is, however, crucial to highlight that, sometimes, the personal values and opinions of Clinton about, for instance religious faith, as represented in her mental models, are different from the socially shared opinions of social groups. This depends on group values, norms, goals and interests. It may also depend on group ideologies and their k-device. This idea is clarified in the following sub-section.

3.3.2.2.2 Ideologies and Socio-cultural knowledge

After dealing with the personal ideological representations of Clinton as a member of the democratic community in previous sub-sections, focus, at this level, has to be on the socially shared ideological representations embedded in Clinton’s discourse. The exact mental organization of ideology is still vague, but one can focus on their general categories in ideologically-based discourse. As for knowledge, it seems to be stored, retrieved and activated by the speaker. Once produced in discourse, it becomes socially shared knowledge.
In the sample, personal mental models about Muslims, Christians, democratic elections, human rights and other concepts become shared knowledge according to the k-criteria of Clinton’s epistemic community. Cognitive slots and schemas are activated to depict ideologically based frames about discourse. Such knowledge scripts seem to emanate from previous knowledge selected from SRs or past personal experiences with the real and conceptual worlds. After analyzing Clinton’s speech discursively and cognitively, the third stage of van Dijk’s (1995b) triangular approach is tackled in the following section.

### 3.3.3 Social analysis

The social level of discourse analysis examines the overall societal structures, institutional structures, group relations and group structures.

#### 3.3.3.1 Overall societal structures

The overall societal structures that may be noticed in the sample are twofold. At the micro level, Clinton is addressing Tunisian youth, hence an interaction between social actors in a social situation. Personal mental models of social members are transmitted via discourse. At the macro-level, these participants belong to different groups or communities, for instance west and east, democratic and non-democratic nations etc. Socially shared values, attitudes, knowledge and ideologies seem to be shared between the social actors of the same epistemic group. This can be illustrated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of structure</th>
<th>Cognition</th>
<th>Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro</strong></td>
<td>Socially shared knowledge</td>
<td>Communities, groups, organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes, ideologies, norms, values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro</strong></td>
<td>Personal mental models of</td>
<td>Interaction/discourse of social members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(experiences of) social members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clinton seems to belong to democrat, humanist, feminist and Christian groups in the present sample. These groups, however, may have conflicting and contrasting values, attitudes and ideologies. Apart from social actors and social roles, the institutional structures of discourse are studied in what follows.
3.3.3.2 Institutional\organizational structures

The organizational structure seems to be hierarchical since Clinton’s institutional role is the representative and the Secretary of State of the USA. The US is a superpower, so it controls access to discourse. Subsequently, as a Secretary of State, Clinton belongs to a dominant group, ideologically and physically. Tunisian youth belong to a developing country in the process of democratization. They pertain to dominated communities. As for the institutional place, the speech was delivered in a Palace in Tunis, Tunisia, which triggers formal context models about the social situation. The institutional structure is illustrated in the following table:

Table 15

_Institutional Settings, Social Actors, Institutional Roles and Social Situations in the Sample_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Institutional Place</th>
<th>Social Actors and Institutional role</th>
<th>Social Situation Context Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-02-2012</td>
<td>Baron d’Erlanger Palace, Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, Tunisian youths, moderator and journalists</td>
<td>Remarks at Town Hall With Tunisian Youth. Context models: formal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (15) shows the institutional settings, mainly time and place, the social actors involved in the communicative event and their institutional roles as well as the social situation and the depicted context models. After analyzing the social as well as institutional structures of Clinton’s discourse, the following sub-section examines group relations.

3.3.3.3 Group relations

Clinton seems to build a relationship of cooperation, support and assistance with countries that seek political change and democratic transition. However, the US relations with non-democratic communities that oppose democracy and human rights seem to be different. These relations seem to be based on enmity, mistrust and conflict. In the sample, religious parties seem to be categorized in the periphery of Clinton’s mental map, unless they adopt democratic principles and human rights' values.

In terms of power relations, Clinton, as a member of the US government, is in a higher position than the hearers. This may pave the way for hegemony and domination by controlling public discourse and deciding on the topics to be fore-grounded or back-grounded. Clinton belongs to dominant groups that attempt to influence ideologically
dominated groups, in this case Tunisia, to implement democracy and protect human rights in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure.

Relations between groups can also be analyzed in terms of CENTRE-PERIPHERY, NEAR-FAR, RIGHT-WRONG, POSITIVE-NEGATIVE and GOOD-BAD image schemas or mental mapping. Each group can be collocated with ICMs that prototypically describe it in terms of mental models, cognitive frames, or cognitive image schemas. After dealing with the kind of relations that characterize groups in Clinton’s discourse, one has to examine group structures in what follows.

3.3.3.4 Group structures

Regarding the structure of the groups mentioned in Hillary Clinton’s speech, the following categories have been analyzed in the sample:

Table 16

| Group Characteristics: Identity, Goals, Norms, Group Reference and Interests in the Sample |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Identity                                      | Goals                       | Norms             | Reference Groups                | Interests                        |
| Democratic groups                             | American Christian          | Convince Arab countries of the benefits of democracy. | Democracy Religious tolerance Anti-dictatorship Anti fanaticism | We\Us\the US Democratic countries | Democratize the Arab world          |
| Countries in transition, in this case Tunisia | Tunisian                    | Adopting a democratic political system | Democracy, human rights, free elections, less corruption, employment, dignity | Our friends                         | Our allies | Political and social reforms |
| Non-democratic groups                         | Arab countries against democracy | Impede democratic transitions | Extremism, lack of freedom, intolerance, human rights violation | They \ them \ Extremists \ Our enemies | Domination, power, oppressing people |
as opposing the American norms and values. The US norms are based on human rights, like the freedom of religion, association, assembly and speech. Other norms are based on respecting other religions and political views, hence democracy. These norms stand in stark contrast with the norms and interests of non-democratic communities. Analyzing discourse within this social framework that incorporates socially shared representations may lead to ‘Out-group derogation’ and ‘In-group celebration’. These are social and cognitive strategies that may typically divide the world according to particular norms and values.

In short, within this theoretical framework of discourse-cognition-society triangle, discursive, cognitive and social facets of Clinton's discourse will be analyzed to unmask presupposed, factive knowledge vs. ideologically tainted beliefs.

3.4 Validation of Research Findings

After describing the corpus of the current study and implementing the research methods on a randomly selected sample from the corpus, one has to investigate the validation of the research results. Indeed, a validation test has been prepared to check the reliability of the research findings (See Appendix T). The responses of the subjects are expected to enhance and confirm the validity of the research results. An illustration of correct and incorrect answers, along with percentages, have to be provided to give a clear idea about the validation test results (See section 4.3 of this PhD paper for more details).

To sum up, chapter three of the present PhD thesis has been divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section has provided a description of the corpus and the selection criteria used. The second sub-section has shed light on the research instruments used and the collected data that should be analyzed in the sample. After identifying the selected framework to analyze the sample, mainly van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive approach, the third sub-section describes its three analytical stages, mainly the discursive, cognitive and social stages of analysis. The last sub-section in chapter three has been devoted to the validation test that is supposed to confirm the reliability of the research findings. These stages of discourse analysis are applied to the whole corpus of the present study in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Chapter four displays the results obtained from both the computational and manual analyses of the whole corpus. These findings have to be analyzed and interpreted on the basis of three levels of analysis, mainly discourse, cognition and society. After implementing the socio-cognitive processing of discourse, discussing the most important results of the research is a focal step to reach the present study’s objectives. The final step is validating the research findings to enhance the accuracy of the current PhD paper.

4.1 Findings

As stated in chapter three, the discourse-cognition-society approach is triangular. First, since a combined framework of analysis is implemented, the pragmatic analysis of factive presupposition and epistemic modality is tackled at the first stage of analysis, or the discourse level. Second, the cognitive analysis focuses on Clinton’s personal and social cognitions, mainly mental models, personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge regarding democracy and human rights in Tunisia. Third, the social analysis tackles the overall societal and institutional structures as well as group relations and structures.

4.1.1 Discursive analysis

At this level of analysis, the corpus of the present PhD research has been processed both computationally and manually. After the computational analysis of the collected data, the following frequency lists have been obtained:
Table 17

*Frequency Distribution of Factive Presupposition Triggers and Epistemic Modals in the Corpus (Computational Analysis Only)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factive Lexical Triggers</th>
<th>Emotive verbs</th>
<th>Epistemic modality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factive verbs</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mental state verbs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciate (0)</td>
<td>Be afraid that (0)</td>
<td>Acknowledge (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be aware (2) Be forced to (1)</td>
<td>Be amazed (0)</td>
<td>Admitted (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear in mind (0)</td>
<td>Be glad (0)</td>
<td>Agree(d) (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discover (0)</td>
<td>Be indifferent that (0)</td>
<td>Conclude (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find out (0)</td>
<td>Be proud (7)</td>
<td>Think (82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forget (1)</td>
<td>Be sad that (0)</td>
<td>Understand (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know (70)</td>
<td>Be sorry that (0)</td>
<td>Infer (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prove (3)</td>
<td>Be surprised (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realize (1)</td>
<td>Regret (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remember (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remind (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factive Noun Phrases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No doubt (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal adverbs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain (5), clearly (5), confidently (0), evidently (0), obviously (5), probably (1), supposedly (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal adjectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain (5), clear (13), confident (5), conscious of (0), evident (1), obvious (3), probable (0), sure (10), true (17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (17) shows the absence of some factive predicates, such as ‘appreciate’, ‘discover’, ‘bear in mind’ and ‘find out’. Similarly, it demonstrates the absence of many emotive verbs, like ‘regret’, ‘be surprised’, ‘be afraid’, ‘be sorry’ etc. Only the emotive predicate ‘be proud’ has been found in the corpus. In addition, one can highlight the absence of some modal adverbs, such as ‘confidently’, ‘evidently’ and ‘supposedly’. Finally, modal adjectives, like ‘probable’ and ‘conscious’, are not used in the corpus, along with the noun phrases ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’.

It is important to note that the different forms of factive verbs have been processed by the ‘AntConc’ software. For instance, to obtain the total number of the frequency of occurrence of the predicate ‘know’, one has to enter the base form ‘know’, the past simple form ‘knew’, the past participle ‘known’ and the present participle ‘knowing’ separately. Another example is the factive predicate ‘remember’, which occurs 6 times in the present...
simple form ‘remember’ and 1 time in the present participle form ‘remembering’. The same can be noted about mental state verbs, like ‘think’ and ‘understand’.

Second, manual handling of the obtained data is necessary to delete the lexical features that do not express factive presupposition or epistemic modality. As such, many items have been omitted from the above table. For example, the verb ‘realize’ has more than one meaning. The occurrences where ‘realize’ means ‘achieve’ are omitted, like in “And everyone must be involved to realize the aspiration” (See App. B, p. 6), or in “I have a dream. It’s a lot of work to realize a dream.” (See App. B, p. 10). Another example is the use of the adjective ‘certain’. Only one use of ‘certain’ presupposes the knowledge of the speaker. The remaining occurrences of ‘certain’, which mean some or specific, are, therefore, removed from the word frequency list. This can be clearly displayed in the following screenshot:

Figure 14. ‘Ant.Conc’ Screenshot of the Frequency of Occurrence of the Adjective ‘Certain’ in the Corpus

Other delimitations are related to the adjective ‘sure’. For instance, its occurrences with the verb ‘make’ have not been considered while collecting the data from the corpus. This can be shown in the following screenshot:
Apart from these delimitations, only the lexical items related to the Tunisian issue, in particular, or democracy and human rights as universal values, in general, are taken into account. Items related to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain are not considered for analysis. After implementing such omissions, the following frequency distribution list is obtained:

Table 18

*Frequency Distribution of Factive Presupposition Triggers and Epistemic Modals in the Corpus (Both Computational and Manual Analyses)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factive lexical triggers (94 items)</th>
<th>Epistemic modality (104 items)</th>
<th>Total N of Lexical Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factive verbs (80 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be aware (2)</td>
<td>Be proud (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be forced (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forget (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know (51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prove (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realize (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remember (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remind (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotive verbs (5 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledge (1), admit (1), think (51), understand (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factive Noun Phrases (9 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modal adverbs (18 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainly (10), clearly (3), obviously (4), probably (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modal adjectives (24 items)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain (1), clear (7), confident (4), obvious (2), sure (2), true (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15. ‘Ant.Conc’ Screenshot of the Frequency of Occurrence of the Adjective ‘Sure’ in the Corpus
Table (18) has been converted into the following diagrams to give a clearer idea about the frequency of occurrence of the remaining lexical features after the manual analysis of the obtained data:

![Factive Predicates, Emotive Verbs, Factive Noun Phrases](image1)

*Figure 16. Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Factive Presupposition Triggers in the Corpus*

To display the frequency distribution of epistemic modality, mainly mental state verbs, modal adjectives and modal adverbs, one can examine the following diagram:

![Mental State Verbs, Modal Adjectives, Modal Adverbs](image2)

*Figure 17. Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Epistemic Modals (Mental State Verbs, Modal Adjectives & Modal Adverbs) in the Corpus*

After examining table (18), which illustrates the lexical features to be analyzed in the whole corpus, one can note the important use of factive presupposition in Clinton’s political discourse, with a total number of 94 lexical items. Factive predicates come first with 80 occurrences, followed by factive noun phrases with 9 uses and emotive verbs with 5 uses. The
most frequently used item in the category of factive predicates is the verb ‘know’ with 51 occurrences, followed by the verb ‘recognize’ (15 items) and ‘remember’ (4 items). As for the noun phrase category, the noun phrase ‘no doubt’ is used 4 times, while the noun ‘fact’ is utilized 3 times. The noun ‘reality’ occurs only 2 times in the corpus. It is worth noting that the nouns ‘fact’ and ‘reality’ in prepositional phrases, such as ‘in fact’ and ‘in reality’, are not considered for analysis since the main concern is about factive noun phrases. Finally, only the emotive verb ‘be proud’ is used in the corpus 5 times. Factive predicates represent the largest block in figure (16) since they are the dominant lexical features in the factive presupposition category.

One can also highlight the important use of epistemic modals (104 occurrences), mainly mental state verbs (62 occurrences), modal adjectives (24 items) and modal adverbs (18 uses). Among the mental state verb category, the verb ‘think’ is the most dominant mental state predicate with 51 items. The second most frequently used verb is ‘understand’ with 9 occurrences. Among the modal adjective category, one can notice the dominance of the adjectives ‘true’ (8 features) and ‘clear’ (7 features), and the quite important use of the adjective ‘confident’ (4 features). Last but not least, within the epistemic modal adverb category, one can highlight the important use of the adverb ‘certainly’ (10) and the approximately similar uses of the adverbs ‘obviously’ (4) and ‘clearly’ (3). One can, therefore, deduce that factive predicates (80) and mental state verbs (62) are the most dominant lexical categories in Clinton's political discourse.

The discursive analysis of the present corpus tackles each lexical trigger of factive presupposition and epistemic modality in table (18). At this stage of the study, factive presupposition lexical triggers and epistemic modality features are analyzed according to their frequency of occurrence from the most frequently used lexical items to the least frequently used ones. To start with, one can focus on the most dominant lexical feature, the mental state verb ‘think’ that occurs 51 times in the corpus (See Appendix J).

(1) And I think the message is one that I particularly resonate to because the revolution here in Tunisia has not only made a significant difference in the lives of Tunisians, but it has also given hope to people everywhere (Feb.25.2.12 \App. B, p. 25).

The verb ‘think’ in (1) unMASKS the mental state of the speaker and presupposes knowledge about what is expressed. It can be interpreted as a description of a mental act in which the speaker’s judgment about a proposition with respect to her current beliefs could feature. What is fore-grounded in (1) is that the Tunisian revolution has domestically changed the lives of
Tunisians and has internationally inspired hopeless and oppressed people. ‘Think’ indicates weak commitment on the part of the speaker regarding the assertivity of the proposition. Instead, it highlights the idea that the proposition is more a subjective personal opinion than an asserted truth. As such, it can be challenged or refuted.

The factive verb ‘know’ is as frequently distributed as the mental state verb ‘think’ in the corpus, with 51 items (See Appendix G).

(2) And we are investing in innovation, because we know that governments on the other side of this fight are constantly improving their methods of oppression, and we intend to stay ahead of them (Dec.6.12 \ App. B, p. 41).

The construction ‘know that’ presupposes the factivity of the proposition in ‘that-clause’. The background assumption here is that knowledge of the speaker is presupposed by the primary verb ‘know’. The fore-grounded assumption, however, is the idea that non-democratic governments do not give up developing oppressive methods. The ‘know that’ construction presupposes that p coincides with the real world as it coincides with the speaker’s perceptual world. The semi-factive predicate ‘know’ is also used in other forms, like in (3).

(3) So Minister, please know the United States remains committed to supporting Tunisia as you deal with this current situation, as you continue your democratic transition, and we want to be with you as you confront challenges and help seize opportunities together for the betterment of the future of Tunisia (Sept.21.12 \ App. B, p. 30).

The imperative form of the semi-factive predicate ‘know’ in (3) presupposes the knowledge of the speaker, but the lack of knowledge on the part of the hearer. The verb ‘know’ is an unchallenged mental act that evaluates the embedded proposition in terms of the speaker’s knowledge state. Unlike ‘think’, the factivity of the embedded clause cannot be questioned.

‘Recognize’ is a pure-factive predicate, and it is ranked third in terms of the frequency of occurrence in the corpus with 15 uses.

(4) In all my conversations with high-ranking officials in these countries, I recognize that particularly in Tunisia and Libya, the people I’m talking to were often victims of security forces, imprisoned, seeking exile, beaten, in some cases, tortured (Oct.12.11 \ App. B, p. 36).
The idea that people in Tunisia and Libya are suffering from police ill-treatment is expressed in a non-assertive clause. The factive predicate ‘recognize’ shows that the speaker has previous knowledge about the situation in these two countries. As it implies accepting that something is true, the predicate ‘recognize’ presupposes the factivity of ‘that-clause’, and therefore its truth is taken for granted.

The fourth most frequently used item in the corpus is the adverbial ‘certainly’ with 10 occurrences (See Appendix K). Certainly is a modal adverb that presupposes the speaker’s knowledge and reveals a high degree of certainty about the truthfulness of p.

(5) And certainly in Tunisia, they are saying all the right things. They are saying that they will protect women’s rights, that – they are saying that they will protect human rights (Feb.26.12 \App. B, p. 26).

‘Certainly’ adds an evidential dimension to the proposition p. The speaker uses it to say statements that she believes to be true and for which she has evidence from the real world. The adverbial ‘certainly’ typically occurs when there is contrast regarding an issue. Indeed, a proposition may be presented as certain in contrast with another one. ‘Certainly’, therefore, stresses that whatever uncertainties about women’s rights in other regions are, the speaker is certain about Tunisia’s attempts to protect women’s rights, in particular, and human rights, in general. It seems to be impossible to doubt, challenge, or disagree with the speaker’s evaluation of epistemic necessity.

The verb ‘understand’ is the second most frequently distributed mental state verb after ‘think’, with 9 occurrences in the selected corpus.

(6) We meet with them at their places of worship and in their homes so we can better understand the challenges they face as we elevate religious freedom both in international settings and bilateral diplomacy (Dec.6.12 \App. B, p. 39).

The predicate ‘understand’ presupposes the truth of the complement. It describes the mental state of the speaker and embeds her presupposed knowledge regarding the challenges that countries in transition are facing. ‘Understand’ means the mental act of grasping an already taken for granted fact or idea. The truthfulness of the proposition does not seem to be a matter of doubt since its presupposed factivity is expressed via the mental state verb ‘understand’.
‘True’ is the most frequently used epistemic modal adjective in the corpus, with 8 occurrences (See Appendix L).

(7) *It’s very true that many governments attempt to squeeze civil society in a steel vise, and we are seeing a particular movement against the LGBT community around the world, punishing people, harassing them, beating them, imprisoning them for who they are* (Dec.6.12 \App. B, p. 41).

‘It’s very true that’ construction in (7) emphasizes the truth value of the proposition. The adjective ‘true’ is boosted by the intensifier ‘very’ to stress on the truth conditionality of the embedded clause. Indeed, the proposition that governments attempt to squeeze civil society in a steel vise is presented as an unchallengeable truth. This has been suggested by the speaker’s strong epistemic commitment to the truthfulness of the proposition.

The epistemic modal adjective ‘clear’ is repeated 7 times in the corpus. It also presupposes the knowledge of the speaker.

(8) *So, as we look forward to help those who are emerging, let us also be clear that we must prevent any setbacks to democracy in our own countries and regions* (July 1.11 \App. B, p. 16).

The construction ‘be clear that’ in (8) indicates the clarity of the propositional content of the complement clause. It unveils the mental state of affairs of the addresser as well as the truthfulness of ‘that-clause’ proposition. Preventing setbacks to democracy in democratic countries must be clearly guaranteed. This rejects any doubts about the felicity conditions of the utterance.

The emotive factive predicate ‘be proud’ is also used 5 times in the corpus (See Appendix H). The following is an example:

(9) *The United States has been very proud to support your efforts, and we understand very well the importance of bringing an end to the violence in Libya not only for the innocent Libyan people but also for Tunisia* (Mar.17.4.11 \App. B, p. 13).

What is presupposed in (9) is the US moral engagement to support Tunisia. The predicate ‘be proud’ embeds the idea that what is expressed in the complement is positive. It also indicates that the proposition is a source of pride. It describes the internal, emotive state of affairs of the speaker.
‘Remember’ is a semi-factive predicate that is utilized 4 times in the corpus.

(10) *I can remember so well when I was First Lady, and I was visiting Guatemala, and I was introduced to a woman who had been an activist on behalf of indigenous people and had suffered greatly trying to prevent abuses against people who were defenseless against private militias or the government’s armies* (Dec. 6.12 \ App. B, p. 41).

What is presupposed in (10) is that Hillary Clinton was the First Lady of the USA and that she visited Guatemala. As such, the factive verb ‘remember’ presupposes the factivity of all the propositions mentioned after it. Indeed, ‘remember’ presupposes that the speaker is committed to the truth value of the proposition while excluding the possibility that it may be false. Clinton does not present the proposition as being subject to debate, and she does not even allow that the proposition might be at issue. Subsequently, the speaker implicitly imposes a particular thematic-pragmatic organization of discourse.

‘Confident’ is a modal adjective that occurs 4 times in the present corpus.

(11) *As you know, there’s a global economic downturn affecting much of the world right now, but I am confident that Tunisia has a way forward that will lead to success for this important country at this point in your history* (Feb. 25.2.12 \ App. B, p. 26).

The use of the epistemic modal adjective ‘confident’ with the first person singular encompasses a strong epistemic commitment to the truth of the proposition on the part of the speaker. The addresser is confident about Tunisia’s successful future. The propositional content of the utterance is presented as a personal point of view that reveals Clinton’s perception of Tunisia’s future, hence her perceptual world. P is, thus, presented as factive, presupposed knowledge that encodes a high degree of confidence and certitude.

‘Obviously’ is an epistemic modal adverbial that is used 4 times in the corpus.

(12) *We obviously have a great deal to discuss, and I want to thank the Foreign Minister and the Government of Tunisia for their efforts over the last week to help secure our Embassy and the American Cooperative School of Tunis following the violent assaults of last Friday* (Sept. 21.12 \ App. B, p. 29).

The modal adverbial ‘obviously’ indicates a high degree of certainty on the part of the speaker. Such an adverb describes a mental act that rejects any doubt or possibility of the participants’ refusal to accept the propositional content of the utterance. The speaker is
doubtless regarding the great deal of issues to be discussed between her and the Tunisian officials, and generally between the US and the Tunisian government.

‘No doubt’ is repeated 4 times in the corpus (See Appendix I).

(13) There is no doubt that the most important goal for most people in the world today is a decent life for themselves and their families. At the very least, that must be the goal that we deliver on (Feb. 28.11 \ App. B, p. 2).

‘No doubt that’ construction triggers the presupposition that what is stated in that-clause is necessarily true. The speaker expresses a personal opinion as presupposed information that is not open to discussion. Subjective epistemic modality expresses different degrees of the speaker’s commitment to the factuality of the embedded proposition. In this case, the speaker’s strong engagement to the truth conditionality of the proposition is clear. This can also be elaborated in the following example:

(14) In the time since I began speaking just minutes ago, more than 300 hours of video has been uploaded to YouTube. Some of it, no doubt, is vile. Some of it, no doubt, is offensive to my religion or yours (Sep. 28.12 \ App. B, p. 32).

Unlike (13) where ‘no doubt’ is used in object position, in (14) ‘no doubt’ is used as adverbial of certainty. It means the speaker’s firm belief that what is stated is true. What is presupposed is that the propositions are irrefutable. The ‘no doubt’ construction introduces background, presupposed pieces of information while highlighting new ones. These pieces of information are not likely to be refuted or rejected by recipients.

The factive noun phrase ‘fact’ is used 3 times in the corpus. It is used in different sentence positions in Clinton’s utterances.

(15) [...] the fact that they want to be part of a family and a community; a good job and a livelihood; a chance to learn and try to make sense of the world; to seek meaning and fulfillment in their choice of religious faith and practice (Dec. 6.12 \ App. B, p. 44).

What is presupposed is that people want to be part of a family and a community, that they want a good job and a livelihood, that they want a chance to learn and try to make sense of the world and that they want to seek meaning and fulfillment in their choice of religious faith and practice. Consequently, ‘the fact that’ construction triggers series of factive presuppositions. ‘The fact that’ is a marker that encompasses a strong epistemic claim. The speaker introduces
it as factual information that is already known to certain people. Indeed, all the propositions mentioned after the ‘fact that’ construction seem to be undisputed by the recipients because of the strong epistemic certainty of the speaker.

Apart from occurring in subject position in a sentence, the factive noun phrase ‘fact’ is found in object position in the corpus, like in the following example:

(16) *I mean, if you go to the United States, you see mosques everywhere, you see Muslim Americans everywhere. That’s the fact. So I would not pay attention to the rhetoric* (Feb. 25.1.12 \App. B, p. 25).

The existence of mosques and Muslim Americans everywhere in the USA is presupposed and asserted at the same time. The noun phrase ‘the fact’ allows the speaker to suggest certain ideas or beliefs which may not be shared knowledge or may be outside the domain of truths for some people. Epistemic backgrounds are not always understood in an objective way in terms of what is known in the epistemic community, but are often restricted to the speaker’s current knowledge state. In (16), the construction ‘that’s the fact’ asserts the factivity of p from the speaker’s angle or perceptual world.

The modal adverb ‘clearly’ is used 3 times in the corpus and it signals the clarity of p.

(17) *Clearly this is a moment of significant transition in Tunisia and through this period and beyond it is important that the Tunisian Government respect the right of its people to peacefully assemble and express their views* (Jan.14.11 \App. B, p. 1).

The proposition that ‘this is a moment of significant transition in Tunisia’ is introduced as factive, presupposed knowledge. ‘Clearly’ is an evaluative epistemic modal adverbial that designates the clarity of the speaker’s thoughts in (17). It presupposes the speaker’s knowledge and implicitly confirms the factivity of the proposition. The Tunisian democratic transition is evaluated as significant. This evaluation highlights the subjective, personal reading of events on the part of the speaker.

The pure factive predicate ‘prove’ is used 3 times in the corpus.

(18) *You proved that if you don’t listen to the people, you don’t respond to their needs, you don’t build a democracy that is not true stability* (Mar.17.11 \App. B, p. 8).

The use of the verb ‘prove’ means that the propositional content of that-clause is built on evidence. As such, the proposition is presented as factive presupposition that enhances the
truth conditionality of p. However, p in that-clause is expressed in a conditional context, which reduces its epistemic impact and restricts its occurrence to certain conditions. Consequently, presupposition in (18) does not persist, hence presupposition defeasibility.

The factive noun phrase ‘reality’ is used 2 times in the selected corpus.

(19) But we also have to deal with the reality that we confront in trying to make decisions about how to conduct our foreign policy (Feb. 25.12 \ App. B, p. 23).

‘The reality that’ construction in (19) leaves no option for the recipient but to accept the truth value of what is embedded in that-clause. It expresses the epistemic certainty of Hillary Clinton via the noun phrase ‘reality’. In case of subjectivity, the proposition and the real world match. However, in case of subjectivity, the proposition and the real world may not match, hence the non-felicity of p.

(20) We send people to diplomatic posts in 170 countries around the world. And yes, some of those are in war and conflict zones. Others are in unstable countries with complex threats and no U.S. military presence. That is the reality of the world we live in (Oct. 12.12 \ App. B, p. 37).

Pragmatic presupposition is triggered by ‘that is the reality’ construction, which represents given knowledge that is apparently shared by all participants in discourse. This may allow the speaker to sell her personal opinions as objective, reliable truths and realities. The reality in Clinton’s perceptual world may not coincide with the real world. It may not also converge with the perceptual world of recipients, hence divergence of perceptions. As such, factive presupposition may be accepted by participants, thus presupposition acceptance, or rejected by recipients, hence presupposition defeasibility.

The epistemic modal adjective ‘sure’ occurs 2 times in the selected corpus.

(21) We also know that there will probably, unfortunately, be the need for rescue missions, because, as I’m sure you’re aware, thousands of Tunisians have already left Tunisia heading for Europe (Feb. 28.1.11 \ App. B, p. 1).

Factive presupposition is triggered by two lexical items, namely the adjective ‘sure’ and the factive predicate ‘be aware’. The adjective ‘sure’ encodes a high degree of epistemic commitment to the truth of the utterance. Clinton expresses certainty about the hearers’ awareness that many Tunisians illegally crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe. The use
of the first person singular shows that the proposition is a personal judgment of the speaker, hence the outcome of her personal experiences. Clinton seems to be completely confident that p is right. In other words, the presupposed factivity of p is presented as undoubted.

The epistemic modal adjective ‘obvious’ is used twice in the corpus.

(22) And transitional authorities must work with them to meet their aspirations. But young people themselves must enter the political process. It also takes far-sighted leadership for this to work. And that is the obvious third lesson (July.1.11 \ App. B, p. 15).

What is ‘obvious’ is easily perceived or understood. P seems to be clear, self-evident and apparent. In this case of epistemic modality, the possible worlds in the conversational background are restricted to what the current speaker knows at the time of the utterance. In case of objective epistemic modality, possible worlds in the conversational background involve what is generally known to the epistemic community, mainly what is publically available as evidence.

‘Be aware’ is used twice in the corpus.

(23) We are well aware of the challenges that come with these kinds of transitions. You cannot create jobs or economic opportunities overnight (Feb.28.2.11 \ App. B, p. 2).

‘Be aware’ is a pure-factive verb that presupposes the previous knowledge of the speaker. The proposition that comes after this predicate is fore-grounded to highlight the challenges that accompany democratic transitions. The adverb ‘well’ is utilized as intensifier to strengthen the factivity of p. The use of ‘we’ indicates that p is socially shared factive presupposition.

'Remind' is also used twice in the corpus.

(24) We see in their struggles a universal yearning for dignity and respect. And they remind us that the power of human dignity is always underestimated until the day it finally prevails (Feb.28.1.11 \ App. B, p. 1).

The verb ‘remind’ means causing someone to think of something because of a resemblance. It also means causing someone to fulfill an obligation or take note of something. The factive predicate ‘remind’ presupposes that p is shared, presupposed knowledge. In other words, it indicates the activation of previous knowledge to implicitly assert the factivity of the proposition in that-clause. Clinton performs a mental act that activates her previous knowledge about human dignity. She anticipates that this human right will finally prevail.
‘Be forced’ is a factive predicate that triggers factive presupposition. It occurs only once in the corpus.

(25) *And I think it’s very important, if you proceed with this democratic revolution, that people are not pressured to wear it or not wear it, because that should be your individual choice in a democracy. And that will be one of the important signposts – are people being forced to* (Feb.25.12 \App. B, p. 23).

Forcing someone to do something means imposing something by coercion or physical power. Consequently, what is presupposed in the above utterances is that people will have no choice but adopt democratic principles, like respecting veiled women. In other words, ‘be forced’ implies the idea that the proposition is physically or morally imposed. This also encodes the truthfulness of p, hence presupposed factivity.

The verb ‘admit’ is used once in the corpus.

(26) *And for them all of the sudden to find themselves on the side of security forces, even ones that are of the new regime, takes a mental change, and they have admitted that it is a responsibility that they now understand they must assume* (Oct.12.12 \App. B, p. 35).

The predicate ‘admit’ means conceding or acknowledging something as true. What is foregrounded in (26) is that people in Libya and Tunisia have to confess that they have to support security forces in their countries. What is presupposed by the factive predicate ‘admit’ is emphasizing the factuality of p in that-clause.

Similarly, this meaning can be expressed by the verb ‘acknowledge’, which is used once in the corpus.

(27) *I want to acknowledge Tunisia establishing an independent Electoral Commission, made up of jurists and civil society leaders* (July 1.11 \App. B, p. 15).

The mental state verb ‘acknowledge’ means admitting that something is true and valid. It indicates the speaker’s confidence in the factivity of the complement. Indeed, Tunisia’s establishment of an independent Electoral Commission that consists of jurists and civil society leaders is presented as a fact that has to be acknowledged or admitted.
The factive predicate ‘forget’ is utilized once in Clinton’s speeches.

(28) *But at the same time, one must never forget universal values are vital to who we are and what we hope to see our world become. And they are American values and Irish values; I would argue they are everyone’s values* (Dec.6.12 \ App. B, p. 37).

‘Forget’ is a pure factive predicate that describes the mental state of affairs of the agent. It presupposes the existence of previous knowledge that is not remembered by the speaker. Using this verb with the adverbial ‘never’ rejects the possibility of forgetting the fact that universal values are vital for humans. As such, ‘forget’ enhances the factivity of the complement clause since it presupposes the truth of \( p \).

‘Probably’ is a weak epistemic modal that is used only once in the selected speeches.

(29) *I think Tunisia is so strategically located, and now that you are on the path to democracy and the end of corruption -- at least a lot less corruption there’s probably* (Mar.17.11 \ App. B, p. 8).

The epistemic modal adverb ‘probably’ expresses the speaker’s assessment of the probability of the proposition. It expresses less commitment to the truth of \( p \) on the part of the speaker. In other words, it indicates the speaker’s low confidence in the truthfulness of \( p \), hence subjectivity. The subjective reading of the modal is based on evidence that is known to the speaker, some of which emanates from her personal experience. It is classified as a speaker-oriented adverb because of its subjective epistemicity.

The modal adjective ‘certain’ occurs only once in the corpus.

(30) *Now, the future is always somewhat uncertain, but what is certain to me is that it will be the young people of Tunisia who determine what the future will be* (Feb.25.1.12 \ App. B, p. 17).

Hillary performs a mental evaluation which is done with respect to her belief set. This has been specifically stated via the prepositional phrase ‘to me’. Hillary asserts that Tunisian youths will determine the future of their country. What is presupposed is Clinton’s knowledge about \( p \) as well as the factivity of the propositional content of that clause.

After dealing with each category of the lexical triggers of factive presupposition and epistemic modality in the whole corpus, one can note the important use of the verbs ‘think’ and ‘know’. ‘Think’ is a predicate that performs a mental act that endorses a judgment, an
evaluation, an assessment or an opinion. Such a judgment reveals the perspective or point of view of the speaker. It is the mirror that reflects the speaker’s perception of the real as well as fictitious worlds. It is a translation of how the user understands and interprets events and entities around her. Although the verb ‘think’ reveals a weaker commitment to the truth value of propositions, Clinton’s recurrent use of evidential markers unveil her attempt to show stronger personal involvement to assert the truth value of her utterances.

In the present section, discourse features have been studied. Focus has been on factive presupposition and epistemic modality, mainly mental state verbs, modal adjectives and modal adverbs, to unmask presupposed knowledge about human rights and democracy in Clinton’s political remarks on the Tunisian issue in post-Ben Ali period. The links between presupposition and epistemic modality, on the one hand, and epistemic modality and evidentiality, on the other hand, will be elaborated and discussed further in section 4.2 of the present chapter. The following section tackles the second stage of van Dijk’s (1995b) triangular approach to discourse analysis, mainly the cognitive component.

4.1.2 Cognitive Analysis

The present stage of van Dijk’s approach (1995b) examines both context-bound mental models, mainly context models and text-based models, and context-free mental models, mainly, the speaker’s values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge. First, focus has to be on Hillary Clinton’s cognitive representations about discourse situations as well as the discussed issues in her political remarks, i.e. the Tunisian revolution and concepts, like democracy and human rights. Second, focus has to be on the speaker’s personal and social cognitions displayed in discourse, i.e. personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge. More emphasis has to be on factive vs. ideological knowledge and the mental mappings that may locate Tunisia in certain cognitive frames or mental categories. Similar attention has to be paid to presupposed knowledge, triggered by factive presupposition and epistemic modality, controlled by mental models and built upon the background, ideological knowledge of the ex-Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.

4.1.2.1 Personal and social cognition

Personal cognition has two facets, particular context-bound mental models, on the one hand, and general, context-free personal values, ideologies, attitudes and knowledge, on the other hand. As mentioned in chapter three, only the cognitive components that are relevant to the present research are examined.
4.1.2.1.1 Particular context-bound models

To start with, the present sub-section tackles context and text-based mental models, constructed in Hillary Clinton’s political discourse on the Tunisian Revolution.

4.1.2.1.1 Context models

Context models consist of a fundamental cognitive schema with certain categories for the interpretation of events, like the setting -mainly time and place-, participants –including their identities, roles and relations-, and an event -involving its goals. Participants’ roles, identities and relations would be tackled in more details at the ideological and societal levels of analysis depending on the aim of each analytical phase. In practice, the time, places, participants and events related to Clinton’s speeches can be illustrated in the following chart:

Table (19)

Settings, Participants and Events Related to Clinton’s Remarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech N</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>14-01-011</td>
<td>Washington, DC.</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and journalists</td>
<td>Press statement on recent Events in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>28-02-2011</td>
<td>Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, moderator, journalists</td>
<td>Remarks to the Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>28-02-2011</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, High Commission of Human Rights’ officials and journalists</td>
<td>Remarks at the Human Rights Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>1-03-2011</td>
<td>Washington, DC. The House of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, House of Foreign Affairs officials and journalists</td>
<td>FY2012 State and USAID Budget Request (Testimony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>10-03-2011</td>
<td>Washington, DC.</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, Subcommittee members congresswoman Lowey and journalists</td>
<td>Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. FY 2012 Budget Request (Testimony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>16-03-2011</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and journalist Shahira Amin</td>
<td>Interview With Shahina Amin of Nile TV (Interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>16-03-2011</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and journalist Kim Ghattas</td>
<td>Interview With Kim Ghattas of BBC (Interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>17-03-2011</td>
<td>Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, moderator and journalists</td>
<td>Interview Hosted by Nessma TV (Remarks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Findings and Discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-03-2011</td>
<td>The Tunisian Red Crescent Training Center, Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and the Red Crescent Training Centre’s officials</td>
<td>Remarks at the Tunisian Red Crescent Training Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-03-2011</td>
<td>US Embassy, Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, US Ambassador, embassy’s officials and journalists</td>
<td>Remarks at U.S. Embassy Tunis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-03-2011</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s office, Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, the Tunisian Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mouldi Kefi and journalists</td>
<td>Remarks With Tunisian Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-03-2011</td>
<td>Washington DC.</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and press</td>
<td>Tunisia's National Day (Press Statement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-07-2011</td>
<td>LitExpo Center, Vilnius, Lithuania</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and Lithuania’s government officials</td>
<td>Remarks at Community of Democracies Ministerial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-09-2011</td>
<td>Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, USA</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, Tunisian Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi and journalists</td>
<td>Remarks With Tunisian Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi at Signing Ceremony</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-02-2012</td>
<td>Baron d'Erlanger Palace, Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, Tunisian youths, moderator and journalists</td>
<td>Town Hall With Tunisian Youth (Remarks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-02-2012</td>
<td>Presidential Palace, Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and press</td>
<td>Remarks Following Meeting With Tunisian President Mazzouki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-02-2012</td>
<td>Sofitel Hotel, Rabat, Morocco</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and NPR journalist Michele Kelemen</td>
<td>Interview With Michele Kelemen of NPR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-03-2012</td>
<td>United Nations, New York City</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, Foreign Secretary Hague, UN Secretary General and UN Security Council officials</td>
<td>Remarks at the United Nations Security Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-03-2012</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and press</td>
<td>Assistance to Tunisia (Press Statement)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-05-2012</td>
<td>Treaty Room, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States Mohamed Salah Tekaya and members of the Tunisian Embassy.</td>
<td>Signing Ceremony With the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States Mohamed Salah Tekaya (Remarks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-09-2012</td>
<td>Treaty Room, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Rafik Abdessalam and the press</td>
<td>Remarks With Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem Before Their Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (19) illustrates the dates of speeches’ delivery, the location where they were released, the participants that took part in the communicative event, including their identities and roles, and finally the events on which these speeches were produced. First, dates range from the 14th of January 2011 to the 28th of December 2012. The delivery of speeches is linked to important dates, like overthrowing Ben Ali’s regime on the 14th of January 2011, Tunisia’s National Day, on the 20th of March 2011, and International Human Rights Day, on the 10th of December 2012. Some dates are related to Clinton’s visits to other countries, or to special events, like the UN or G-8 meetings.

Second, most of Clinton’s remarks were issued in Washington, DC and New York. Some remarks were delivered in Tunis, Tunisia, while a few speeches or interviews were produced in Egypt, Morocco, Ireland, Switzerland and Lithuania. At the national and local level, Clinton’s remarks were delivered in places, like the House of Foreign Affairs, Ben Franklin Room, Treaty Room, or Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in Washington, DC. Other speeches were delivered in New York, particularly the United Nations. At the international level, however, one can mention Palais des Nations, Switzerland, Palais du Baron d’Erlanger, the Presidential Palace and the US Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia. One can also notice less official settings, such as hotels.

Third, the participants in the various communicative acts differ according to political occasions and locations. Their political roles reveal the kind of relationships between them. It is clear that Clinton is a permanent participant since she is the speaker or producer of political discourse. Her role is the Secretary of State of the United States of America. The identities
and roles of other participants in discourse are also identified. For instance, we notice the presence of Tunisian officials in Tunis, Tunisia, or Irish officials in Ireland. Add to that, participants’ roles are highlighted, like the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Rafik Abdessalam, the Tunisian Ambassador to the US Mohamed Salah Tekaya, or the UN Secretary General. Other participants’ roles, like journalists and moderators, are also identified in the above table. The aim of specifying participant identities and roles is to uncover the kind of relations between them.

Fourth, the various speech events, or political occasions on which discourse was produced, have been specified in table (19). These speech events are on various issues, like uprisings in Tunisia, Tunisia’s Independence Day, the United Nations Security Council Session on Peace and Security in the Middle East, the signing ceremony with the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States Mohamed Salah Tekaya, G-8 Deauville partnership with Arab countries in transition: Foreign Ministers Meeting, meeting with Tunisian President Marzouki, FY2012 state and USAID budget request and interviews with T.V journalists, like Nessma, BBC and NPR journalists.

The settings -including time and place-, participants and events of the communicative acts are important for the mental representations about current actions and events. These cognitive categories represent the interface between discourse and context. It is worth noting that the premises trigger the mental models of a formal setting where government officials usually meet and deliver political speeches. Washington, DC is the political capital of the USA, where the White House and most of the political institutions are located. Consequently, these premises are typically the most commonly used places to discuss important national and international political issues.

Context models, related to participants and their roles, are those of politicians and audience, interviewer and interviewee, government officers and journalists or reporters. The relations between participants are, therefore, very formal. Such context models are also determined by the communicative events in the corpus. The mental models triggered by such events are meetings with presidents, ministers, UN officials etc. These meetings activate image schemas of two or more poles, entities or groups that meet in a formal context for a reason. Moreover, press statements activate images of politicians who answer the questions of journalists. As for signing ceremonies, they invite mental scripts of a public celebration or a party, as well as the existence of two partners or people who have to sign a contract, a treaty or a convention.
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In short, context models are analyzed to better grasp the situation in which Clinton’s speeches were delivered. They are also studied to understand the main context features that might help to decode mental models related to the events, concepts, subjects and people referred to in Clinton’s discourse. To better understand the cognitive component of discourse, the following sub-section sheds light on the mental models, activated by Clinton’s political discourse, mainly by the lexical triggers of factive presupposition and epistemic modality.

4.1.2.1.2 Text-based mental models

Text-based mental models are manifested in the semantic structures of Hillary Clinton’s discourse. Since the main objective of the present PhD research is unveiling presupposed, ideological knowledge in Clinton’s political discourse, focus has to be on the mental representations, triggered by certain linguistic features in discourse, particularly factive presupposition and epistemic modality (See Appendices M, N, O, P, Q and R). More concern has to be about highlighting the mental frames related to the Tunisian revolution, Tunisia’s democratic transition and the speaker’s representations about human rights and democracy in post-revolution Tunisia, or new Tunisia.

Since mental models are fragments of instantiated socio-cultural knowledge, focus has to be on personal mental representations, or episodes, in Clinton’s episodic memory. To cover more data from the corpus and enlarge the scope of analysis, different speech excerpts are selected from Clinton’s discourse. Like the discourse analytical phase, the current stage focuses on randomly selected excerpts for each lexical item that triggers factive presupposition, or expresses epistemic modality. Some lexical categories are given more importance because they serve the aim of the present stage better.

(1) I think they want the same thing as what all of us want – peace, prosperity, and dignity, a chance to participate, a chance for your voices and your votes to be heard and counted (Feb. 25.12\App. B, p. 19).

Clinton’s personal mental models are related to ‘peace’, ‘prosperity’, ‘dignity’, ‘participation’ and ‘election’. These schemas are mentally mapped in a hierarchical structure. The general topics are human rights and democracy. The mental representations of ‘peace’, ‘prosperity’ and ‘dignity’ are specific scripts related to the general category ‘human rights’. Similarly, the mental models triggered by the words ‘chance to participate’, ‘your voices’, ‘your votes’ and ‘heard and counted’ stimulate the schematic representations of elections, in particular, and democracy, in general.
(2) So I think Tunisia’s geographic location is very important and gives you a chance to expand your reach economically (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 21).

The speaker’s personal opinion is mediated via the mental state predicate ‘think’. P is that Tunisia’s geographically strategic location helps economic expansion. The mental scripts evoked in (2) are positive cognitive schemas constructed by the words ‘very important’ and ‘a chance’. The speaker’s mind locates Tunisia in a strategic place on a mental map of her perceptual world.

(3) Now, personally, I think that you will face extremists who are trying to really change the Tunisian culture (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 23).

The adverb ‘personally’ emphasizes the idea that Clinton’s utterance is a personal point of view. She shows strong personal involvement and a clear negative attitude towards extremists. This ignites negative image schemas related to previous personal experiences or socially shared representations in Clinton’s epistemic community.

(4) I mean, if you believe, as the people of faith do, we are all created in God’s image, and we all have an obligation to treat one another with dignity and respect. And we think that needs to be part of the political system of any democracy (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 24).

The mental models, triggered in (4), are both religious and political scripts. First, the religious repertoire is expressed via the words ‘believe’, ‘faith’, ‘God’s image’, ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’. Second, the political repertoire is based on words, like ‘political system’ and ‘democracy’. These words activate some socially shared representations about religion and politics. They are personal mental schemas that are selections or fragments of socio-cultural knowledge.

(5) Now, I know that there are those here in Tunisia and elsewhere who question whether Islamist politics can really be compatible with democracy (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 20).

Clinton uses the verb ‘know’ with the first person singular pronoun ‘I’ to inform the recipients of citizens’ queries about Islamist governance and its compatibility with democracy. She also aims to show previous knowledge about p. As such, she triggers two categories of mental representations. The first category represents Islam as religion, while the second category refers to politics. More specifically, there is an implicit dichotomy between Islamist politics and democracy that is depicted on the basis of certain differences between the two concepts.
(6) So please know that as you make this incredibly historic and important journey to a democracy that produces results, politically and economically for you, the United States will stand with you (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 21).

The proposition seems to stimulate certain episodic models in the episodic memory. Such episodic models are fragments of the world, known by the speaker, but seem to be unknown by the hearers. As such, Clinton uses the imperative form of the factive predicate ‘know’ to change the cognitive models that other participants have in mind in the speech event. Clinton clearly emphasizes the US support of Tunisia’s democratic process. The use of the words ‘incredibly historic’, ‘important journey’ and ‘democracy’ portrays positive cognitive schemas about the Tunisian democratic transition.

(7) We know that lasting change comes from within. Societies must be the authors of their own futures (Mar.12.12\App. B, p. 28).

The predicate ‘know’ along with the pronoun ‘we’ signal that what is presupposed seems to be shared knowledge. The mental models, triggered by what is expressed in the complement clause, may activate different schematic representations of p. Indeed, this depends on the personal past experiences of participants and what kinds of scripts are stored in their LTM. As such, the mental mapping of p will differ according to the personal episodic models of each individual as well as the common ground that is shared by the participants’ communities.

(8) Well, first of all, I am so thrilled to be back here in Tunis, and to have this opportunity to see the new Tunisia, and to know that the people in this audience and everyone watching, and this station, played a role in bringing democracy and freedom to the people of Tunisia (Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 5).

The use of the factive predicate ‘know’ and the evidential verb ‘see’ stimulates cognitive models related to audio-visual features. The presupposed knowledge in p is based on what is seen in Tunisia and heard from Nessma channel officials. As such, a description of Tunisia as ‘new’ is true or false with respect to a mental model of Tunisia in the past and the present. This difference is based on the visual perception of the speaker. The knowledge of the speaker is also built on what she heard, hence hearsay evidentiality. Mental models, related to ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’, are activated when Clinton describes the new Tunisia to highlight the important role played by Nessma’s audience, in particular, and the Tunisian people, in general, in the Tunisian revolution.
(9) A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly, and speech, so that even if you disagree with the party and the party’s positions, you are free to do so, even if it is a party based on religion, which gets people sensitive in their interaction politically (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 23).

The factive predicate ‘recognize’ presupposes that p is true. Concepts, like ‘freedom of religion’, ‘freedom of association’, ‘freedom of assembly’ and ‘freedom of speech’ ignite mental models related to freedom, faith, associations, or organizations, public gathering and expressing oneself. Both the speaker and hearers, opt for past, personal experiences or episodic models to decode these image schemas. Such episodic models play an important role in making inferences, drawing pictures and recalling and recognizing events in discourse. More focus is allocated to religious freedom to pave the way for people to criticize even Islamist parties. This implies the idea that religious parties do not allow the freedom of faith or expression. Subsequently, this stimulates implicit image schemas of religious leaders as authoritarian dictators, and religious parties as theocratic regimes.

(10) And if you are truly representing your citizens, you cannot do so effectively in the 21st century without recognizing that human rights must remain a central goal of those of us who believe in the dignity of every person (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 43).

The proposition in (10) is that human rights should be recognized as a central goal by people who believe in dignity. The verb ‘recognize’ stimulates personal scripts about mental acts performed by the brain. It also activates personal episodes that confirm the truth of what is recognized. Add to that, the mental models, depicted by the concepts ‘human rights’ and ‘dignity’, activate a cluster of information about prototypical features related to them. Such prototypical features are positive image schemas about freedom, dignity and humanism. These mental models are organized in a hierarchical structure that varies from general frames, in this case human rights, to specific frames or sub-frames, in this case dignity and all the rights that a human being has to enjoy, like the freedom of religion, expression and belief, and the rights to work, education and a decent life. These models vary with respect to the STM and LTM of the speaker or analyst. This can be explained by the various scripts and personal episodes saved in our memories that produce different mental model schemas.
Now we recognize, of course, that women’s political participation matters not only when tackling the worst challenges of conflict and violence, but also when finding solutions for more everyday governance problems at the village and community level, in national parliaments and ministries.\footnote{Dec.6.12\textup{App. B, p. 43}.

If we ‘recognize’ the proposition $p$ in that-clause, $p$ is then true. Clinton and other referees of ‘we’ share the perception that women’s political participation is significant in controlling conflicts and violence, and in solving governance problems in their countries. Therefore, fragments of scripts related to women rights are activated. These fragments deal with women rights to participate in political life at the micro and macro levels of society. These personal, mental scripts can build different cognitive models because they may be interpreted in different ways, from different perspectives, and with different goals in mind by different individuals. This depends on the socio-cultural background of participants.

But she wanted to talk about how we had to keep working to bring people together so that they would recognize the common humanity and experience in the other.\footnote{Dec.10.12\textup{App. B, p. 44}.

The cognitive representations, related to ‘common humanity’ and ‘common experience’, are accumulations of previous, biographically determined experiences of similar events or situations. Indeed, the image schemas are formed by activating past knowledge about ‘commonality’, ‘humanity’ and ‘experience’. Recalling similar concrete situations produces mental representations that should be clustered to comprehend discourse. The word ‘other’ triggers scripts about people who are different from us. However, what is considered as common between them and us is humanity and certain life experiences.

The United States has been very proud to support your efforts, and we understand very well the importance of bringing an end to the violence in Libya not only for the innocent Libyan people but also for Tunisia.\footnote{Mar.17.(4).11\textup{App. B, p 13}.

Clinton depicts a positive image schema about the USA. The mental models that can be produced are the image schemas of support, solidarity and cooperation. Americans are represented as the saviors of innocent people in Libya and Tunisia. Likewise, the same can be noted about Tunisia with respect to its relations with its neighbor. The mental state predicate ‘understand’ emphasizes the importance of controlling violence in Libya, and this proposition triggers negative image schemas about the security situation in this country.
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(14) And so, what I was interested in is hearing the plan, offering as much support as was appropriate that you wish to have, explaining how we have provided assistance to run a free and fair election to help train candidates, to help people understand how to put political parties together, all the things that go into making up a vigorous democracy

(Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 7).

Clinton activates and shares personal knowledge about political parties in a democracy to help countries in transition reach that end. As such, cognitive representations about political parties and democratic elections are constructed on the basis of previous biographical experiences. In fact, being part of the American government that adopts a democratic political system makes Clinton familiar with such experiences in her country. Given the long history of the US democracy, Clinton and the US government are pushing transitions in other countries. Such mental scripts are triggered by the words ‘help’ and ‘a vigorous democracy’.

(15) And durable democracy depends on civil society, and we are proud to support individuals and organizations seeking to improve their own societies


The emotive predicate ‘be proud’ makes the analyst construct positive image schemas about p. The verb ‘support’ in p encodes mental scripts of solidarity, help, cooperation and assistance. These mental models frame the USA or ‘we’ as the saviors of the world. The idealized cognitive models about ‘we’ or the US are positive, prototypical ICMs that portray the American administration as a supportive government. The US is presented as assisting other people or organizations that seek positive changes in their societies. Apart from the verbs ‘be proud’ and ‘support’ that ignite positive mental representations, the phrases ‘durable democracy’ and ‘civil society’ represent some of the American ideals or democratic values.

(16) And it was exciting for us to remember all of that history, the support that the United States gave for Tunisian independence. And now, once again, we are supporting the Tunisian revolution for democracy


The speaker recalls the history of the US-Tunisian relations and the US support of Tunisia’s independence. This not only presupposes and confirms the factuality of the recalled information, but also ignites mental representations of friendship, solidarity and cooperation between the two countries. As such, these image schemas incorporate the past, personal knowledge of Clinton in this regard. In addition, the US is portrayed as a supportive country that is concerned about Tunisia’s revolution and its democratic process.
(17) [...] while remembering that human rights are at the center of some of the most significant challenges to global security and stability and therefore to our national interests (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 38).

The cognitive, personal representations, that can be formed in (17), are related to the phrases ‘human rights’, ‘significant challenges’, ‘global security and stability’ and ‘our national interest’. Clinton’s personal cognition selects certain scripts to frame these concepts accordingly. For Clinton, human rights are the pillars of global security and stability, in general, and the US national interest, in particular. The word ‘center’ draws a schematic or mental map where human rights are at the center. This CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema shows their importance for a stable and secure world.

(18) In fact, last January, as protests were filling the streets of this city, I traveled to Doha and warned a conference of regional Arab leaders that if they did not act quickly enough to offer young people a better vision for the future, their regimes would sink into the sand. And the young people of Tunisia proved that point (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 18).

The factive predicate ‘prove’ encodes the existence of evidence that makes information reliable. The verb ‘warned’ triggers image schemas of a danger, or a threat. Indeed, Clinton warned Arab leaders that they would lose power if they did not offer young people a better vision for the future. The word ‘regimes’ builds mental models of dictatorships, authoritarian rulers and power abuse. It also ignites image schemas of human rights’ violations, oppression of the opposition, corruption and non-transparent elections. These models represent the ICMs of the word ‘regimes’. They embody the interface between episodic, personal knowledge of events and entities and the socially shared beliefs of involved groups.

(19) We are well aware of the challenges that come with these kinds of transitions. You cannot create jobs or economic opportunities overnight (Feb.28.11\App. B, p. 2).

‘Be aware’ is a pure-factive verb that presupposes the previous knowledge of p by the speaker. P in (19) highlights the challenges that come with democratic transitions. Cognitively speaking, words, like ‘challenges’ and ‘these kinds of transitions’, construct mental image schemas of difficulties and hardships that may accompany a democratic change in a country. In addition, the use of expressions, like ‘be well aware of’ and ‘these kinds of transitions’, presupposes that the referees are familiar with democratic change as well as democratic political systems.
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(20) [...] and at the same time reminding Egyptians and Libyans and Tunisians and others that democracy is not one election one time (Feb.26.12\App. B, p. 26).

The process of ‘reminding’ involves the retrieval of a previous particular model, or the retrieval of a general model about a situation that is recognized. In this context, Clinton reminds people in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya that democracy is a continuous process that does not stop after one election. Clinton’s personal episodic event knowledge is associated with shared mental representations in her epistemic community. As such, she attempts to activate the mental scripts about Egyptians, Libyans and Tunisians by recalling p. The proposition that democracy is not one election encodes mental models that are structured according to the mental state of the speech participants, along with the people of these Arab countries.

(21) I think it’s time to put youth empowerment there as well. Now I realize, being young, you may be skeptical (Feb.25.11\App. B, p. 18).

Clinton tackles the issue of youth empowerment and youth role in democratic transitions. The adjective ‘skeptical’ in p triggers image schemas of doubtful youngsters who are skeptical about their conditions and societies. By covering that issue, Clinton stresses on the importance of youths role in changing and building their societies. As such, she builds positive mental representations of young people as energetic and powerful activists. Their skepticism and queries may lead to improving their societies, and hence foster democratic transitions. Encouraging youth empowerment in non-democratic countries also leads to schematically framing the USA as the savior of the world since it helps oppressed people to make a change.

(22) And I think it’s very important, if you proceed with this democratic revolution, that people are not pressured to wear it or not wear it, because that should be your individual choice in a democracy. And that will be one of the important signposts – are people being forced to (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 23).

‘Be forced’ embeds the idea that the proposition is physically or morally imposed. This also encodes the truthfulness of this proposition. The mental models, evoked in (22), are related to religious freedom, and more specifically wearing the veil in a democratic country. Since mental models are evaluative and subjective, Clinton gives her opinion in this regard asserting that women should not be forced to wear or not wear it. The words ‘your individual choice’ and ‘a democracy’, along with ‘this democratic revolution’ activate image schemas of freedom, religious tolerance and other values related to the US ideals, like dignity, respect, women rights, etc. They stem from Clinton's personal past experiences.
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Findings and Discussion

(23) I want to acknowledge Tunisia establishing an independent Electoral Commission, made up of jurists and civil society leaders (July.1.11\App. B, p. 15).

The mental state verb ‘acknowledge’ means admitting or conceding that a proposition is true and valid. P, in (23), builds models and sub-models in a hierarchical structure. The general mental models are related to democracy and civil society in Tunisia. The sub-mental models are schematic representations about the establishment of an independent electoral institution, or an Electoral Commission that consists of jurists and civil society leaders. The ICMs that may be built on the basis of the word ‘jurists’ are those of fairness, lawyers, law experts, literate and competent elite etc. The expression ‘civil society leaders’ triggers image schemas of human rights’ activists, NGO’s members and the idea of leadership. These representations are conceptualized on the basis of socio-cultural knowledge.

(24) But at the same time, one must never forget universal values are vital to who we are and what we hope to see our world become. And they are American values and Irish values; I would argue they are everyone’s values (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 38).

Mental models have evaluative dimensions because Clinton not only builds and uses models of discussed issues in order to represent her knowledge about such issues, but also in order to express her personal opinion about them. These opinions are linked with general, socially shared representations about ‘universal values’. Such socially shared image schemas represent the typical attitudes or ideologies of the involved groups and their members about specific political issues. By recalling the importance of universal values, Clinton expresses the opinion of her epistemic community as well.

(25) I can certainly promise you, it will continue to be mine. I will continue advocating for civil society, working to make democracy real, pushing for Internet freedom, standing with religious minorities, women, LGBT communities, people with disabilities – anyone else who someone says are less human and therefore less deserving of their human rights (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 43).

The use of ‘certainly’ reveals the speaker’s epistemic state and her commitment to the truth of p. In fact, Clinton asserts her commitment to carry on the fight for human rights and freedoms. Such an engagement portrays mental representations of Clinton as a determined, dedicated and engaged person. She shows perseverance to advocate for civil society, make democracy real, promote Internet freedom, support religious minorities, women, LGBT
communities, disabled people and anyone who is deprived of human rights. The previous propositions establish a hierarchical structure of mental frames that oscillate from general to specific. The general mental model ‘human rights’ includes sub-models, mainly civil society, democracy, freedom of Internet, freedom of religion, especially for minorities, women rights, disabled people, gay community rights, etc.

(26) There are comments made that certainly don’t reflect the United States, don’t reflect our foreign policy, don’t reflect who we are as a people. I mean, if you go to the United States, you see mosques everywhere, you see Muslim Americans everywhere (Feb.25.11\App. B, p. 25).

Clinton strongly rejects critics about the US foreign policy, its values and people. She stresses the idea that the USA respects religious freedom by allowing mosques and welcoming Muslim Americans everywhere. The image schemas that can be formed in (26) are mental models of a tolerant country that respects other religions, religious freedom and, more specifically, the freedom of Muslim Americans. These mental models are idealized image schemas, or ICMs, used by Clinton to reflect her personal knowledge about the US. They emanate from Clinton’s attitude, which may reflect subjective, evaluative, mental representations about her country.

(27) Extremists are clearly determined to hijack these reforms and revolutions to further their agendas and ideology, so our partnership must empower those who would see their nations emerge as true democracies’ (Sep.28.12\App. B, p. 31).

‘Clearly’ adds an evidential dimension to the proposition. P in (27) is that extremists are determined to hijack democratic reforms and revolutions. Extremists’ agendas and ideologies are depicted as the opposite of democratic agendas and ideologies. The cognitive mental mapping of this relationship is based on a dichotomy of ‘WE’, or ‘true democracies’ and ‘THEY’, or ‘extremists’. Such ICMs lead to polarization by dividing the perceptual world into in-groups and out-groups. Hence, polarization establishes CENTRE-PERIPHERY mental mapping, where ‘WE’ is in the CENTRE, while ‘THEY’ is in the PERIPHERY of this mental map.

(28) I think Tunisia is so strategically located, and now that you are on the path to democracy and the end of corruption -- at least a lot less corruption there’s probably -- I don’t know any society in the world that has zero corruption, but there is corruption, and then there’s corruption (Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 8).
Since the socio-cognitive approach focuses on how people perceive, understand and memorize information and how such information is reproduced in talk, focus here should be on Clinton’s perception of Tunisia, democracy and corruption, and how the mental models related to these entities are reproduced in her discourse. These mental models are representations of fragments of the world with respect to which expressions are meaningful, or given a truth value. The propositions that Tunisia is so strategically located and that there is corruption in any society in the world are representations of Clinton’s perception of the world. They are presented as true mental models or fragments that reflect the real world.

(29) You are obviously an intelligent young woman who’s made your own choice, and I respect that. And I want every woman here to make her own choice, and we should all respect that as well (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 23).

The adverb ‘obviously’ uncovers the speaker’s epistemic state and makes it clear to recipients. Mental models are subjective, cognitive mappings of social situations and the real world. More specifically, Clinton’s utterance activates episodic models that are localized in her episodic memory. These mental models suggest that such cognitive representations are integrated structures of previous experiences of the speaker. They represent Clinton’s personal knowledge and beliefs about past, concrete situations. They are the experimental base for abstract ‘frames’ and more general ‘scripts’ in the speaker’s semantic memory.

(30) Now, the future is always somewhat uncertain, but what is certain to me is that it will be the young people of Tunisia who determine what the future will be (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 17).

Clinton expresses certainty about the proposition that the future will be determined and decided by young people. Consequently, p seems to be evident for the speaker, and this may emanate from her past experience, or previous knowledge. Mental models about young people and how they are the symbol of determination may stem from both Clinton’s personal experiences and the socially shared representations about ‘youth’. Clinton opts for past scripts to reproduce mental fragments or cognitive models in discourse.

(31) I hope that what we will do is make it very clear that, as parties are organized, as platforms are written, as campaigns are waged, and elections are won, no one can claim to be representing the democratic will if their intention is to marginalize women (July.1.11\App. B, p. 15).
Clinton enhances the importance of protecting women rights in a democracy. In (31), one can notice the retrieval and reproduction of mental model fragments about women rights. Clinton updates and transforms these episodic models according to text production and understanding. One can also note the construction of mental models related to the adjective ‘clear’ that emphasizes the clarity of the recalled or retrieved information.

(32) **Well, Tunisians have a dream. But Martin Luther King also made very clear that once you have the dream, you just can’t say, “I have a dream.” It’s a lot of work to realize the dream** (Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 10).

The propositional content is not only clear in Martin Luther King’s mind, but also clear in Hillary Clinton’s mind. It implies the previous, personal knowledge of Clinton, hence factive scripts or frames based on evidence. In fact, Clinton quotes what Martin Luther King said in the past, thus quotative evidential. Clinton retrieves old models about the situation and reproduces them in discourse to support her arguments. These frames belong to social memory as well since they are shared by Clinton’s epistemic community in the USA and abroad. These scripts are gradually transformed from personal previous models about a given situation to general, shared representations through generalization or abstraction.

(33) **We know there is a lot of work to be done, but we are very confident about the potential for democracy and economic opportunity in Tunisia and the United States will be ready to assist in any way** (Mar.17.(4).11\App. B, p. 13).

Tunisia’s potential for democracy and economic opportunity is presented as factive. Such confidence emanates from fragments of previous knowledge about Tunisia’s social, economic and political conditions. Activating these personal as well as social knowledge fragments helps the speaker to produce discourse and hearers to comprehend it by decoding mental representations. In terms of information, models are, however, much richer than the discourse based on them. In other words, discourse activates some fragments only from a wide range of information, stored in individuals’ LTMs.

(34) **Let me start by stating the obvious: Nobody should have ever thought this would be an easy road. I certainly didn’t** (Oct.12.12\App. B, p. 33).

‘Obviously’ signals that what is stated is evident and proved, and thus undisputed. Confidence in p stems from Clinton’s previous personal knowledge that is acquired and selected from socially shared knowledge of the in-group or the US community. Clinton
presupposes that these knowledge fragments are also shared by the international community. This can be construed from her use of the word ‘nobody’ to reject the non-knowledge of people about the hardships that occur in democratic transitions.

(35) Let us be sure that we support these new democracies, and we keep moving ourselves toward perfecting our own democracies (July.1.11\Ap. B, p. 16).

The mental models evoked in this utterance are related to democracies. The general image schema is divided into two specific mental representations, mainly ‘new democracies’ and ‘old democracies. This enhances the hierarchical structure of knowledge fragments in the human mind. New democracies pertain to the countries undergoing revolutions and proceeding towards implementing a democratic political system. Old democracies are typically the political systems in America and her allies in Europe that have been adopting this system for long. Clinton depicts a dichotomy between ‘new\present’ and ‘old\past’, just like the dichotomies between ‘THEM’ and ‘US’, and between democratic and non-democratic political systems.

(36) The social media that was used to bring down the Ben Ali regime now can be used to expose corruption, encourage transparency and good government. It’s also true that this goes hand in hand with the kind of freedom that is now available, so that it is not only to make a living but it is to enable and empower people to be participants (Feb.25.11\App. B, p. 19).

From a cognitive perspective, the phrases ‘social media’, ‘expose corruption’ and ‘encourage transparency and good government’ build positive mental models about the role that social media can play in society. More specifically, social media can empower people to be active participants. The speaker borrowed these mental models from her previous, personal experiences in her democratic community. Such cognitive representations are the interface between discourse and society. They pave the way for the speaker to produce discourse and help hearers to process and understand discourse.

(37) So the dream of Tunisian democracy is so alive and you can feel it. One of my colleagues who has been to Tunisia in the past said even spending two days now in Tunisia, you come out with so much more energy and feeling than – the future is just there for the taking. That is all true (Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 10).
The propositions that Tunisia’s democracy is so alive and that Tunisia is a nice place for tourists and visitors are representations of Clinton’s personal perception of Tunisia. These propositions are presented as true mental models or factive knowledge fragments of the real world. These cognitive models are selections of fragments of the world with respect to such meaningful expressions, and they are given a truth value.

(38) *I mean, if you go to the United States, you see mosques everywhere, you see Muslim Americans everywhere. That’s the fact. So, I would not pay attention to the rhetoric* (Feb.25.1.12\App. B, p. 25).

Expressions, like ‘mosques everywhere’ and ‘Muslim Americans everywhere’, invoke mental models of religious tolerance, religious freedom and the protection of human rights on a religious basis. They are Clinton’s and the American people’s prototypical knowledge about these concepts. Such mental scripts are organized in terms of mental frames or episodes. These frames or schematic organizations of information are structured to help the cognitive processing of discourse.

(39) *We deal with China, and we criticize them on a regular basis because of their violation of human rights and freedom of speech and freedom of religion and so much else. But we deal with them. I mean, that is reality* (Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 7).

‘That is reality’ construction makes the propositional content of the utterance inescapable. Clinton portrays China as an authoritarian regime that violates human rights. Since a schema consists of a number of fixed categories, these categories can be classified as general and specific categories. The general schematic category consists of image schemas related to human rights. The sub-schematic categories are freedom of speech, freedom of religion etc.

(40) *I personally have no doubt that if women everywhere were treated as equal to men in rights and dignity, we would see economic and political progress come to places that are now teetering on the edge* (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 42).

The mental models of 'equality', 'rights' and 'dignity' are collocated with a more general image schema; that is women. Clinton stresses the idea that economic and political progress cannot take place without treating women as equal to men in rights and dignity. Clinton reflects her community’s values, beliefs and shared representations about women, economy and politics. She attempts to spread these principles in other countries, more specifically in the Middle East and North Africa.
After analyzing the excerpts of each lexical category that expresses factive presupposition or epistemic modality in the corpus, one can recapitulate that mental models are organized in hierarchical and categorical. The following figure illustrates the hierarchical structure of mental models representing human rights and democracy in the corpus:

![Diagram](image.png)

*Figure 18. Diagrammatic Representation of the Organizational Structures of Human Rights and Democracy Image Schemas in Clinton’s Episodic Memory*

Figure (18) shows how mental representations are structurally classified into general and specific image schemas. In the selected corpus, one can notice two general mental models, mainly human rights and democracy. These two general categories are divided into sub-categories. First, human rights are related to specific image schemas of freedom, women rights, dignity, a decent life and equality. Second, the general category 'democracy' is linked to sub-categories, mainly free and transparent elections, civil society, diverse political parties, free voters and less corruption. These sub-categories, however, are in their turn divided into sub-schemas. The following figure illustrates how the concepts of freedom and women rights ignite sub-schemas in episodic memory:
As one can notice in figure (19), the mental representations of freedom and women rights are sub-divided into sub-categories. Freedom ignites sub-image schemas of freedom of religion, speech, Internet, press, assembly, association and beliefs. Similarly, the general mental model ‘women rights’ triggers sub-image schemas, namely freedom, equality with men, participation in political life, health care, a decent life, dignity and physical sanctity. This enhances the idea that episodic memory is organized in a hierarchical structure.

Apart from the hierarchical structure of mental models, one can notice the prevalence of ICMs in Clinton’s political discourse. First, prototypical image schemas about Tunisia, human rights and democracy are dominant in her discourse. For instance, Tunisia is portrayed as a ‘new democracy’, like in “let me say Tunisia is a beautiful country, and you should come visit, and you should support the new democratic Tunisia by being tourists here and put people back to work who are trying to build a new democracy’” (Mar.17.11\Ap. B, p. 10). Tunisians, who took part in the revolution, are depicted as people who seek freedom and dignity. In addition, Tunisia is cognitively described as a beautiful country, and its location is mentally mapped as ‘strategic’. Clinton emphasizes the importance of Tunisia's transition and enhances its role in influencing other countries in the MENA region. Subsequently, Clinton depicts positive mental frames or scripts, like in “And we think Tunisia is proceeding in the right direction, based on what we’re seeing” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). To sum up, Tunisia is prototypically represented by positive mental models, frames or ICMs.
Second, ICMs are also clearly observed when Clinton refers to the USA. Indeed, the US is portrayed as a model that should be imitated, like in “And I think that anyone who believes in democracy should open their eyes to America” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). Clinton highlights the advantages of a democratic political system and calls for implementing it in countries that lack freedom and human rights. Freedom, human rights and democracy are mental models that prototypically represent the American values. This is made clear in the following example: “the entire historical record shows we’ve been on the side of freedom, we’ve been on the side of human rights” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). As such, ICMs prototypically frame the USA as an ideal country that seeks to provide assistance and support to disadvantaged communities, like in “And it was exciting for us to remember all of that history, the support that the United States gave for Tunisian independence” (Mar.17.(3).12\Ap. B, p. 11). The USA is mentally mapped as the savior of the world that provides assistance and support to promote democracy and human rights.

However, it is important to note that mental models are ideologically biased in political discourse. Mental models are ideologically subjective because they represent events and entities from the perspective of an ideological group. For instance, in political discourse, mental models function as an interface between socially shared political cognitions and personal political beliefs. Consequently, biased or subjective political cognition may affect political discourse, and hence communicate biased ideological mental models, like in “I hope that what we will do is make it very clear that, [...] no one can claim to be representing the democratic will if their intention is to marginalize women” (July.1.11\App. B, p. 15). This example shows how mental models are ideological representations of the speaker’s conceptual and perceptual worlds. Clinton’s ideological bias in favor of women rights and women participation in political life is clear. People produce and understand discourse on the basis of socially shared attitudes and ideologies. In sum, Clinton’s mental models in discourse are ideology-laden (See section 4.1.2.1.2.2 for more details).

Finally, it is worth noting that information, pertaining to these text-based mental models, emanates from subjective situation models, general knowledge of the world as well as information about context. The text base will, thus, involve only the information that is necessary and relevant in a given situation. Clinton has to activate and retrieve only the relevant mental models necessary to produce, process and comprehend discourse. Since discourse is controlled by the subjective interpretations of language users, one can deduce that discourse cannot be produced or understood unless people construct relevant subjective mental representations about it. In other words, discourse production and comprehension
are based on decoding the implied, biased, mental models about context. Apart from context models and text-based mental models, one has to examine general, context-free models in the selected corpus.

### 4.1.2.1.2 General context-free models

The mental models of Clinton’s experiences are not only representations of actions, situations and events, but also positive or negative opinions and emotions associated with these personal experiences. More specifically, Clinton’s mental representations are analyzed via factive presupposition and epistemic modality in the corpus. More emphasis is allocated to her views and perceptions of democracy and human rights in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. To reach this goal, one has to sort out the link between linguistic and cognitive dimensions in Clinton’s discourse. This is elaborated through the analysis of Clinton’s personal values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge postulated via factive presupposition and epistemic modality. As stated in chapter three, personal values and attitudes are tackled in the same sub-section to avoid redundancies.

### 4.1.2.1.2.1 Values and attitudes

This sub-section is devoted to analyzing Clinton’s personal values embedded in the selected discourse. Focus has also to be on Clinton’s positive or negative attitudes towards entities, events and issues discussed in her remarks (See Appendices M, N, O, P, Q and R). The following figure and table illustrate the frequency of occurrence of words related to human rights, such as freedom, dignity, equality, solidarity etc.

![Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Human Rights Rhetoric in the Corpus](image)

*Figure 20. Diagrammatic Representation of the Frequency Distribution of Human Rights Rhetoric in the Corpus*
Table 20

Frequency Distribution of Human Rights Rhetoric in the Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words Related to Human Rights</th>
<th>Frequency of Occurrence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rights (Human rights = 73)</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 (out of 28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedoms</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion(s)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Religious freedom = 7)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Occurrences</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure (20) and table (20) show how the rhetoric related to human rights is distributed in the whole corpus. The word ‘right(s)’ is the most frequently used items, with 153 occurrences. The noun ‘woman\women’ is the second most frequently used word, with 82 items. The item ‘freedom(s)’ comes third, with 63 occurrences, followed by ‘religion(s)\religious’ and its equivalent ‘faith’, with 60 occurrences. First, one can note the dominant use of the noun phrase ‘right’ (153 items) in its singular and plural forms. Such dominance reflects the speaker’s main concern, which is promoting human rights in a new democracy, like Tunisia. Given the human rights' violations that were observed in this country with Ben Ali’s regime, Clinton highlights the importance of guaranteeing these rights for all people and paving the way for implementing them. These rights will protect citizens from police torture, oppression, lack of freedoms, discrimination against minorities and power abuse. For Clinton, protecting the freedom of speech, assembly, association and faith are the pillars of building a sustainable democracy in Tunisia and Arab countries, in general.
Second, one can notice the dominant use of the singular noun ‘woman’, along with its plural form ‘women’ (82 items). This translates Clinton’s focus on women issues, particularly in newly democratized Arab countries, because women are deprived of their basic rights in some regions. She asserts, on different occasions, the necessity of protecting women rights and encouraging women participation in political life. According to Clinton, women empowerment in the economy, their participation in political life and their freedom are necessary in a democracy. Women equality with men is another basic right that puts an end to gender discrimination and fosters economic and political progress in countries in transition.

Third, the singular noun ‘freedom’ and its plural form ‘freedoms’ are frequently used in the corpus (63 items) to stress the importance of freedom as a basic human right. According to Clinton’s values, humans should not be jailed for expressing their opinions, adopting a different faith, or protesting in public. For democratic transitions to be successful, Clinton emphasizes the importance of providing more freedom for youths, women and every citizen. More focus is given to the freedom of faith or religion. Fourth, religion is frequently mentioned by Clinton (60 items) in the corpus. Religious freedom is considered by Clinton as a focal point in democratic transitions. Since the Arab revolutions erupted in Muslim countries, many people showed concern about compatibility between Islam and democracy. In this regard, Clinton asserts that democracy and Islam can be compatible if religious freedom is guaranteed. The recurrence of the religious repertoire in Clinton’s discourse reflects its importance for interlocutors.

As stated in chapter two, the speaker assesses what the audience needs to know or hear and produces discourse accordingly. Indeed, what is presented as shared, presupposed knowledge with the addressees is what these addressees want to hear regarding Islam. Clinton activates mental models of previous knowledge about religion, Islam, Christianity and democracy to produce discourse. As a strong Christian believer, Clinton presupposes and then asserts that compatibility between Islam and democracy is possible. Finally, Clinton mentions many examples of human rights, mainly dignity (34 times), freedom of speech (11 times), association (7 times) and assembly (6). In a similar vein, the noun phrase ‘values’ is used 33 times to refer to the term ‘principles’, which is used 18 times. These two items are used to refer to either the universal values of human rights, or the American ideals and principles. They are also used interchangeably to refer to democratic principles. Clinton’s aim behind discourse production is making people aware of the advantages of the American ideals, the humanitarian side of the USA, the benefits of human rights and the positive outcome of a democratic political system.
Chapter Four

To sum up, women (82 occurrences), freedoms (63 items) and religion (60 uses) are the most frequently tackled issues in Clinton’s selected discourse. More specifically, women rights and religious freedom are the most recursive issues in the corpus. Apart from values, one has to shed light on the main findings related to Clinton’s attitudes in the corpus.

As far as Clinton’s opinions about events and entities are concerned, adopting positive or negative attitudes depends on the issues discussed in discourse. First, Clinton has a clear positive attitude towards human rights, democratic transitions and religious freedom. Second, she reveals negative attitudes towards dictatorship, intolerance, fanaticism, corruption, oppression and non-democratic regimes. To have a clearer idea about Clinton’s positive or negative evaluations of events and entities, the following table illustrates her attitudes in randomly selected speech excerpts from the corpus.

Table 21

Clinton’s Attitudes towards Human Rights and American Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excerpt N</th>
<th>Clinton’s Attitude</th>
<th>Date &amp; Ref.</th>
<th>Excerpt N</th>
<th>Clinton’s Attitude</th>
<th>Date &amp; Ref.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Table (21) gives the analyst a clear idea about Hillary Clinton’s opinions regarding human rights. The speaker’s views and attitudes are clearly in favor of guaranteeing these rights in the Arab world, and more specifically in Tunisia. She also supports women and minorities’ rights. In this regard, she highlights the significant role that can be played by women and young people to determine the future of the country and be active actors in political life. According to Clinton, the rights to a decent life, a good job and physical sanctity are also necessary for building a sustainable democracy.

However, Clinton reveals negative attitudes towards human rights’ violations, like torture, oppression, lack of freedom, intolerance and discrimination on the basis of religion, gender or sexual characteristics. She shows hostility toward oppressive rulers or dictators
dictators, like Arab leaders in the Middle East and Ben Ali in Tunisia. Clinton rejects corruption and corrupt political systems. She is also critical about offensive remarks online that nurture hatred and religious intolerance. Similarly, she shows a hostile attitude towards religious fanaticism and extremism. In sum, by promoting human rights and democracy in the MENA region, Clinton fights rulers’ abuses of universal values, religious conflicts, oppressive political systems and social vices, like corruption.

Like values and attitudes, Clinton’s ideological background and knowledge have to be studied at this level of cognitive analysis. This idea is elaborated in the following sub-section.

4.1.2.1.2.2 Ideologies and knowledge

Since the aim of the present study is analyzing factive presupposition and epistemic modality as well as highlighting the discursive-cognitive-social dimensions of political discourse, the main concern, at this stage, is about Clinton’s ideological background and her personal political views and agendas regarding human rights and democracy. In addition, focus has to be on Clinton’s presupposed knowledge about these issues. More specifically, it is important to examine the structural organization of knowledge and the different image schemas and mental scripts activated in episodic memory to understand and produce political discourse (See Appendices M, N, O, P, Q and R).

It is important to note that the same speech instantiations, analyzed in 4.1.2.1.1, are reconsidered for analysis. These speech excerpts are selected from the whole corpus for each lexical item. Subsequently, these textual features may reveal the speaker’s ideological background and both fore-grounded and back-grounded knowledge. Since the main concern is the analysis of knowledge, more examples, including the primary verb ‘know’, are provided. ‘Think’ is exempted from analysis because it reflects the speaker’s personal opinions and attitudes, but not her knowledge state.

(1) So please **know** that as you make this incredibly historic and important journey to a democracy that produces results, politically and economically for you, the United States will stand with you (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 21).

The proposition in (1) is already known by the speaker, but not previously known by the recipients. Clinton aims to change the knowledge state of other discourse participants in the speech event by using the verb ‘know’ in the imperative form. In terms of frames, Clinton evokes the ‘AID-FRAME’ that characterizes the relations between the USA and the
rest of the world. The USA is depicted as a supportive country whose function is helping people all over the world. As such, ‘POSITION-FRAME’ can be activated by portraying the USA as a superpower that is in a higher position than other countries. A third frame is the ‘FRIENDSHIP-FRAME’ that reflects the friendly relations between supporting and supported countries. The cluster of these frames builds knowledge about the USA and Tunisia, and, thus, helps the addressees’ construal of discourse.

(2) What we do know is the outcome will be determined by the people themselves. And this moment belongs to them, particularly the young people who have inspired the world with their courage (July.11\App. B, p. 14).

The emphatic form ‘do’ and the factive predicate ‘know’ emphasize the referees’ knowledge about the propositional content of the complement clause. Clinton enhances the idea of having previous knowledge that young Tunisians will determine the outcome of the revolution. Such confidence in the truthfulness of p emanates from past experiences that were transformed into knowledge slots, saved in the speaker’s episodic memory. Being a member of a democratic community, what is back-grounded is that Clinton already knows that the outcome of democratic transitions was determined by the citizens of a community. What is fore-grounded is that Clinton asserts that this previous experience will occur in Tunisia. Consequently, Clinton’s knowledge about the present situation stems from knowledge about similar past situations that make the speaker knowledgeable.

(3) We know that lasting change comes from within. Societies must be the authors of their own futures (Mar.12.12\App. B, p. 28).

The predicate ‘know’ and the pronoun ‘we’ signal that p is not the personal knowledge of the speaker only. Clinton presupposes that what is stated is shared with her epistemic community. P, in this case, is that change comes from within. This implicit presupposed knowledge is based on personal experiences, as well as on socially shared beliefs. Clinton presents p as taken for granted knowledge, and hence irrefutable and unchallengeable. Lasting changes should be made by these societies themselves. Clinton’s knowledge is based on previous experiences in her society, which succeeded to make significant and radical changes in America by promoting the American ideals of democracy and human rights.
A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly, and speech, so that even if you disagree with the party and the party’s positions, you are free to do so, even if it is a party based on religion, which gets people sensitive in their interaction politically.

The verb ‘recognize’ presupposes the knowledge of the speaker, but the non-knowledge of religious parties. Concepts, like ‘freedom of religion’, ‘freedom of association’, ‘freedom of assembly’ and ‘freedom of speech’, are constructed knowledge fragments. These scripts are mentally accumulated and associated with certain features or properties to facilitate discourse comprehension. These specific knots are information units that describe a more general concept, mainly human rights. In this case, knowledge is ideologically biased because it represents the knowledge of the speaker’s epistemic community. Such knowledge may be considered as mere beliefs by epistemically or ideologically different groups, such as dictators or theocrats.

And so, what I was interested in is hearing the plan, offering as much support as was appropriate that you wish to have, explaining how we have provided assistance to run a free and fair election to help train candidates, to help people understand how to put political parties together, all the things that go into making up a vigorous democracy.

The verb ‘understand’ presupposes the truth value of p. In this utterance, p is that political parties should be put together and that there are certain criteria that build a vigorous democracy. These propositions are presented as irrefutable, factive information that emanates from the speaker’s personal knowledge and previous experiences. Much of the participants’ knowledge is typically construed and reproduced by discourse. Consequently, personal, presupposed knowledge, in (5), becomes shared knowledge by other participants in the speech event once Clinton produces the utterance.

What impressed the world is by Tunisia’s remarkable humanitarian response to the crisis on your border, and that the United States is very proud to be your partner, to help with this center, to help with the ambulance and the training for the Red Crescent.
What is presupposed is that Tunisia helps to solve the problems of refugees on its borders with Libya by providing a help center, ambulances and training for Red Crescent agents. What is also presupposed is that the US is proud to be Tunisia’s partner in supporting such efforts. As a result, one can infer that these propositions are given as unchallengeable facts due to the use of the factive emotive verb ‘be proud’. Such facts are considered socially shared knowledge because both the speaker and hearers already have an idea about these issues. Though Clinton and Tunisian officials belong to different ideological backgrounds, it seems that they share the same common ground about the security situation in Libya and the efforts that should be made to help solve the problem. The socially shared knowledge in this utterance is presented as specific knowledge that is not related to abstract concepts, but to concrete events that took place during the Libyan revolution. Knowledge can also be classified as institutional or organizational because it is shared by members of the Red Crescent and the US Secretary of State.

(7) And durable democracy depends on civil society, and we are proud to support individuals and organizations seeking to improve their own societies (Mar.12.12:App. B, p. 28).

The emotive predicate ‘be proud’ triggers factive presupposition because it indicates the truthfulness of the propositional content of p. In other words, Clinton highlights the fact that the US helps individuals and organizations improve their societies. Clinton assumes that the hearers know that fact, so she does not need to assert p. Instead, she tacitly or implicitly presupposes it. The k-device should be permanently active because it has to calculate what the recipients know at any moment of the communicative act. Subsequently, Clinton adapts the structure of talk to the dynamically changing knowledge state of recipients. Notions, like ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’, reflect the ideological background of the speaker and her attempt to spread the American principles.

(8) […] while remembering that human rights are at the center of some of the most significant challenges to global security and stability and therefore to our national interests (Dec.6.12:App. B, p. 38).

Clinton calls audience to keep in their memories that human rights are very important to international security and stability, as well as to national interests. As such, Clinton emphasizes the truthfulness of p and presents it as forgotten knowledge that should be recalled by participants. The type of activated knowledge, in (8), is general and abstract because the concept of ‘human rights’ is abstract, intangible and general. It stems from
Clinton’s personal knowledge, but it becomes shared knowledge through generalization and abstraction. However, the evaluation of such information as true or false depends on the interlocutors’ ideological and political background. What is perceived as true and factual by the speaker may be considered as mere beliefs or wrong information by some recipients.

(9) And we have tried to tell them, publicly and privately, that they needed to change if they expected to be strong into the 21st century. And you proved that here in Tunisia
(Mar.17.11\App. B, p. 8).

Clinton utilizes the predicate ‘prove’ to support her arguments with evidence. P is presented as taken for granted knowledge by the speaker and the US government officials, who kept on warning Arab regimes of foreseen changes. Tunisia is taken as evidence that what they expected is true. Hence, Clinton presents information as factive, irrefutable knowledge. Such knowledge is concrete since it is based on evidence in the real world. The ideological context is that Clinton attempts to convince recipients that democratic change in North Africa and the Middle East is inevitable. As such, the speaker reveals her concern about democratic transitions in Arab countries. She does not reflect her concern only, but also the concern of the American administration.

(10) We are well aware of the challenges that come with these kinds of transitions. You cannot create jobs or economic opportunities overnight
(Feb.28.(1).11\App. B, p 2).

Clinton is confident that democratic transitions may bring hardships and challenges to people. Clinton is also certain that such a fact is shared by the recipients. This can be inferred from the use of the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ and the intensifier ‘well’. Consequently, Clinton presupposes that p is shared knowledge and produces discourse accordingly. The recipients, on their part, construct knowledge by activating only relevant mental models from a wide range of knowledge fragments.

(11) [...] and at the same time reminding Egyptians and Libyans and Tunisians and others that democracy is not one election one time

Clinton reminds people in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya that democracy is a continuous process that does not stop after one election. Hence, Clinton activates the mental ability of these people to bear in mind p. Subsequently, p is introduced as presupposed knowledge that reflects Clinton’s personal commitment to its truth conditionality. Since political cognition is by definition ideological, the speaker’s ideology is reproduced in her political discourse.
Cognitively, ideologies are stored in Clinton’s LTM. They are a special kind of belief systems that are socially shared by the members of certain groups or communities. In (11), Clinton is a member the ideological group of democrats. The ideological belief system of this community enhances the importance of elections in a democratic society and stresses the necessity to organize elections regularly.

(12) *I think it’s time to put youth empowerment there as well. Now I realize, being young, you may be skeptical* (Feb.25.11\App. B, p. 18).

Clinton describes her mental state of affairs when she uses the factive verb ‘realize’. It means to understand something completely or correctly. This means that the speaker has previous incomplete or incorrect knowledge of p. Hence, ‘realize’ confirms the factuality and correctness of p. In other words, the idea that being young means being skeptical is presented as an irrefutable fact. From an ideological angle, Clinton reveals commitment to fostering youth empowerment in non-democratic societies.

(13) *And I think it’s very important, if you proceed with this democratic revolution, that people are not pressured to wear it or not wear it, because that should be your individual choice in a democracy. And that will be one of the important signposts – are people being forced to* (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 23).

From an ideological perspective, one can notice Clinton’s call for religious freedom in a democratic system. The principle of religious freedom is related to a more general concept, mainly human rights, which is, in its turn, associated with the more general concept 'democracy'. All these concepts reflect America’s principles that have been promoted since the US independence. Such American ideals are reproduced in Clinton's discourse to mirror her ideological background.

(14) *I want to acknowledge Tunisia establishing an independent Electoral Commission, made up of jurists and civil society leaders* (July.1.11\App. B, p. 15).

The mental state verb ‘acknowledge’ means admitting that something is true and valid. It indicates the speaker’s confidence in the factivity of the complement. Indeed, p is presented as a fact that has to be admitted. Since the cognitive theory provides insight into the processes of discourse production, storage and reproduction, focus has to be on knowledge scripts in the utterance. Knowledge frames in (14) are related to ‘independent Electoral Commission’, ‘jurists’ and ‘civil society’. Such frames are stored in Clinton’s LTM and reproduced in
discourse as ideological representations of previous, personal experiences. These frames pertain to the ideological system of a democracy based on free elections, the rule of law and the significant role of civil society.

(15) But at the same time, one must never forget universal values are vital to who we are and what we hope to see our world become. And they are American values and Irish values; I would argue they are everyone’s values (Dec.6.12/App. B, p. 38).

‘Forget’ enhances the factivity of the complement clause. Since p is presented as a fact, ideology is given as true knowledge, not mere beliefs. However, the members of other ideologies or epistemic communities may challenge such presupposed facts. In other words, the out-group members may perceive p as the general socio-cultural knowledge adopted by one epistemic community, based on the ideology and beliefs of that community. P is presupposed to be true in the in-groups of a given community only. Clinton also perceives these human rights as universal and as ‘everyone’s values’. As such, Clinton constructs knowledge via generalization by assuming that human rights are the values of any individual worldwide. She implicitly sets an obligation on the out-groups, who do not believe in or respect human rights, to follow these democratic principles and adopt these universal values.

(16) There are comments made that certainly don’t reflect the United States, don’t reflect our foreign policy, don’t reflect who we are as a people. I mean, if you go to the United States, you see mosques everywhere, you see Muslim Americans everywhere (Feb.25.11/App. B, p. 25).

The proposition is introduced as factive knowledge since its truth conditionality is enhanced through the use of the adverb ‘certainly’. Clinton strongly rejects any doubt about the US good intentions and motives. Our knowledge about Clinton’s opinions about the USA and its political system is acquired, changed or confirmed by her talk. Political processing is a form of discourse processing. Understanding political concepts or events is part of discourse comprehension. Participants use socially shared representations of political groups and institutions. In (16), Clinton clearly adopts the socially shared representations of her government. She rejects the claims that the USA is not tolerant towards Muslim Americans, or not respecting religious freedom, in particular, and human rights, in general. If recipients challenge the speaker, the common-ground political knowledge and mental representations of participants do not converge. Clinton tries to defend her government by challenging the negative mental models, shared by other political or epistemic communities.
Extremists are clearly determined to hijack these reforms and revolutions to further their agendas and ideology, so our partnership must empower those who would see their nations emerge as true democracies (Sep. 28, 2012, App. B, p. 31).

The proposition that extremists are determined to hijack democratic reforms and revolutions is presented as a fact. ‘Clearly’ unveils the epistemological state of Hillary Clinton. P is socially and ideologically accepted by the members of her epistemic community. These extremists can be perceived in a different way by other epistemic communities. Thus, what is clearly stated by Clinton can be rejected by extremist groups. For instance, extremist Islamists, like the fighters of the Islamic State, have different k-criteria shared by their epistemic community. A ‘WE’ vs. ‘THEY’ dichotomy is drawn, where ‘WE’ represents the US and its supporters, who boost democratic principles and universal values. However, ‘THEY’ represents extremists, who hamper democratic transitions and reject the ideas of human rights and civil societies. These extremists perceive such concepts as blasphemy or offense against God. They are portrayed by Clinton as hijackers of political reforms and revolutions, who aim to implement their own ideologies and political agendas, mainly an Islamic state or Khilafa, based on Islamic Sharia.

[...] and now that you are on the path to democracy and the end of corruption -- at least a lot less corruption there’s probably -- I don’t know any society in the world that has zero corruption, but there is corruption, and then there’s corruption (Mar. 17, 2011, App. B, p. 8).

The epistemic modal adverb ‘probably’ indicates the speaker’s low confidence in the truthfulness of P. However, Clinton later retracts to show more confidence in the truth value of P by denying knowledge about any society that has zero corruption. Clinton links democracy to reducing corruption, which highlights the idea that democracy means putting an end to corrupt elections, corrupt political sponsors and corrupt rulers and officials. Corruption can be controlled by encouraging transparent elections, independent judicial institutions and non-biased and non-corrupt mass media. These are some of the pillars or principles on which democracy is built. This reflects the perceptual world of the discourse emitter. It unmasksthe ideological and political cognition of the speaker.

You are obviously an intelligent young woman who’s made your own choice, and I respect that. And I want every woman here to make her own choice, and we should all respect that as well (Feb. 25, 2012, App. B, p. 23).
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The adverb ‘obviously’ uncovers the speaker’s mental or epistemic state and makes it clear to recipients. This adverb makes the truth conditionality of the proposition evident and unchallengeable. Consequently, Clinton’s opinion about the young woman is presented as concrete knowledge about the real world, but not as personal beliefs of the speaker. The mental representation of the independent woman activates previous knowledge about free women. Such past knowledge consists of Clinton’s personal mental schemas about free women as well as the socio-cultural shared views or representations about free women. The cluster of these knowledge scripts builds the speaker’s knowledge as well as her ideological background, which are both reproduced in the form of political discourse. This model of women is presented as an intelligent individual because she made her own choices. This reflects the feminist ideological background of Clinton, who promotes women freedom, women empowerment and women rights.

(20) I hope that what we will do is make it very clear that, as parties are organized, as platforms are written, as campaigns are waged, and elections are won, no one can claim to be representing the democratic will if their intention is to marginalize women (July.1.11\App. B, p. 15).

The epistemic modal adjective ‘clear’ is a modifier that describes the clarity of p. It is boosted by the intensifier ‘very’ to emphasize the truth conditionality of p. As such, p is the presupposed knowledge of the speaker, who seems to base her idea on previous, personal experiences and facts. We may infer more general, abstract knowledge from Clinton’s utterance due to the generalization and abstraction of these past, concrete examples. We may also infer the ideological background of the speaker since she enumerates the main pillars of a democracy and stresses the importance of recognizing women rights in democratic transitions. Ideologically, Clinton is a feminist and democrat, who defends the rights of women, in particular, and human rights and democratic principles, in general.

(21) We know there is a lot of work to be done, but we are very confident about the potential for democracy and economic opportunity in Tunisia and the United States will be ready to assist in any way (Mar.17.(4).11\App. B, p. 13).

The speaker’s certainty is expressed via the epistemic modal adjective ‘confident’. The proposition that Tunisia has a potential for democracy and economic opportunity is factual. The kind of knowledge, in (21), is general, based on Clinton’s perception of the real world. The use of ‘we’ indicates that such knowledge is not personal, but shared by the referees. Shared, political knowledge is the basis of socio-political cognition.
(22) *Let me start by stating the obvious: Nobody should have ever thought this would be an easy road. I certainly didn’t. However, it is important to look at the full picture – to weigh the violent acts of a small number of extremists against the aspirations and actions of the region’s people and governments* (Oct.12.12\App. B, p. 33).

What is evidently presupposed in this utterance is that democratic transitions are not easy. ‘Obviously’ signals that what is stated is evident and proven, and thus unchallengeable. Subsequently, the presupposition in p is factive. It stems from Clinton’s previous, personal representations that are selected from socially shared knowledge. Ideologically, one can notice a clash of ideologies or agendas, mainly the US ideology and its democratization agenda in the Middle East and North Africa Vs extremists, who performed acts of terrorism and violence to impede democratic transitions in the region. Clinton marginalizes these groups by describing them as ‘a small number of extremists’. They are also depicted as opposing the aspirations of MENA people.

(23) *Let us be sure that we support these new democracies, and we keep moving ourselves toward perfecting our own democracies* (July.1.11\App. B, p. 16).

The adjective ‘sure’ highlights Clinton’s certainty about p and presupposes that p is a fact. As such, the US support of new democracies and her attempts to perfect old democracies are facts based on evidence from the real world. Since knowledge is organized in schema-like packages, the present scripts that organize knowledge are related to new democracies and old democracies. The cluster of scripts about these two concepts helps to build knowledge and comprehend discourse.

(24) *The social media that was used to bring down the Ben Ali regime now can be used to expose corruption, encourage transparency and good government. It’s also true that this goes hand in hand with the kind of freedom that is now available, so that it is not only to make a living but it is to enable and empower people to be participants* (Feb.25.11\App. B, p. 19).

What is presupposed in the first utterance is that social media can be used to unveil corruption and enhance transparency and sound governance. What is presupposed as factual in the second utterance is that social media can play a role in guaranteeing freedoms. Ideologically, Clinton is a democrat, who defends democratic principles by exposing corruption and encouraging transparency and good governance. Clinton is also a humanist, who attempts to promote values, like freedoms and people empowerment. She presents the views of both her epistemic and ideological communities.
Clinton rejects the rhetoric about the US stand towards Muslims. She enhances the idea that there are Mosques and Muslims everywhere in the USA, hence guaranteeing the rights of Muslim minorities. Knowledge is cognitively conceptualized in terms of mental representations of states of affairs characterizing situations or worlds. The mental models triggered by the rhetoric do not coincide with the real world in Clinton’s perception. The construction ‘that’s the fact’ imposes Clinton’s proposition as true or correct knowledge of the world or objective knowledge, while rejects other propositions by negating their truth value. Ideologically, religion is tackled as a general category or concept. Sub-categories are related to religious freedom, Islam, Muslim Americans and mosques. These sub-schemas build knowledge about religious freedom in the USA, especially Muslim rights in the country.

‘That is reality’ makes the propositional content of the utterance inescapable. The speaker expresses her attitude towards the state of affairs encoded in the previous sentences. Clinton admits that her country deals with China in spite of its violation of human rights. The mental models invoked in (26) are general and specific. The general category is human rights, while the sub-categories are freedom of speech and freedom of religion. In other words, one can notice the activation of general knowledge about human rights, which can be instantiated or fragmented in more specific representations about freedom of speech and religion. As such, knowledge is represented in schematically organized structures, like scripts, to facilitate its retrieval, activation and then use to understand discourse. The activation of more or less of such knowledge depends on context. In other words, only relevant fragments or mental models need to be expressed in discourse, depending on context constraints.

‘I personally have no doubt that if women everywhere were treated as equal to men in rights and dignity, we would see economic and political progress come to places that are now teetering on the edge’ (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 42).
The expression ‘no doubt’, along with the first person singular pronoun ‘I’ encode the speaker’s strong personal commitment to the truth conditionality of the utterance. This has been strengthened by the adverb ‘personally’, which means that p is a selection of Clinton’s personal knowledge. Factive knowledge is based on the speakers past experiences and shared representations in her epistemic community. Indeed, the American society opted for guaranteeing women equality with men in rights and dignity a long time ago. So, Clinton relies on her society’s previous experiences in this regard as well as the mental models she stored in her memory to construct knowledge. She sets women rights as a condition for economic and political progress. Being a feminist and humanist, Clinton reflects her ideological convictions by calling for women empowerment and equality with men.

After analyzing the corpus in terms of knowledge and ideologies, one can note the following. Knowledge is based on autobiographical information and past experiences. Since Clinton is a member of an epistemic community, she may acquire knowledge by the generalization and abstraction processes of mental models of past personal experiences. Knowledge about democracy and human rights is considered true within an epistemic community and justified by the k-criteria or standards of that community. Such basic k-criteria are, for example, direct reliable perception, such as seeing, hearing, feeling, discourse, like reading or hearing information from reliable sources, and inference from reliable evidence. Once she produces discourse, Clinton’s knowledge is shared with participants in the speech event and audience in general. Knowledge that is already believed to be known by the recipients remains implicit, past, old, presupposed and probably taken for granted shared knowledge.

To have a clearer idea about the ideological background of the speaker, one has to analyze the frequency of occurrence of words relating to the concept of ideology in the corpus. The following figure is an illustration of the frequency distribution of democracy-related rhetoric:
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Figure 21. Diagrammatic Representations of Clinton’s Rhetoric Related to Democracy in the Corpus

Figure (21) explain how the rhetoric related to democracy is distributed in the whole corpus. One can notice the frequent occurrences of the word family ‘democracy’ (229), including the singular noun ‘democracy’ (124), the plural noun ‘democracies’ (42), the adjective ‘democratic’ (61) and the adverb ‘democratically’ (2). One can also note the important use of the noun ‘transition(s)’, which is used 57 times in its singular and plural forms. Similarly, the word ‘change(s)’ is utilized 52 times in the corpus. The nouns ‘party\parties’ and ‘election(s)’ are also frequently used in the corpus with 44 and 36 occurrences successively. The recurrence of these words unveils the ideological dimension in Clinton’s discourse.

These ideological background can be demystified further via the analysis of group characteristics. These group characteristics are identity, activities, goals, norms, reference and resources. The following table illustrates the features of identities, activities and goals in the 27 selected excerpts from the corpus.
### Table 22

*Clinton’s Ideological Representations (Identity, Activities and Goals) in the Speech Excerpts*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excerpt N</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>The USA, represented by Clinton, and Tunisia, represented by youth.</td>
<td>US-Tunisian cooperation to promote democracy</td>
<td>Promote democracy and economic prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Clinton and the US government</td>
<td>Remarks at the Community Democracies Ministerial</td>
<td>Help democratic transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>The US government officials</td>
<td>Remarks at the United Nations Security Council</td>
<td>Urge countries in transitions to make their own future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>The US Secretary of State and Tunisian youths</td>
<td>Discussing the issue of religious parties in a democracy</td>
<td>Religious parties should respect human rights and democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>The US Secretary of State and Tunisian audience</td>
<td>Clinton’s visit to Nessma TV channel</td>
<td>Discuss about the US efforts to make a vigorous democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and Tunisian youths</td>
<td>Clinton’s visit to Tunisia</td>
<td>Support Tunisia’s democratic Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>The US Secretary of State and Tunisian youths</td>
<td>Tackling the issue of religious freedom in a democracy</td>
<td>Protect religious freedoms in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>The US and Secretary Clinton</td>
<td>Remarks at the Tunisian Red Crescent Training Center</td>
<td>Support Tunisia’s humanitarian aid to Libyan refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>The US Secretary and Tunisian youths</td>
<td>Addressing Tunisian youths</td>
<td>Encourage youth empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and the High Commission of Human Rights’ officials</td>
<td>Remarks at the Human Rights Council</td>
<td>Face the challenges that come with democratic transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>The US Secretary of State</td>
<td>Interview Hosted by Nessma TV</td>
<td>Stress the need for democratic change in the Arab world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>The US Secretary of State and a Moroccan journalist</td>
<td>Interview With Michele Kelemen of NPR in Morocco</td>
<td>Discuss issues related to Arab revolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and Irish government officials</td>
<td>Delivering a speech in the Conference: Frontlines and Frontiers</td>
<td>Stress the importance of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and Lithuania’s government officials</td>
<td>Remarks at Community of Democracies Ministerial</td>
<td>Present Tunisia as a good example of a country in transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and Irish government officials</td>
<td>Conference: Making Human Rights a Human Reality</td>
<td>Stress the importance of universal values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton and the US</td>
<td>Town Hall With Tunisian Youth</td>
<td>Defend the US image and religious freedom there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>Secretary Clinton, members of G-8 meeting</td>
<td>Remarks at G-8 Deauville Partnership With Arab Countries in Transition</td>
<td>Discuss the issue of extremists who hijack democratic transitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The identities in table (22) reveal that the speaker is an official representative of the US government, more specifically its Secretary of State. She is an American woman, who speaks on behalf of the US Administration. The activities are various, and they involve Clinton’s official visits to Tunisia, Morocco, Lithuania, Ireland and Switzerland. They also involve attending conferences on human rights and democracies, delivering speeches in the UN Security Council or remarks at the G-8 members meeting.

The goals are mainly promoting democracy in North Africa and the Middle East, implementing basic human rights. These rights include women and youth empowerment and religious freedom, especially for faith minorities. Another important goal is defending the image of the US in the region by providing humanitarian aid and financial support to governments in transitions. The goals of such activities are different, but they aim to reach the same objective, mainly democratic change in the MENA region. Such goals are linked to the group norms and values as well as its interests. This is illustrated in the following table:
Table 23

Clinton’s Ideological Representations (Norms, Group Reference and Interests) in the Speech Excerpts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excerpt N</th>
<th>Norms</th>
<th>Group Reference</th>
<th>Resources/interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democrats and a newly democratized country</td>
<td>Democratic change in Tunisia and the Arab world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democrats and communities in transition</td>
<td>Youth empowerment in new Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Democratic change</td>
<td>Democrats Vs non-democratic countries</td>
<td>Promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>Freedom of religion, association, assembly and speech</td>
<td>The US secular government Vs religious parties</td>
<td>Democratize Islamist parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>Assisting free fair elections and a vigorous democracy</td>
<td>Democracies and new-democracies</td>
<td>Assist Tunisia’s democratic Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>Assistance, democracy in Tunisia</td>
<td>The US government and a country in transition</td>
<td>Promote democracy in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>Religious freedom, democratic principles</td>
<td>Democrats and Tunisia as a country in transition</td>
<td>Promote religious freedoms in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid, assisting Tunisia’s efforts</td>
<td>Humanists, the US as a savior of the world</td>
<td>Push revolutions forward and promote democracy in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>Youth empowerment</td>
<td>Democrats and Tunisian youths</td>
<td>Young people’s participation in democratic transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>Creating jobs and economic opportunities</td>
<td>Democrats and humanists</td>
<td>Sustain democratic transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>Democratic change</td>
<td>Democrats Vs Arab dictators</td>
<td>Democratize North Africa and the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>Democratic principles, like regular elections</td>
<td>Democrats and countries in transitions</td>
<td>Promote democratic principles in North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>Human rights, security and stability</td>
<td>The US and Irish governments or democrats</td>
<td>Global security and stability and national interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>Free, transparent elections, democratic principles</td>
<td>Democrats and countries in transition</td>
<td>Encourage other democratic transitions in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>Universal values, human rights</td>
<td>American and Irish humanists and democrats</td>
<td>Promote universal rights in other regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>Religious freedom for Muslim Americans</td>
<td>The US, Democrats, Christians</td>
<td>Emphasize the US positive attitude towards Muslims and religious freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (23) demonstrates that the group norms are also various ranging from the most to the least general in the present corpus. The general norms are democratic principles, human rights and religious freedom. These norms can be subdivided into specific sub-categories. First, democratic norms include political participation, free, fair vote, regular elections and transparency. These sub-categories aim to build a vigorous or sustainable democracy. Second, human rights norms are also divided into the freedom of Internet, speech, association and assembly. More focus is noticed on women rights, like women equality with men and women empowerment. Third, religious freedom norms consist of sub-categories, including tolerance towards Muslim Americans and faith minorities everywhere. These ideological representations coincide with the clusters of attitudes about democracy, human rights and religion examined in the previous sub-section.
Chapter Four

Findings and Discussion

As for group reference and group interests, Clinton, implicitly, refers to her group as democrats who push democratic transitions forward. Similarly, she also identifies her community as humanists who aim to guarantee universal human rights for any individual in any society. Likewise, Clinton refers to the group as Christians who are moderate and tolerant people, attempting to promote religious freedom, tolerance and moderation. In addition, she identifies herself and her group as feminists who defend the basic rights of women and call for their empowerment. Clinton’s epistemic community is depicted as standing in stark contrast with extremists who try to hijack democratic transitions and impede democratic progress in the MENA region. The OTHER is different in terms of values, ethics and religion.

This leads to a dual vision of the world provided by Clinton, mainly ‘WE’ and ‘THEY’. The ‘WE’ group involves democratic countries, the defenders of human rights, tolerant people and feminists. The ‘WE’ group also involves countries in transitions, societies that seek change, minorities that suffer from rising abuse, and communities that ask for more rights and freedom. This involves Arab people, who seek to overthrow their authoritarian rulers, implement democratic principles and protect universal rights in their countries. However, ‘THEY’ group includes extremists, who struggle to hamper democratic revolutions, violate human rights and nurture religious intolerance and extremism. The values of ‘THEY’ group, from Clinton’s point of view, are oppressing their people, torturing them, abusing power, limiting freedoms and hampering their people’s ambitions for freedom and dignity.

In the above speech excerpts, as well as in the whole corpus, Clinton focuses on the POSITIVE SELF-PRESENTATION more than the NEGATIVE OTHER-PRESENTATION. This is deduced from the dominance of Clinton’s positive mental models over negative image schemas. This indicates her concern about boosting democratic transitions, promoting human rights and protecting religious freedom more than magnifying extremists’ violence and terrorism. In other words, Clinton marginalizes these extremist groups and locates them in the PERIPHERY of the mental map. This presupposes the existence of ‘WE’ at the CENTRE of this map, surrounded by positive image schemas. This also presupposes allocating negative image schemas to ‘THEY’ to depict them in stark contrast with ‘WE’.

Consequently, this leads to an ideological square that is based on ‘Emphasizing Our Good Things’, ‘Emphasizing Their Bad Things’, ‘Mitigating Our Bad Things’ and ‘Mitigating Their Good Things’. These discourse strategies are expressed via attitudes.
and mental models triggered by the lexicon, more specifically factive presupposition triggers and epistemic modals. They are forms of social cognition or mental representations, just like socially shared knowledge. They are explicitly or implicitly formulated in discourse to unveil Clinton’s presupposed knowledge, and hence her ideological background.

These clusters are gradually acquired by the members of dominated groups or cultures. The dominant groups control ideologies by organizing attitudes and practices of domination. In other words, ideologies of dominant groups monitor the formation and development of SRs and mental models. Therefore, dominant groups will maintain power and reproduce it by embedding hegemony over dominated groups in discourse. From a western perspective, Arab political systems need to change into democracies that represent the will of the people and guarantee their basic rights. Such polarization leads to positive representation of the IN-GROUP, or democratic countries and negative representation of the OUT-GROUP, or non-democratic communities.

Regarding knowledge, one can notice the approximately similar uses of factive presupposition lexical features (94 items) and epistemic modality features (104 items). This shows that Clinton’s discourse is based on a dichotomy, mainly implicit vs. explicit knowledge, indirect vs. direct meanings, back-grounded vs. fore-grounded ideas and presupposed vs. exposed knowledge. Both factive presupposition lexis and epistemic modals signal the speaker’s epistemological knowledge state. This demystifies Clinton's perceptual and conceptual worlds.

After analyzing the whole corpus in terms of knowledge manifested by the speaker, one can notice the use of two types of knowledge, mainly personal and social. To start with, Clinton’s political discourse is a cluster of personal knowledge, based on personal mental models, or personal experiences about specific events. Clinton’s personal knowledge about democracy and human rights is stored in LTM. These mental models are retrieved, activated and combined with new mental models about recent situations. Old and new image schemas influence each other to produce and comprehend discourse. Personal knowledge is private until it is shared by the speaker with other participants in the speech event. Once shared with recipients, knowledge is no longer personal, but social.

As for social knowledge, it is divided into group, institutional, cultural and universal knowledge. First, group knowledge is shared between democratic countries that share the
same social and political values. Group members have similar epistemological backgrounds of general abstract knowledge about democracy and human rights. They may have the same experiences or the same sources of knowledge. Second, institutional or organizational knowledge is shared by the members of an institution or organization. In this context, one can give the following example that was produced in the UN Security Council “Democracies make the strongest, most capable partners. And we know that it takes a lot of hard work and oftentimes struggle.” (Sep.26.12\Ap. B, p. 30). Clinton’s remarks are delivered at the UNSC regarding peace and security in the Middle East. The UN members share knowledge about the security situation in the region, and, therefore, p is institutional knowledge shared by participants in the UN.

Third, cultural knowledge can also be decoded in the corpus when Clinton tackles religious issues. For example, Clinton invokes cultural knowledge segments in “I mean, if you go to the United States, you see mosques everywhere, you see Muslim Americans everywhere. That’s the fact.” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 25). She defends the American cultural values, like religious tolerance and moderation. She tries to reject the rhetoric about Islamophobia in the US. Moreover, Clinton’s personal knowledge about women seems to be a selection of sociocultural knowledge about women in her community, like in “You are obviously an intelligent young woman who’s made your own choice, and I respect that. And I want every woman here to make her own choice, and we should all respect that as well” (Feb.25.12\App. B, p. 23). Clinton mentally evaluates the young woman as intelligent because she made her own choices. We can infer that Clinton respects free and independent women, who enjoy their rights. This draws a contrasting image with some Arab women, who are submissive, oppressed and deprived of their basic rights.

Finally, universal knowledge in Clinton’s discourse is made clear when she discusses the issue of universal values or human rights. For instance, in “But at the same time, one must never forget universal values are vital to who we are and what we hope to see our world become.” (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 38), Clinton stresses the idea that human rights are not only American values, but also universal and everyone’s values. Clinton presupposes that these values are known to any individual and that they should be enjoyed by any human being worldwide. In short, knowledge in the corpus is both personal and social, including group, institutional, cultural and universal knowledge.
Knowledge in Clinton’s discourse can also be classified as episodic and conceptual semantic. First, episodic knowledge is derived from past experiences and previous situations, like in “We are well aware of the challenges that come with these kinds of transitions” (Feb.28’.11\App. B, p. 2). Hence, Clinton’s previous experience as part of a democratic system makes her conscious about the challenges that come with democratic transitions. Second, semantic, or conceptual knowledge is inferred from generalization, abstraction and de-contextualization. An example of generalized knowledge is the following: “[...] while remembering that human rights are at the center of some of the most significant challenges to global security and stability and therefore to our national interests” (Dec.6.12\App. B, p. 38). In sum, knowledge in Clinton’s discourse is both episodic and conceptual.

To sum up, it has been shown that knowledge in Clinton’s political discourse is implicit and explicit, presupposed and highlighted, backgrounded and foregrounded and episodic and conceptual. Knowledge is personal, social, cultural, national and universal. It is ideologically biased and politically oriented. Like beliefs, knowledge may be relative and subjective since it represents reality from the speaker’s angle or perspective. Finally, knowledge consists of fragments that are structural and hierarchical.

In view of the above, the analysis of personal cognition in Clinton’s political remarks on democracy and human rights in Tunisia in post-Ben Ali period has demonstrated that Clinton’s personal values, attitudes, ideology and knowledge are selections of socially shared mental representations of her epistemic community, mainly the USA, and democratic communities in general. Though the social dimension of cognition is tackled in the present sub-section, one has to elaborate socio-cultural values, the systems of attitudes and ideologies, as well as socio-cultural knowledge in the corpus. This is the main concern of the last part of the cognitive component of van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive approach.

4.1.2.2 Social cognition

Social cognition is a system of socially shared representations or SRs, which may be conceptualized as networks, organized in hierarchical structures in terms of node-categories. For example, social representations about groups may feature nodes, like cultural characteristics, socio-political goals, appearance, origin, religion, political orientation etc. These categories determine the propositional contents of SRs, which encompass shared social knowledge as well as evaluative information, like opinions and attitudes towards other people, groups or communities. Socio-cultural values and attitudes are the main focus of the following sub-section.
4.1.2.2.1 Socio-cultural values and systems of attitudes

The SRs, related to social and cultural values and attitudes, are social because they are acquired, changed and utilized in social situations. They are shared cognitions between all or most of the members of a group. They are abstractions of personal experiences and opinions of social actors. Such personal cognitive representations undergo a process of adaptation, abstraction or generalization to become socially shared values, or opinions. More specifically, SRs are any socially shared cognitive representations about social phenomena, such as social problems, social groups and social relations.

After examining the speech excerpts that have been selected from the corpus of the present research to study personal values and attitudes, one can emphasize that Clinton’s personal values are selections of socially shared values and principles. In fact, Clinton calls for universal human rights and American democratic values, which are acquired, saved and retrieved to be reproduced in discourse. Political and humanitarian values, like democratic principles and human rights, are shared cognitive representations that make discourse meaningful and facilitate its interpretation and understanding. Such cognitive interface embeds social, cultural, political and religious values of a community or a group.

Regarding attitudes, Clinton reflects the attitudes of her American society, in general, and her government, in particular, since she is the US Secretary of State. She also expresses the attitudes of groups, like humanists and feminists, since she defends the rights of disadvantaged and unprivileged people, including religious minorities, LGBT communities and women. However, Clinton, sometimes, stresses the idea that her opinion is personal, and hence expresses her personal convictions, not the group’s beliefs or her epistemic community’s views. In short, the micro-level of Clinton’s values and attitudes reflects the macro-level of socially and culturally shared values and attitudes.

4.1.2.2.2 Ideologies and socio-cultural knowledge

After dealing with the personal ideological representations of Clinton as a member of a democratic community in previous sub-sections, focus has to be on the social and ideological representations, embedded in Clinton’s discourse. Mental models are cognitive representations of personal experiences and interpretations, involving personal knowledge and opinions. Whereas mental models are situated in episodic memory, socially shared SRs are located in social memory. Mental models play the role of interface between the personal and individual uses of SRs in social perception and interaction, and the generalized
SRs shared by a group, community or society. Similarly, mental models are the basis of SRs and general knowledge.

In the corpus of the current study, one can note that Clinton’s beliefs reflect the socially shared opinions of her epistemic community. For instance, Clinton’s feminist ideology about women’s equality with men emanates from the socially shared ideological beliefs of her society, or at least the feminist groups in the USA and elsewhere. Likewise, Clinton, who is a democrat, might have stored personal beliefs and attitudes about democracy in the past. She retrieves these stored mental models and reuses them in political discourse to highlight the democratic values and principles of her epistemic community, in this case democrats in the USA and everywhere in the world.

As far as knowledge is concerned, one can state that knowledge is basically social since people acquire knowledge mostly from public discourse, whether it is school discourse, media discourse, political, parliamentary discourse and everyday social interactions. Subsequently, knowledge is socially shared by the members of certain societies. Personal knowledge scripts are selections of cultural, social and international knowledge. First, Clinton uses cultural knowledge, or common ground, to speak about religious freedom in her country, such as Muslim Americans in the USA. Second, she shows knowledge about democracies to reflect what is taken for granted by democrats, hence group knowledge. Third, Clinton also promotes human rights, which she thinks they are universal values that should be granted for every individual in the globe. Such kind of knowledge is international and may be based on scientifically approved facts, specialized knowledge and evidence.

In this context, one can confirm that knowledge refers to what is taken for granted as true beliefs in an epistemic community. However, what is taken as knowledge in one epistemic community can be considered as false beliefs or mere ideologies in other epistemic communities. For example, what Clinton introduces as presupposed knowledge about a democratic system can be challenged by leftist parties or theocrats. Another example is that Clinton’s knowledge about human rights in some countries can be interpreted as false beliefs, or wrong opinions that do not coincide with the real world. Some extremists may even consider human rights or democracy as blasphemy for religious reasons. In short, Clinton’s ideological background and personal knowledge are influenced by the socially, culturally and politically shared knowledge of her epistemic community, in this case the American, Christian, democrat, moderate, humanist and feminist communities.
In short, one can deduce that group beliefs affect and shape personal beliefs. In other words, social cognition influences personal cognition. Subsequently, Clinton’s personal values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge are different types of social representations. After dealing with the discursive and cognitive analyses of Clinton’s political remarks about the Tunisian revolution, one can tackle the final stage of van Dijk’s (1995b) triangular approach.

4.1.3 Social analysis

The third stage of analysis, or the social dimension of discourse analysis, focuses on the overall societal structures, institutional structures, group relations and group structures.

4.1.3.1 Overall societal structures

The overall societal structure is organized according to micro and macro levels. At the micro level of analysis, discourse is considered as a form of social interaction. It is interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation. Discourse is not only observable verbal features, but also the cognitive representations involved during discourse production and understanding. As such, discourse is part of both situations and cognitions. In other words, the discursive acts cannot be separated from the social acts that define social situations. Discursive acts are simply social acts that can be understood via mental models. Speakers act as members of various social groups to establish a link between the microstructures of groups and the microstructures of interactions. Such a relation also establishes a link between personal beliefs and the socially shared beliefs of groups.

In the selected corpus, Clinton is a social actor, who speaks as a politician, a woman, a mother, a previous lawyer and a party member. As such, she plays different social roles in society. Her actions, apart from the discursive action of speech producer, accomplish larger social acts and processes, like representing the US as its Secretary of State, building strong relations with other countries, promoting the American ideals worldwide and encouraging the democratization processes of non-democratic countries, more specifically Tunisia as part of the Arab world. As for Clinton’s identity as a social actor, it depends on her group affiliations or membership. Every social actor is a member of many social groups. For instance, Clinton is a member in democrat, humanist and feminist groups. This leads to the macro level of societal structures.
At the macro level, focus has to be on communities, groups and organizations involved in Clinton’s discourse. Since the present research paper studies epistemological presupposition and factive knowledge in Clinton’s discourse, the main concern is identifying the main epistemic communities, groups or social actors in the communicative situations. As stated above, Clinton, as a social actor, is a member of many social groups; each group has specific beliefs and, sometimes, conflicting ideologies. Clinton belongs to humanists since she calls for implementing human rights. She is a member of a feminist group because she defends the rights of women. She pertains to democratic parties as she enhances the importance of democratic transitions. She is part of the Christian community since she describes herself as a strong Christian believer. She also identifies herself as an idealistic realist, who seems to adopt conflicting attitudes and values. Subsequently, Clinton is a member of various groups, which ideologies and goals may converge or diverge.

The social representations of attitudes and ideologies are mediated via mental models manifested in discourse. Discourse can only have a social impact when it contributes to the formation as well as confirmation of social attitudes and ideologies. For instance, in Clinton’s discourse, human rights and democracy are not merely abstract systems of political and social justice, but should actually manifest in everyday practices, via the beliefs, attitudes, actions and interactions of group members. In the case of Tunisia, Clinton’s discourse affects the overall social structure of this country in transition. The cognitive interface between discourse and society impacts the attitudes of people, and hence influences their interactions and actions in society. This leads to changing the social structure by promoting a new social order that integrates democratic values, like civil society, non-governmental organizations, human rights associations etc. In short, discourse changes society via cognition.

Ideologies are situated between societal structures and the structures of the minds of social members. Ideologies permit social actors to express or translate their social properties into beliefs and knowledge. Such beliefs and knowledge form the concrete models of their everyday life experiences, or the mental representations of their discourse and actions. The discourse properties that should be translated are identities, activities, goals, norms, interests etc. Consequently, ideologies control how people arrange and comprehend their social practices and discourse structures. Every social actor has her own biographical experiences or old, past mental models, values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge. These mental models interfere to help understand discursive interactions in different social situations. These models and ideologies are also influenced by institutional and organizational structures.
4.1.3.2 Institutional\organizational structures

To tackle the institutional level of social analysis, one has to focus on the different institutional locations where discourse has been delivered, as well as the speaker’s institutional role. It is worth noting that context models are very important to understand discourse. Table (19), drawn in section 4.1.2.1.1.1, is re-used at this level of analysis to highlight the institutional aspect of Clinton’s speeches. This table (See Appendix S) is adapted to show the different institutional locations, where Clinton delivered her political speeches, the various institutional roles of participants, as well as the communicative events.

Since the institutional locations, roles and events have been discussed in sub-section 4.1.2.1.1.1, focus, at this analytical phase, is on topical control and hegemony in discourse. Clinton is also the discourse producer, so she controls interactions, like journalists’ questions and turn taking. This is manifested via interrupting other speakers and changing her tone. Similarly, she controls the selection of topics discussed in her remarks. Topical control reveals the speaker’s power over discourse and recipients. For instance, Clinton controls the representations about socio-political situations by eliciting powerful groups’ views about revolutions and democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. Due to her institutional role, she persuades recipients, such as Tunisian youths, by drawing positive image schemas and favorable mental models about democratic transitions and democratic political systems. Likewise, she builds positive mental representations about human rights, supporting people in need, liberating oppressed people, the freedom of Internet, the freedom of the press, the freedom of religion etc.

Indeed, one cannot tackle the social level of analysis without highlighting power and dominance in discourse. Clinton, as the Secretary of State of a powerful country like the USA, controls the addressees’ mental schemas about Arab leaders, like Ben Ali and Ghadafi, by portraying them via negative stereotypical images, like oppressors, corrupt rulers and dictators. In addition, controlling access to discourse is one of the manifestations of power in discourse. However, Clinton does not deny access to anyone in order to reach more audience and convince more people about the benefits of a democratic political system and the advantages of human rights to save the dignity and welfare of people worldwide. Like societal structures, institutional structures lead to polarization by dividing the world into camps, groups or poles. This idea is elaborated further in what follows.
4.1.3.3 Group relations

Since the aim of the present sub-section is uncovering group relations, focus has to be on the communities and groups mentioned in Clinton’s discourse, and whose cognitive representations are shared by their members. In other words, groups whose socio-cultural values, attitudes, knowledge and ideologies determine their collective identities have to be studied. Indeed, after examining the corpus, one can notice an IN-GROUP\OUT-GROUP structure. First, Clinton’s representations, as a social actor, determine who belongs to the IN-GROUP, what degree of involvement is considered and how much information is given about IN-GROUP social actors. Consequently, Clinton understands the world in terms of categories by ordering, classifying and organizing social actors in discourse. Clinton mentally transforms people and the world in terms of her categories.

Second, the OUT-GROUP social actors are interpreted, shaped and organized by Clinton, who understands the others and evaluates them in terms of her standpoint or perspective. Outsiders, for Clinton, stand far away of ‘OUR’ standards because they are different from ‘US’. ‘THEY’ refers to extremists, oppressors, dictators and human rights violators. Difference is negatively evaluated by Clinton, who opts for a ‘WE-THEY’ dichotomy that divides the world into two poles. Clinton stores mental models, involving beliefs, attitudes and knowledge about ‘OTHERS’ values, customs, habits, religious beliefs and socio-cultural features to organize them in terms of categories or mental frames. Group interests as well as everyday inter\intra-group interactions, perceptions and norms shape social representations about IN-GROUPs and OUT-GROUPs.

Ideologies play a significant role in categorizing people into groups based on ideological backgrounds. In the corpus, Clinton categorizes the world as democratic countries, non-democratic countries and countries in transitions. These groups are depicted as cooperating and conflicting depending on the group ideologies, goals and interests. The first ideological group is Clinton’s epistemic community, which defends democracy and cooperates with countries in transitions, like Tunisia. Clinton’s group, however, shows a hostile attitude towards extremists and governments that work hard to impede and hamper the democratic process. Clinton’s ICMs reflect a triangular mental map, which consists of democrats, ‘our allies’ and ‘our enemies’. Democrats and ‘our allies’ relations are based on positive mental representations, like friendship, solidarity, cooperation, collaboration and humanitarian aid. Democrats and ‘our enemies’ relations are based on negative image schemas, such as extremism, enmity, threat, hijackers of democracy, dictators etc.
The discursive strategies of polarization, in the corpus, are based on semantic macrostructure, local meanings and lexicon. The semantic macrostructures are based on two strategies. The first strategy is POSITIVE SELF-PRESENTATION, like in “we’ve been on the side of freedom, we’ve been on the side of human rights” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). What is foregrounded is Clinton’s enumeration of American principles, like freedom and human rights. As such, Clinton gives a very positive account of the American historical record. The second strategy is NEGATIVE OTHER-PRESENTATION, like in “Now, personally, I think that you will face extremists who are trying to really change the Tunisian culture” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). Clinton depicts a clear negative image about extremists and shows a hostile attitude towards them. This image can also be portrayed by de-emphasizing or rejecting negative topics about ‘US’, like in “There are comments made that certainly don’t reflect the United States, don’t reflect our foreign policy” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 25). In this example, Clinton rejects any doubts about the US intolerance with regard to Islam and Muslims in America.

As for local meaning strategies, one can notice Clinton’s focus on and explicitness about ‘OUR GOOD ACTIONS’ as opposed to ‘THEIR BAD ACTIONS’. One can note the prevalence of positive lexicon collocated with ‘WE’, like in “But the United States stands very clearly on the side of peaceful protest, nonviolent resolution, political reform” (Mar.16’.11\Ap. B, p. 5). Indeed, Clinton selects positive words for the US, such as the adjectives ‘peaceful’ and ‘nonviolent’ and the noun phrases ‘resolution’ and ‘reform’. However, Clinton selects negative words for ‘THEM’, like in “It’s very true that many governments attempt to squeeze civil society in a steel vise [...] punishing people, harassing them, beating them, imprisoning them for who they are” (Dec.6.12\Ap. B, p. 41). In fact, Clinton uses words that imply negative connotations, such as the verb ‘squeeze’ and the gerunds ‘punishing’, ‘harassing’, ‘beating’ and ‘imprisoning’, which portray very negative image schemas about non-democratic governments.

The third group includes countries in transitions, in this case, Tunisia as a model. The discursive strategies are used to positively present countries in transitions. In the whole corpus, Clinton opts for different persuasive strategies to convince audience about the benefits of such political changes. Apart from the positive presentation of Tunisia’s revolution and its democratic transition, Clinton mitigates its drawbacks, like in “We are well aware of the challenges that come with these kinds of transitions. You cannot create jobs or economic opportunities overnight” (Feb.28’.11\Ap. B, p. 2). Clinton also emphasizes friendship and cooperation between the US and Tunisia to help foster democratic transitions in the regions.
At the socio-cognitive level, Tunisians are prototypically framed as struggling youths protesting for human rights and democracy. On behalf of the USA, Clinton establishes good relations with countries that adopt the American ideals or democratic principles. This can be inferred from the following example: “Let us be sure that we support these new democracies” (July.1.11\Ap. B, p. 16).

The following figure illustrates the kind of relations between social groups in Clinton’s discourse:

![Figure 22. Rightness-Wrongness Proximity-Remoteness Scale](image)

Inspired by Chilton’s (2004) scale, figure (22) demonstrates that 'WE' and friends, allies and countries in democratic transitions, or insiders, are collocated with positive words, like ‘right’ and ‘good’. However, 'THEY', referring to anti-democratic countries or outsiders, are depicted negatively by allocating them pejorative words, like ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’. Likewise, 'WE' or the SELF is located in the CENTRE of the image schema. 'THEY' or our friends are NEAR, whereas 'THEY' or our enemies are marginalized in the PERIPHERY. Hence, RIGHTNESS and PROXIMITY are the characteristics of groups like 'US', while WRONGNESS and REMOTENESS are the aspects of groups that are different from 'US'. After examining the different kinds of relations between groups in discourse, or intra-group relations, the following sub-section focuses on group structures from a social perspective.

### 4.1.3.4 Group structures

At this level of analysis, one can focus on inter-group structures. As stated in previous sub-sections, three groups have been identified, namely democratic communities, democratic communities in transition and non-democratic communities. Every category, however, involves sub-categories, or sub-groups, whose identities, goals, norms and interests
may converge or diverge. The following table illustrates the different groups in Clinton's discourse and their characteristics:

Table 24

Group Characteristics: Identity, Goals, Norms, Group Reference and Interests in the Corpus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Norms</th>
<th>Group reference</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic groups</td>
<td>Communities that adopt democracy</td>
<td>Spread democratic principles</td>
<td>Free and transparent elections, human rights, civil societies</td>
<td>We\ US\ the US\ Our allies\ Friends</td>
<td>Fulfill the American ideals and the universal values of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries in transitions</td>
<td>In this case Tunisia</td>
<td>Implement democratic values, protect human rights</td>
<td>Free and transparent elections, human rights, civil society, moderation</td>
<td>Our friends\ Our allies</td>
<td>Political and social reforms, economic prosperity, enjoy basic human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-democratic groups</td>
<td>Arab countries, communities against democracy</td>
<td>Hamper democratic transitions</td>
<td>Oppression, lack of freedom, extremism power abuse, dictatorship</td>
<td>They\ Them\ Their\ extremists</td>
<td>Domination, power, control the threats of democratic nations or Communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table (24) shows the major groups identified in Clinton’s discourse. Within such groups, one can identify sub-groups. These groups and sub-groups are based on hierarchical structures, where some powerful groups affect weak groups. As such, the structure is based on dominant and dominated communities. Dominant groups influence people, control access to discourse and information, serve their own interests and spread their ideologies, agendas and propagandas. However, dominated groups are just passive recipients that are affected by dominant ideologies. They may suffer from the power abuse and hegemony of dominant communities.

In the present corpus, the dominant group is the democrat community, which members attempt to promote their principles in North Africa and the Middle East. Their motives are fostering the democratic process in Tunisia to urge other Arab countries to follow the same steps for freedom, human rights and democratic values. Tunisians are influenced by Clinton’s discourse, along with other communities seeking freedom. The American ideology is, therefore, dominant since it affects the perceptions of other people. Non-democratic governments and rulers, however, try to block such processes and transitions by resisting the US ideologies and agendas in the region. To sum up, the societal aspects of discourse, mainly the overall societal and institutional structures, group relations and group
structures enhance the interrelation between discourse and society. Discursive structures are reflections of social structures and practices via a cognitive interface.

In the present chapter, it has been shown that discourse analysis is textual, cognitive, and social, both locally and globally in society and its structures. We have, therefore, related discourse structures to cognitive structures and processes to social structures. At the first stage, the discursive analysis has focused on the study of factive presupposition triggers, mainly factive predicates and noun phrases, and epistemic modality, mainly mental state verbs and epistemic adjectives and adverbs, in Clinton’s political discourse. The aim has been sorting out the lexical items and discourse features that reveal factive knowledge and, therefore, unveiling the speaker’s perception of human rights and democracy in Tunisia in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s era.

At the second stage, the cognitive mechanisms that unmask the speaker's mental models, values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge have been examined. More focus has been on mental frames, ICMs, prototypical image schemas and knowledge scripts relating to human rights and democracy with respect to post-Ben Ali Tunisia. The mental mapping of Clinton’s perceptual and conceptual worlds according to a mental scale, factive presupposed knowledge, structural schematization of knowledge scripts as well as the cognitive lexical networks in the human mind have been highlighted while processing Clinton’s political discourse.

At the third stage, the social dimensions of discourse have been uncovered. More specifically, societal and institutional structures, and group relations and structures have been analyzed. More concern has been about polarization and the relations between democratic and non-democratic communities or countries as well as dominant and dominated groups, hence discursive and ideological hegemony between social groups and social actors. After implementing the three stages of analysis of van Dijk’s (1995b) approach, the main findings displayed in the current section have to be discussed in what follows.
4.2 Discussion

At this level, one has to focus on the most important research findings and relate them to the research questions in an attempt to reach the objectives of the present study. To start with, the lexical features that trigger factive presupposition and epistemic modality in Hillary Clinton’s discourse, mainly factive and emotive verbs, factive noun phrases, mental state verbs, epistemic adverbs and adjectives, have been sorted out. The aim is demystifying presupposed knowledge regarding human rights and democracy in the Arab World in Tunisia in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s regime collapse in January 2011.

It has been noticed, while analyzing the corpus, that ‘think’ is a mental state verb that sells personal, subjective opinions as objective, reliable judgments. Speakers may serve specific agendas and ideologies, and hence encode their opinions and attitudes towards certain political parties, or social trends in a form of objective views based on evidence. They may also give the illusion that these opinions are mutually shared by the hearers, or the epistemic community to urge receivers to accept them without checking their validity. Such fake objectivity may deter recipients from challenging the truth value of such judgments. They take them as taken for granted or presupposed truths, hence the speaker’s and hearers’ epistemological worlds converge. However, some recipients may doubt the truth conditionality of such thoughts, and interrupt discourse to correct the speaker’s information, and hence the two epistemic worlds diverge.

‘Think’ foregrounds information and explicitly reveals the propositional content of the utterance. ‘Think’ expresses the attitude of the speaker clearly, leaving no doubts on the part of the hearer. More specifically, it is a direct and subjective way to translate personal as well as group thoughts and opinions about certain issues. In other words, it designates a great deal of speaker involvement and reflects a strong engagement to the truth conditionality of a given proposition. Such strong personal involvement unveils the speaker’s perception of events, entities and issues and her mental and epistemological state. In other words, the use of the mental state verb ‘think’ reveals the cognitive mechanisms used to understand issues in the world. In sum, the predicate ‘think’ is subjectivity-laden since it portrays the speaker’s personal thoughts and her own views.

Unlike ‘think’, which expresses attitudes, the factive verb ‘know’ reflects knowledge about the real world. It reflects what an individual knows about the physical world, hence personal knowledge that stems from personal experiences. The source of such knowledge
must be reliable, and this explains why Clinton, sometimes, opts for evidential verbs, like ‘see’, ‘tell’, ‘hear’ and ‘say’. The predicate ‘know’ translates what can be seen in the physical, real world without any evaluation on the part of the speaker. It is an objective description of reality or reliable transfer of information from source to target.

Since ‘know’ is a primary verb that expresses the speaker’s knowledge, it is used to claim the objectivity and reliability of information. It is also a factive verb that takes a complement clause whose truth conditionality is clearly presupposed by the addresser. Indeed, what is presupposed in p is presented as taken for granted. The proposition is introduced as previous knowledge that is personal or shared by an epistemic community. Such past knowledge seems to be unchallengeable and irrefutable by discourse participants since it is not the speaker’s personal point of view or a biased attitude towards events. The use of the factive predicate ‘know’ means that the proposition is based on evidence, or a reliable source. As such, knowledge is not a matter of doubt or controversy because it has to be shared and accepted by all group members.

‘Know’ is a presupposition lexical trigger, and, therefore, factuality is expressed in the complement clause in an implicit or indirect way. The proposition in that-clause is classified as backgrounded knowledge. Presupposed, backgrounded information cannot be rejected, and hence recipients just accept it as shared knowledge. Consequently, factive presupposition can serve certain group interests and promote the ideologies of certain communities. For instance, presupposed knowledge may be used by manipulators to distort truths and misrepresent other groups or ideologies. In this regard, one can note that the use of ‘think’ (51 items) and ‘know’ (51 items) in the corpus shows that Clinton’s discourse is based on a dichotomy, mainly opinions and knowledge. Indeed, ‘think’ expresses the point of view of the speaker in an explicit and direct way, whereas ‘know’ encodes the speaker’s presupposed knowledge. Presuppositions are taken for granted by Clinton, or she pretends taking them for granted to serve ideological purposes. Such implicit, presupposed information is represented in ideologically biased mental modals. For these reasons, presuppositions can be deceptive and manipulative.

‘Know’ is a typical factive verb that triggers factive presupposition, while ‘think’ is a typical verb that signals epistemic modality. Presupposition is always restricted to non-asserted true propositions, while epistemic modality asserts the propositional content of utterances. In whole, the features that embed presupposed, factive information are 94 items, compared to 104 features that describe the epistemological knowledge state of the speaker.
Subsequently, both factive presupposition and epistemic modality nearly evenly uncover Clinton’s mental state and her perception of the world. In other words, epistemic presupposition and epistemic modality reveal both the unstated and stated knowledge and attitudes in the corpus. Epistemic presupposition deals with what is unstated in the corpus, while epistemic modality focuses on what is stated in Clinton’s discourse. For instance, propositions introduced by ‘know’ pertain to non-asserted, taken for granted knowledge, whereas propositions stated after ‘certainly’ are asserted beliefs or knowledge. ‘Remind’ is, however, between presupposing and asserting and pertains to the shared knowledge of a group.

Another important remark is that most of factive presuppositions and epistemic modals are stated in that-clauses. Indeed, factive verbs, like ‘recognize’, presuppose the truth conditionality of p in that-clause, like in “Now, we recognize that our ability to directly influence political reforms and institution building from the outside in a lasting way is limited” (6.12.12\Ap. B, p. 41). Likewise, the epistemic modal adjective ‘confident’ also asserts the truth value of the proposition embedded in the complement clause, like in “And I am very confident – I am very, very confident that Tunisia will be successful because of you” (25.2.12\Ap. B, p 21). As such, the complement clauses that come after factive presupposition triggers and epistemic modals encode not only the beliefs and knowledge of the speakers, but also their attitudes and ideologies (See sections 4.1.2.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.1.2.2 of the present thesis). In short, it has been found out that presupposed knowledge, decoded in Clinton’s discourse, reveals that information is implied in the complement clause or that-clause as factive truths. Although the mental state verb ‘think’ mediates subjective opinions, Clinton attempts to show strong epistemic involvement in the truth conditionality of her utterances.

It has also been found out that factive presupposition and epistemic modality are supported by evidential verbs to enhance the reliability of the information, presented in Clinton's political discourse. Indeed, one can notice Clinton’s use of evidential predicates to support the statements with evidence. Clinton opts for hearsay evidence, like in “Now what we are hearing said by the Nahda party here is in accordance with democratic values” (25.2.12\Ap. B, p. 22). So, apart from the verb ‘say’, which seems to report reliable information, the evidential verb ‘hear’ is used to further enhance the truth value of the utterance. Clinton also uses visual or optic evidence, like in “We are watching closely the parties that are forming in countries, like Tunisia and Egypt” (1.7.11\Ap. B, p. 15). In addition, Clinton uses real life proofs when she uses the verb ‘prove’, like in “You proved that if you don’t listen to the people, you don’t respond to their needs, you don’t build a democracy; that is not true stability” (17.3.11\Ap. B, p. 8). In this context, the speaker’s knowledge is formed
by different components, mainly audio-visual sources of information and her physical, tactile experience with the real world.

Similarly, Clinton uses quotative evidence in “But Martin Luther King also made very clear that once you have the dream, you just can’t say, “I have a dream.” (17.3.11\Ap. B, p. 10). Apart from these kinds of evidentials, the speaker uses assumed and inferential evidence when she opts for factive presupposition and epistemic modality. For instance, when Clinton says: “[…] as I’m sure you’re aware, thousands of Tunisians have already left Tunisia heading for Europe” (28.2.11\Ap. B, p. 1), Clinton does not use sensory evidence, but makes use of two lexical items that present the proposition as factive knowledge, mainly the modal adjective ‘sure’ and the factive predicate ‘be aware’. So, the interpreter has to infer the existence of evidence that led the speaker to show strong epistemic involvement by asserting the truth of p. In short, Clinton uses a variety of evidential verbs that range from hearsay, visual, auditory, quotative, assumed and inferential evidence to enhance the truth value of her utterances.

It is important to note, in this regard, that epistemic modality systems, sometimes, correspond to evidential systems. In other words, certain epistemic modals serve the same functions as certain evidential forms. For instance, the modal adverb ‘obviously’ plays the same role as an evidential adverb, like in “You are obviously an intelligent young woman who’s made your own choice, and I respect that” (25.2.12\Ap. B, p. 23). ‘Obviously’, in this utterance, is both a modal adverb and an evidential adverb, hence epistemic modality and evidential modality coincide. The same applies to the modal adjective ‘clear’, like in “It was clear even then that the status quo was unsustainable, that refusal to change was itself becoming a threat to stability” (12.10.12\Ap. B, p. 33). As such, both epistemic and evidential readings are possible in the previous two examples. In short, epistemic modals can be analyzed as evidential markers.

After clarifying the link between epistemic modality and evidentiality with illustrations from the corpus, one has to work on the link between epistemic modality and presupposition. It seems clear that when the speaker uses a mental state verb, she has evidence that leads her to express epistemic involvement in the truth of p. For instance, in “But think of how many people need this help right now” (6.12.12\Ap. B, p. 41), Clinton presupposes that many people need help in the world. Clinton uses the imperative form to call recipients to perform a mental act. Asking recipients to think about people who need help presupposes the truth value of p. In sum, presuppositions are based on epistemic evidence.
The same can be noted about the epistemic modal adverb in the following example: “But the United States stands very clearly on the side of peaceful protest, nonviolent resolution, political reform” (16.3.11 Ap. B, p. 5). The modal adverb ‘clearly’ rejects any doubt that the proposition can be false. Hence, p is given as presupposed knowledge. Clinton presupposes p because she has evidence for it. Another example of presuppositions, triggered by epistemic modality, is the following: “But then the people who are elected have to also respect their people. And that is true whether it is a Christian party, a Hindu party, or a Muslim party” (25.2.12 Ap. B, p. 22). The epistemic adjective ‘true’ evaluates the truth value of p by performing a mental act that confirms the factuality of the proposition. Clinton seems to rely on previous, personal knowledge to introduce p as factive, presupposed knowledge. In short, epistemic modals can act as factive presupposition triggers.

It has also been shown that both factive presupposition and epistemic modality uncover the epistemic state of the speaker. In other words, they both reflect the perceptual as well as conceptual worlds of the speaker with respect to human rights and democracy. It has been demonstrated how the use of epistemic modality presupposes that the speaker has evidence that proves the truth value of the proposition. The presuppositions triggered by epistemic modals, such as epistemic modal adverbs and modal adjectives, show that the speaker has appropriate evidence or evidential proof on which she constructs factive presuppositions. In addition, it has been found that epistemic modals, just like presupposition triggers, produce a set of propositions that are known to the speaker and may also be shared by the hearers. Both factive presupposition and epistemic modality reveal the background assumptions or the participants’ common ground.

Since factive presupposition and epistemic modality deal with the truth conditionality of propositions, they are closely connected to evidentiality because this latter reveals the speaker’s degree of knowledge as inferred by the interpreter. They uncover the speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of the utterance. Subsequently, evidential markers are used by Clinton to express stronger epistemic involvement and more commitment to promote human rights and democratic principles in Arab countries, more specifically in Tunisia, which is considered the cradle of Arab Revolutions. Monitoring the source of information reflects the speaker’s informational relations to the world, hence her perceptual world. In sum, evidentiality is the basis for factive presuppositionality and epistemic modality. It is the cognitive ground on which the reliability of information and truths are built.
More importantly, one has to unveil the speaker’s perception of human rights and democracy and how it is portrayed via discourse features. It has been demonstrated that factive presuppositions are backgrounded, taken for granted beliefs on which other assumptions and ideas are built and proven, and on which other concepts are based. The speaker’s knowledge is presented as a reflection or mirror of the real world. Presupposed information is, therefore, transmitted as factual information that fits in with the real world, hence reliable, justifiable, presupposed facts. It has also been proven that factive lexical items present propositions as unchallengeable, irrefutable, undoubted, real facts. Epistemic modality also unmasks the epistemic mental state of the speaker, hence her evaluative opinions and thoughts. Both factive presupposition and epistemic modality describe the speaker’s conceptual world, in this case, human rights and democracy in Tunisia, and her perceptual world, mainly how she thinks, grasps, understands, perceives, evaluates and judges the world around her.

Another objective of the present research is investigating how mental models influence discourse production and comprehension. In this regard, it has been confirmed that information about events, concepts, entities and their related features is stored in the episodic memory. Information is interpreted as representations, and, thus, people construct models about concepts, like elections, dictators, universal values, etc. People also construct models about context, like participants’ interests, objectives, norms and identity that can help decode the meaning of discourse, hence context models. In addition, it has been shown that mental models are knowledge fragments, or cognitive image schemas that represent human rights as one of the basic prerogatives to democracy. Democracy is also mentally framed as the most suitable political system that meets the aspirations of Tunisians. More specifically, mental models are knowledge scripts that are stored, retrieved and activated to comprehend discourse. These mental models are socially and culturally variable because they depend on the attitudes, values, ideologies and knowledge set of the interpreter.

This leads to another research objective that sheds light on Clinton’s values and attitudes towards Tunisia's democratic transition, the American ideals and human rights in the Arab world. In this context, it has been demonstrated that Clinton’s repertoire oscillates between two major sub-categories of human rights' values, mainly religious freedom and women rights. In fact, Clinton defends the rights of women and calls for their empowerment. As for religion, Clinton calls for more religious freedom to pave the way for democratic transitions. Another important value is solidarity with countries in transitional phases. The USA is mentally schematized as a humanitarian and supportive country that provides
assistance to people seeking democratic change. As far as attitudes are concerned, it has been found out that the mental models, collocated with human rights, democratic principles and the US policy towards Tunisia, are positive cognitive representations. However, image schemas about extremists, dictatorship and the violation of human rights are negative. They reflect the hostile attitude of the speaker. Clinton’s attitudes are general and organized around these concepts. Since attitudes are ego-centered, Clinton reflects her own personal impressions about these issues.

After identifying the different types of knowledge found in the corpus in 4.1.2.1.2.2, one has to discuss the main results obtained from the analysis of knowledge within the socio-cognitive framework. Knowledge is conceptualized as mental representations, stored in LTM, but activated and used in STM. Knowledge takes the form of frames, scripts or schemas that help the speaker, in this case Hillary Clinton, to understand and produce discourse. Discourse comprehension occurs via building mental models by retrieving and activating relevant knowledge fragments in episodic memory. Clinton selects the knowledge fragments that should be implicitly expressed, and the knowledge instantiations that should be explicitly stated in discourse. Depending on context, Clinton opts for presupposed knowledge or apparent explicit knowledge. This also depends on the speaker’s k-device that helps to guess how much knowledge is already shared and how much knowledge needs to be shared with recipients at time t.

Presupposed knowledge is inferred from Clinton’s uses of factive presupposition triggers, mainly factive predicates, emotive verbs and factive noun phrases. As stated in previous sub-sections, presupposed knowledge is implicit, hidden and indirectly expressed. Presupposed knowledge is taken for granted and assumed to be true by Clinton and discourse recipients. In other words, it has to be known and accepted by participants so that other propositions can be meaningful. Though presupposed knowledge is known by the epistemic community, Clinton, sometimes, reminds the addressees of already known information, like in “And it was exciting for us to remember all of that history, the support that the United States gave for Tunisian independence” (Mar.17’’.11\App. B, p 11). Clinton is aware of what the recipients already know because she adjusts her discourse and includes only the relevant knowledge slots for the social situations or communicative events she takes part in.
However, presupposed knowledge is not always assumed to be known by the hearers. The speaker may imply presupposed knowledge to indirectly express what is not known by the recipients before the ongoing speech event. In this context, the speaker should be aware of what the recipients want to know because it is relevant or interesting for them, like in “[…] while remembering that human rights are at the center of some of the most significant challenges to global security and stability and therefore to our national interests” (Dec.6.12\App. B, p 38). In this utterance, Clinton highlights the importance of human rights for international security and stability. In spite of the use of the factive predicate ‘remember’, which triggers factive presupposition, the proposition may not be shared or accepted by recipients.

From a semantic perspective, discourse is the tip of the iceberg since only some propositions are explicitly expressed in discourse, while the remaining propositions are presupposed, hidden and indirectly stated. In the present research, Clinton’s remarks regarding the Tunisian revolution are factivity-laden because, as it has been shown, most of the utterances that include factive presupposition triggers or epistemic modals are presented as true facts. The speaker demonstrates high degrees of personal involvement to the truth conditionality of her propositions. Discursively, knowledge is given as undisputed, unchallengeable facts since it is stated by a competent member of the epistemic community. Indeed, Clinton is the US Secretary of State at the time of discourse production, and hence most hearers seem to accept what is presupposed as factual knowledge.

It is worth noting that understanding discourse is impossible without understanding and sharing the knowledge backgrounds between discourse participants. To comprehend discourse, one has to decode the implicit, tacit background knowledge of the local features, mainly the discourse settings, the participating members as well as the resources they are using. As such, discourse comprehension necessitates context comprehension, which in its turn requires understanding the background knowledge of the main discourse features. In short, only background knowledge allows discourse processing and comprehension.

In a similar vein, one can note that presupposed knowledge uncovers the background knowledge of the speaker, and demystifies her ideological background. Although knowledge is defined in epistemology as justified true beliefs, it may embed beliefs and attitudes. For instance, in the following example, Clinton presents the proposition as factive knowledge: “So I think we have demonstrated that we support democracy, and we support it where it is occurring.” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). This utterance unveils the background
knowledge of the speaker. The proposition is also shared within the American and pro-American democratic communities in the USA. Consequently, what is expressed is a belief that is shared by the same group members to the point that it becomes common-ground knowledge or a fact. It can also be widely shared and presupposed in larger epistemic communities, in this case democratic nations worldwide, hence universal, presupposed knowledge.

In this regard, it has been shown that such background knowledge is basically ideological. The group ideologies, found in Clinton's political discourse, can be classified as democrats, humanists and feminists. First, Clinton’s socially shared knowledge about democracy is ideology-laden, like in “And we are investing in innovation, because we know that governments on the other side of this fight are constantly improving their methods of oppression” (Dec.6.12\Ap. B, p. 41). In this utterance, Clinton is ideologically biased against non-democratic groups or nations. Her knowledge is determined on the basis of the ideological parameters of her group, its goals and interests. As such, Clinton’s repertoire reveals her ideological background as a democrat.

Second, the humanist ideology is clear in the following example: “A party that is a religious-based party has to recognize the freedom of religion, association, assembly, and speech” (Feb.25.12\Ap. B, p. 23). Clinton shows her ideological background as a humanist, who defends the rights and freedoms of people. These values are perceived, interpreted and represented on the basis of group convenience and common ground. Knowledge is, therefore, relative to the beliefs and attitudes of an epistemic community that shares the same beliefs, values and norms. In short, Clinton’s ideology as a humanist is obvious in her discourse.

Third, Clinton’s discourse reflects a feminist orientation. The feminist ideological background is clear in this example: “And you can’t be a democracy if you don’t listen to half the population and you don’t respect the role that women have and give women the same opportunity to be in business, politics, run for office, everything else. So I think it’s very promising” (Mar.17.11\Ap. B, p. 10). Beliefs are relative depending on the person’s perspective, culture, background and identity. The proposition is considered as knowledge according to human rights’ activists and western societies. However, it may be perceived as false beliefs by Muslim communities, who adopt Islamic values that may not coincide with western values and norms.
Whether she is a democrat, a humanist or a feminist, Clinton presents her beliefs as objective, indisputable facts. Her beliefs act as the epistemic common ground of democrats, human rights' activists and feminists worldwide. These values are accepted, approved and adopted by the members of the same epistemic community. As such, ideologies determine the social representations of the group, and determine knowledge. Since knowledge and ideology are interrelated, both of them affect discourse production and comprehension. Indeed, Clinton’s discourse is tainted with ideological assumptions or manifestations of her attitudes and norms. In sum, Clinton’s remarks regarding the Tunisian revolution are basically ideological.

With regard to knowledge structure, it is schematically represented as ‘scripts’, or ‘slots’ about stereotypical events or entities. Knowledge is organized as schemas or certain networks that are structured in terms of categorical relations. Knowledge consists of cognitive representations, mental models, or a mental mapping of certain concepts or events. Since a hierarchical structure has been noticed while analyzing mental models about democracy and human rights in previous sub-sections, the same applies to knowledge in general. Indeed, knowledge, as a mental construct, is schematically represented in different frames that take into account the typical features of the world units that surround a given concept.

While analyzing frames in Clinton’s corpus, one can notice that knowledge is saved in memory as several related frames. For instance, ‘democracy’ frame is characterized by specific prototypical features. For example, in “[...] and at the same time reminding Egyptians and Libyans and Tunisians and others that democracy is not one election one time” (Feb.26.12\Ap. B, p. 26), one can construct frames and sub-frames. The general frame is democracy, and the sub-frames that may be formed are elections, political parties, plurality and voters. These sub-frames or features encode the prototypes that typically represent the category ‘democracy’. Knowledge is the interrelations between frames that are built upon these categories or prototypical features.

These PROTOTYPES or prototypical knowledge frames influence how Clinton perceives the world. For instance, Clinton’s perception of women rights is based on frames and sub-frames. The typical features of women rights are equality with men, freedom, dignity, physical sanctity, health, education etc. Such set of knowledge slots determine Clinton’s construal of women situation in her epistemic world and her attitude towards women. As shown in the previous section, the organizational structure of these mental
frames is hierarchical, ranging from general to specific mental categories. These frames can also be classified in terms of dominance from the most dominant to the least dominant features in Clinton’s discourse. The most dominant frames are the ‘DEMOCRACY-FRAME’ and ‘HUMAN RIGHTS-FRAME’. These general frames can be divided into sub-frames, such as ‘women rights sub-frame’, ‘religious freedom sub-frame’ and ‘free elections sub-frame’. This leads to a network of epistemic units that is made of interrelated frames and sub-frames. Inspired by Aitchison’s (2012, p. 228) lexical network, the following figure illustrates how knowledge frames are organized in the corpus:

Figure 23. Networks of Knowledge Frames in the Corpus
Words, like ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, ‘religion’ and ‘women’, build lexical towns in the form of a mental network. Every lexical town in figure (23) involves several clumps of words that are strongly interrelated. These words have other weaker relations, semantic connections or common aspects with other groups. As such, the mental lexicon has strong and weak bonds with other words depending on the topic.

Since one of the objectives of the present research is studying the ideological as well as knowledge backgrounds implied in Clinton’s discourse, it has been demonstrated that ideologies determine Clinton’s beliefs, attitudes and views about the world. Indeed, ideologies affect the socially shared representations about human rights and democracy with respect to Tunisia and Arab Revolutions. It has also been shown that knowledge is ideologically biased and depends on the ideological parameters of the group, like the group goals, norms and interests. In fact, the epistemic common-ground beliefs are presented as indisputable facts and unchallengeable truths. Though knowledge is not always ideological, the knowledge scripts or frames, derived from fragments of old experiences, and both the real and conceptual worlds, are, sometimes, cognitively and socially relative. Similarly, it has been shown that knowledge, whether general or specific, episodic or conceptual, personal or social, cultural, institutional, national or international, is ideologically tainted to promote the speaker’s agenda and her epistemic community’s values, attitudes and ideologies discursively, cognitively and socially.

One can, therefore, recapitulate that factive knowledge is manifested in Clinton’s political discourse via mental models, cognitive frames, image schemas and knowledge scripts, stored in LTM and activated in episodic memory, or STM. One can also state that such cognitive frames or knowledge fragments are schematically structured and organized from general to specific categories and sub-categories. General categories represent human rights and democracy, while sub-categories represent women rights, freedom, religious freedom, free elections etc. Clinton uses factive presupposition triggers to background information. She also opts for epistemic modality to reach the same purpose. However, mental state verbs, especially ‘think’, foreground information and express opinions and attitudes, but not knowledge. Clinton tends to present personal opinions and attitudes as presupposed, taken for granted, factive truths.
To shed light on the social dimension of Clinton’s personal values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge, it has been shown that they are selections or fragments of socio-cultural values, the systems of attitudes, group ideologies as well as socio-cultural knowledge. First, Clinton’s personal values translate the democratic societies’ values and principles, mainly human rights and democratic values. Second, Clinton’s attitudes mirror her community’s perception, interpretation and evaluation of events and entities, hence positive attitudes towards the two basic political concepts in the current research. Third, Clinton’s personal ideologies are a cluster of democrat, humanist and feminist ideologies. Finally, personal knowledge in Clinton’s discourse is a manifestation of group knowledge, or social knowledge. SRs are the basis for knowledge construction. The speaker retrieves stored knowledge fragments and activates relevant social representations or mental models to produce and understand discourse. In sum, personal cognition is affected by social cognition.

After clarifying, above, how the perceptual world of the speaker is reflected via factive presupposition and epistemic modality at the discourse level, one has to show how mental models, personal and social values, attitudes, ideologies and knowledge unmask Clinton’s perceptual as well as conceptual worlds, at the cognitive level. First, it has been found out that mental models and sub-models are evaluative and subjective interpretations of social situations. It has also been demonstrated that these mental frames are fragments of past experiences and previous knowledge, hence what is already stored in our memories about the real, perceptual world as well as what we internalize from the abstract, conceptual world. The retrieval and activation of such cognitive frames facilitate discourse production and understanding. Decoding these mental representations in discourse uncovers the speaker’s cognitive frames and the kind of mental models she stores via discourse lexical features.

Second, Clinton’s values and attitudes, manifested in discourse, reflect her ethics, convictions, evaluations and assessments of events and people. In fact, it has been discovered that discourse unveils the speaker’s adoption of humanist values and her involvement in defending the rights of disadvantaged people, more specifically people who seek freedom and flee dictatorship and oppression. The attitudes of the speaker have also been examined to reveal a very positive stand towards guaranteeing human rights and implementing democratic principles in Tunisia and non-democratic countries, in general. A similar positive attitude has been noticed towards countries in transitions that seek democratic change. However, Clinton’s negative attitude towards dictators, oppressors and the opponents of
democracy and human rights is obvious. These values and attitudes mirror Clinton’s perceptual world, how she grasps events and from what perspective she makes evaluative judgments.

Third, as far as ideologies and knowledge are concerned, it has been revealed that the different ideological assumptions or traces found in the corpus uncover the ideological background of Hillary Clinton, her political orientation as well as her government’s agendas in North Africa and the Middle East. These ideological assumptions are reflections of Clinton’s perceptual world and her epistemological state of mind as a democrat, humanist, pacifist and feminist. Knowledge also mirrors the speaker’s thoughts and facts. While analyzing Clinton’s political discourse, focus has been on back-grounded, presupposed knowledge as well as fore-grounded, explicit knowledge of the discourse producer. Both types of knowledge reflect the conceptual world of the speaker with respect to human rights and democracy. In sum, ideology and knowledge translate and portray the perceptual and conceptual worlds of the speaker and describe her mental state of affairs.

After discussing the main results obtained at the discursive and cognitive analytical stages, one has to discuss the main findings at the social stage of van Dijk’s (1995b) triangular approach. It has been shown that Clinton’s identity as a social actor depends on group affiliation or membership and the epistemic communities she belongs to. It has been highlighted that Clinton pertains to many social groups, mainly democrats, humanists, feminists and Christians. As for her institutional role, it has been noticed that the speaker has played the institutional role of the US Secretary of State and the representative of the US in different institutional settings. As for group relations and structures in Clinton’s political discourse, it has been demonstrated how group relations are based on ideological differences. Clinton’s perceptual world is divided into ‘WE’, ‘friends’ or ‘pro-democratic countries’ and ‘THEY’, ‘enemies’ or ‘anti-democratic countries’. Relations between ‘WE’ and ‘pro-democracy’, more specifically relations between the USA and Tunisia, are based on friendship, cooperation, solidarity and collaboration at different levels. However, relations with ‘THEY’ or ‘OTHERS’ group are negative and based on hostility since they have different socio-political norms, identities, interests and goals. These relations are also based on enmity, conflict, opposition, belligerence and contrasting agendas.
Regarding societal structures, the impact of micro and macro levels of discourse on mental models and discourse understanding has to be elaborated further. In this respect, it has been revealed that the cognitive representations produced in a communicative event, mainly context models, establish a link between discourse or the micro level, and society, or the macro level. Subsequently, cognitive representations play the role of mediator between discourse and society. As we understand discourse and social situations via mental models, cognition is, thus, the interface between discourse and society. At the micro level, concern has been about context models, triggered during discourse production, hence the mental representations relating to discursive acts, social situations and context. At the macro level, focus has been on Clinton as a social actor, who plays social roles, as well as her membership in different social groups. Clinton plays various social roles, mainly a politician, a woman, a mother, a previous lawyer and a party member. As the US Secretary of State, she plays different social and institutional roles, like representing the USA, promoting human rights and democracy, supporting countries in transition, helping settle peace in conflict zones and improving the image of the USA abroad.

As the current PhD research studies factive vs. ideological knowledge as well as presupposed vs. asserted knowledge in Clinton's political discourse, it is important to highlight the idea that knowledge in Clinton’s discourse ranges from the simplest perceptual contact with the physical world to the most complicated cognitive effort while evaluating concepts, such as ICMs, mental spaces, cognitive representations etc. The k-device is crucial for the control of many important aspects of discourse, such as what information is explicitly expressed and asserted, what information has to be reminded and what information is presupposed. Clinton presents knowledge as intellectually virtuous because it reflects reality as well as the factual world. However, she imposes her beliefs and assumptions as generally accepted knowledge. By imposing one’s beliefs as true, presupposed knowledge, the speaker marginalizes large audience segments by presupposing knowledge that is not generally known or that is not accepted by other communities. Consequently, Clinton can sell her views-disguised-as-truths by giving the illusion that personal knowledge, most of the time ideologically-tainted, is shared by all discourse participants.

With respect to knowledge, it is also important to note that the distinction between knowledge and belief is scalar. Like knowledge, beliefs are organized in terms of higher-order and lower-order beliefs. Beliefs are represented by Clinton as networks of belief-clusters that are structured by various schemata. It has been shown that subjective
propositions are based on the speaker’s beliefs, while objective propositions are based on the speaker’s knowledge. Propositions, based on the speaker’s beliefs, are evaluative judgments. This presupposes that propositions, based on the speaker’s knowledge, are factive segments of information. Subsequently, ideologies monitor evaluative beliefs but not factive knowledge. Ideologies determine people’s beliefs about the world and control the way the epistemic community evaluates knowledge. Political knowledge is mostly group knowledge that is considered by opposing groups as mere political opinions.

Finally, one has to emphasize the idea that CDA is discourse analysis with attitude. In fact, it takes an explicit sociopolitical stance by spelling out points of view. It portrays the world and criticizes social and political issues. Likewise, it shows the conceptual outcome of ideological language choices. Clinton's discourse interprets conditions, problems and events in favor of the elites’ interest, in this case the US interests and agendas in the MENA region. The discourse of the marginalized groups is, however, considered a threat to the ideological interests and propaganda efforts of the elite. CDA, hence, analyses the socially or morally illegitimate control of minds, especially when emitters control the minds of recipients in a self-serving way.

In view of the above, one can confirm that Clinton plays a language game by apparently presenting knowledge as factive to manipulate recipients and promote the agenda of her government. Her discourse is ideologically biased since she boosts the American ideals and democratic principles in Arab countries. At the discourse level, factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality, mirror the speaker's backgrounded vs. foregrounded knowledge, her perception of Tunisia's revolution and her conception of human rights and democracy. At the cognitive level, mental models, context models as well as the personal and social cognitions of Hillary Clinton demonstrate that knowledge is ideological, but disguised as factive in her discourse. At the social level, societal, institutional and group relations establish a dichotomy, a dual vision of the world, or polarization, dividing the world into two spheres, mainly pro-democracy and anti-democracy communities. CDA, more specifically van Dijk's discourse-cognition-society triangle, has demystified Clinton's perceptual and conceptual worlds discursively, cognitively and socially. After discussing the main findings of the current research, one has to investigate and confirm the reliability of the results found while analyzing the corpus of the present PhD study.
4.3 Validation of Research Findings

As stated in section 3.4 of the methodology part, a validation test is prepared to investigate the reliability of the results obtained in this chapter. The test consists of three parts, mainly covering the discursive, cognitive and social stages of analysis. Each part involves randomly selected excerpts for each lexical category from the whole corpus. The first section is devoted to discursive analysis, and it questions whether the underlined features in the provided excerpts are factive verbs, emotive verbs, factive noun phrases, mental state verbs, epistemic modal adjectives or epistemic modal adverbs. The second section of the validation test concerns the cognitive stage of analysis by investigating the speaker’s mental models, values, attitudes, ideologies and types of knowledge that can be decoded in the randomly selected examples from the corpus (See Appendix T). The third and last section focuses on the social stage. It inquires the reliability of the results related to social structures, institutional structures, group relations and group structures. A speech is randomly selected from the corpus to serve that end (See Appendix U).

The validation test has been distributed to 5 subjects who are colleagues and experts specializing in linguistics. The aim of relying on experts in the field is to avoid misinterpretations and guarantee the accuracy of responses. The need for experts’ help also emanates from the fact that this area of research, mainly factive presupposition and epistemic modality, necessitates background knowledge about the field to cope with ambiguity and context sensitivity. To overcome anticipated difficulties, key-word definitions have been provided below the test. In addition, the classification of factive presupposition triggers and epistemic modals has been provided with the validation test (See Appendix C). Some colleagues have been handed hard copies of the test, while other subjects have received soft copies via emails.

After collecting responses from colleagues and experts, they have been compared to my answers to the same questionnaire. It has been found out that a considerable number of the respondents’ answers are similar to my responses related to the randomly selected excerpts from the corpus. As the questionnaire is a collection of randomly selected speech instantiations, this may confirm the validity of the current research results (See Appendix V).

The following table illustrates the total number and percentage of valid and invalid responses in the validation test.
Table 25

Number and Percentage of Valid and Invalid Results of the Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and percentage of valid responses</th>
<th>Number and percentage of invalid responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 out of 66</td>
<td>61*100/66 = 92.424%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 out of 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5*100/66 = 7.575%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to table (25), the validity of the results has been confirmed due to the high percentage of correct responses; nearly 92% of valid answers compared to approximately 8% of invalid responses.

The five invalid responses can be explained by different factors. First, the context sensitivity of certain utterances explains why some respondents could not identify the correct answer. Second, the different perspectives and background knowledge of the respondents may affect the results. Since the test is based on Clinton’s political discourse, the subjects analyze and interpret speech excerpts according to the mental models and cognitive representations they construct while reading the examples. The few different responses (8%) confirm that knowledge is, sometimes, relative and depends on the k-criteria of individuals, groups and communities. Similarly, the subjects have found that distinguishing the personal and social knowledge of the speaker is challenging. This can be justified by the fact that Clinton’s personal knowledge is a selection of socially shared representations. Her personal thoughts and opinions are reflections of the SRs in her society (See Appendix W).

In sum, chapter four has been divided into three major sections. The first section has been devoted to describing the research findings after implementing van Dijk’s (1995b) socio-cognitive approach. The aim has been to analyze factive presupposition and epistemic modality in Clinton’s political discourse. The second section has discussed the most important results and dealt with the main research questions that fostered the present PhD study. The third section has investigated the reliability of the research findings.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

5.1 Recapitulation of the Findings

To start with, an epistemic account of presupposition has clarified the cognitive mechanisms that internalize aspects of the real, perceptual world as well as the conceptual world of Hillary Clinton. This has been elaborated via lexical expressions in Clinton’s discourse, mainly epistemic presupposition and epistemic modality. In this regard, it has been deduced that factive lexical features, like ‘know’, ‘be proud’ and ‘fact’, may present personal beliefs as factual information. Just like factive predicates and emotive verbs, factive noun phrases indicate strong epistemic certainty about the truth of the propositions. Presupposed, factual knowledge, expressed via factive presupposition, is back-grounded, while what is explicitly stated is fore-grounded. The link between what is fore-grounded and what is back-grounded, along with the related lexical expressions is likely to demystify the real meanings of presupposition and reflect the perceptual and conceptual worlds of the speaker.

As far as epistemic modality is concerned, it can be concluded that epistemic modals reveal the speaker’s attitude towards the truth of the proposition. It unveils the speaker’s strong or weak commitment to the propositional content of the utterance. It can also be deduced that epistemic modality indicates the degree of the speaker’s knowledge since it reflects different attitudes towards the embedded propositions or different degrees of certainty. Indeed, the choice of epistemic modals is influenced by Clinton’s attitude toward and assessment of evidence, by selecting ‘certainly’ or ‘obviously’ if she believes the proposition is strong enough, or ‘probably’ if she believes the evidence is weak. Epistemic modals are, therefore, speaker-attitude markers or source-of-information markers.

It is worth noting that the link between evidentiality, epistemic modality and factive presupposition has been made clear. Like evidentiality, epistemic modality does not affect the truth conditions of utterances, but expresses the degree of the speaker’s assessment of attitude towards the proposition. Epistemic modality assigns the proposition a commitment value which is something external to the content. As such, epistemic modals have both epistemic aspects and evidential dimensions. Epistemic modality is considered as one type of indirect evidence, namely inferential evidential. Evidentiality, however, encodes sources of direct and indirect evidence. Like evidentiality and epistemic modality, the link between epistemic modality and presupposition has been highlighted since the use of epistemic modals
presupposes that the speaker has evidence that enhances the content of a proposition. When Clinton expresses an epistemic judgment, she gives the impression that she has evidence for her statement. However, this may lead to insincerity since she might mislead the listeners and present ideologically biased information in a guise of factive truths.

With regard to mental models, it can be concluded that ICMs are also used to background and foreground information. The FIGURE-GROUND distinction has been made clear, including the mental frames triggered by the selected lexical items. The image-schemas that prototypically describe human rights and democracy are fore-grounded, positive, mental spaces or cognitive constructs. It has been shown that ICMs create realities by the speaker and involve other participants in them. The mental spaces, constructed by Clinton’s discourse, reflect the speaker’s established perceptual and conceptual worlds. For instance, Clinton’s beliefs construct mental spaces about human rights, democracy, revolutionary Tunisia and the supportive and humanitarian sides of the US government. Clinton’s belief world creates cognitive relations between her mental spaces and the real world.

Similarly, it has been noticed that the construction of mental model involves building fragments of instantiated socio-cultural knowledge shared by participants. Mental models are the interface between episodic, personal knowledge of events and the socially shared beliefs of a group. Context models not only provide a knowledge device to perform epistemic strategies, but also embed the mutual intentions and knowledge of participants. Participants form context models to construe the intentions in a communicative event, and distinguish between knowledge that is presupposed, or known by participants, and knowledge that has to be shared, or explicitly communicated. Mental models are evaluative and may reflect conflicting opinions about text and talk. They do not influence discourse directly, but the language users' subjective interpretation of discourse affects discourse production and understanding.

As far as discourse processing is concerned, one can recapitulate that discourse participants activate or construct, and continuously update a model of the current context or action. People make use of old situation schemas to build new situation models. The human mind’s control system specifies the scripts or models that should be activated and the model fragments that have to be retrieved for discourse production. The amount of knowledge to be activated and integrated in such mental models is determined by context. LTM involves a person’s knowledge of language, the spatial models of his world, and the characteristics of
people, things and events as well as the perceptual-motor skills. The mental representations and schematic knowledge are activated to help retrieve stored traces in memory. Implicit information and inferences in discourse processing are also represented in mental models. As information is part of the speaker’s mental models, it can be implicit and inferred from the text, or explicit and overtly expressed in discourse.

Focusing on categorization, it can be concluded that categories are conceptual structures built via discourse. Certain categorizations frame experience by evoking concepts that activate evaluation-laden scripts or frames. These cognitive categories are ideologically constructed by repeating certain words or labels by speakers with vested interests. The three notions frame, script and schema belong to a highly complex network of mental representations. Scripts seem to be organized clusters of information about stereotypical events, in this case Tunisia's democratic transition; or concepts, like human rights and democracy. From a political angle, political context models define the political situations of discourse, political cognitions and political concepts.

Likewise, it has been confirmed that in the human memory, knowledge is stored in a form of several related frames. Each frame is characterized by specific typical features. Indeed, a frame consists of cognitive components and their related elements. These features imply prototypes or central and typical instances that represent a category. A frame is, therefore, built upon categories and their interrelations or sub-categories. In the present study, frames are the set of epistemic units we have about human rights and democracy. These units organize not only our construal of the world, but also our behavior with respect to the world and the ways we interpret others' behavior. These frames can be organized in a hierarchy and inherit properties from super-ordinate frames. For example, the sub-frames, generated or inherited from the general frame ‘human rights’, are the freedom of religion, speech, association and assembly, along with human dignity, physical sanctity etc.

Another important point that has been deduced from the analysis of Clinton’s discourse is polarization. Polarization occurs when a dichotomy of 'US' vs. 'THEM' portrays adversarial, conflicting or evil ideologies, based on the American system of beliefs and values. It has been found out, in this regard, that construing the world involves a process of ordering the world in terms of our categories, organizing and classifying it and actively bringing it under control in some way. This means that when we encounter the other, we actively assimilate it and transform it in terms of our categories of understanding. In the present study, Clinton classifies non-democratic countries and countries in transition according to
her perception of the world as well as the US norms and values. We understand and evaluate the other in terms of our standpoint or perspective. As such, in processing any discourse, people position other entities in their world by positioning these entities in relation with themselves.

We can, thus, conclude that the concepts ICMs, scalar adjustment and modality, borrowed from Cognitive Linguistics, have revealed the speaker’s epistemic mental state and her categorization of entities, relying on cognitive frames and mental models. Similarly, this has been applied to ideological and stereotypical framing in political discourse. Since there is no direct link between text and social context, we have shown that we need a cognitive interface in the form of subjective mental models that are constructed by the participants of a given communicative event. Unlike objective modality, which expresses an objectively measurable chance that the propositional content of an utterance is true or not, subjective epistemic modality includes subjective guesses related to its truth.

As for ideology, it can be deduced that CDA is both colored by ideology and productive of ideology. Discourse serves the ideological interests of Hillary Clinton since it highlights the advantages of human rights and democratic political systems in North Africa and the Middle East. Discourse naturalizes ideology by gaining the acceptance of recipients of such ideologies as common sense, non-ideological and even presupposed. CDA, however, denaturalizes them, and this is the aim of the current PhD research. It has been demonstrated that ideologies are the background of the social representations of a group via social attitudes and personal mental models. They control discourse and other social practices of the group members. These ideologies and socio-cognitive representations are constructed and transmitted via presupposition. Ideologies are, therefore, important in discursively constructing a world view or perception.

In terms of lexicon selection, one can recapitulate that the analyzed lexical features reveal the ideology of the speaker or writer. Clinton’s lexical choices are both knowledge-laden and ideology-tainted. Ideologically biased models represent the input of discourse production and, thus, highlight biased topics, lexical choices and other semantic facets of discourse. By controlling discourse, Clinton controls the way people think. At the discourse level, factive presupposition triggers and epistemic modals serve ideological goals because they boost the agendas and interests of the USA and its Secretary of State. They unveil the background knowledge about human rights and democratic change. Hence, the lexis used by Clinton is determined on ideological grounds.
It can also be concluded that the ideological identities of politicians are manifested in discourse. At the micro level, Clinton adopts combinations of ideologies, namely democrat, humanist and feminist ideologies. Her discourse reflects the interference of different ideologies at a time. Ideologically, discourse studies categories at varying degrees of specificity to involve certain entities and exclude others. At the macro level, ideologies are defined in terms of social groups, group relations and institutions. Ideologies are the interface between the cognitive representations and the social positions and interests of social groups. Ideologies are presented as basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups and constituted by relevant selections of socio-cultural values. Apart from their social role of promoting the interests of groups, ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social representations of the group. Indeed, ideology forms the essential building blocks, the selection principles of relevant norms and values as well as the structural organization of SRs.

Unlike ideologies, which can be described as false, wrong and misguided beliefs, knowledge in Clinton’s discourse is presented as factive or justified true beliefs. Knowledge is a form of mental scripts of prototypical episodes. It can be about past, present or future; about real, fictitious or abstract events. Mental scripts can also be old or new knowledge, and they can be acquired by observation, experience or more/less reliable sources. Language users need to have knowledge of the world, knowledge about the communicative situation as well as mutual knowledge about each other’s knowledge. Participants share background knowledge or mental states, lying at both the surface and depth of language and thought. The aim is to understand the human systems of knowledge, including implicit and explicit meaning, perception and reasoning. As such, language and discourse construct and control knowledge and the world.

Similarly, one can recapitulate that opinions are a mixture of personal opinions, derived from personal experiences or old models, and more general opinions, stored in the socially shared attitudes of some social groups and sub-groups. Although their general knowledge is constant, people construct different models representing different angles and points of view of the same entity. As for attitudes, one can conclude that SRs control our construction of models, and, thus, influence discourse production and understanding. As such, discourse can be considered as a mirror that reflects the speakers’ attitudes. As these attitudes are arranged around a core or a cognitive concept, they are ego-centered because people evaluate entities according to their perspectives and norms.
Since ideologies are the basis for socially shared representations, it can be deduced that even our knowledge is ideologically biased. Reality is perceived, interpreted and represented in terms of the ideological parameters of a group. In interactions, the members of an epistemic community present beliefs as facts and deal with them as knowledge. Consequently, beliefs function as the epistemic common ground of such an epistemic or culture community. Moreover, it has been shown that the interface between knowledge and ideology has a cognitive nature. In sum, knowledge and ideology are interrelated, and they influence discourse production and comprehension.

Regarding the social analysis of Clinton’s discourse, it can be stated that language users engage in text and talk as members of multiple social categories. They display social identities in discourse. At the micro level, it has been noticed that, at the discourse level, there are conflicts of interests between democrats and non-democrats to promote their agendas and values. Struggle for gender equality and religious freedom has also been observed in Hillary Clinton’s political discourse. At the macro level, political institutions attempt to resolve conflicts of interests and work to ensure the power of dominant groups, in this case American democracy promoters. A powerful group may control the action and cognition of other groups by limiting the freedom of others to think and act. Modern and effective power is mostly cognitive, and it is exerted via discourse.

After recapitulating the most important points that have been noticed while analyzing and processing discourse, the following section of the present thesis emphasizes the major implications of the current PhD research.

5.2 Main Implications

One implication of the present study is addressing the lack of research evidence on the link between, first, factive presupposition and epistemic modality, and second between epistemic modality and evidentiality. Another major implication of the current study is tackling factive presupposition and epistemic modality from a socio-cognitive approach. Last but not least, demystifying the cognitive and ideological drives in Clinton’s discourse is another important implication of this study. These ideas are elaborated in what follows.

The first major contribution of the current research is that it provides needed evidence on the link between factive presupposition and epistemic modality and their role in constructing knowledge and building the perceptual and conceptual worlds of the speaker. The connection between presupposition and modality has been made explicit by showing
evidence on the epistemic mental state of the speaker and how she constructs factive knowledge and attitudinal assumptions about entities, concepts, events and the world. As such, the mental processes that govern Clinton’s discourse production and comprehension have been practically explained via presupposition and modality analyses.

The second important implication of the current research is revealing the link between factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality. Almost no research has been conducted on factivity, modality and evidentiality. The epistemic links between factive presupposition and its evidential dimensions are successfully demonstrated to mirror, with evidence, the epistemic world of the speaker. The third major contribution of the present paper is that factive presupposition and epistemic modality are tackled from a socio-cognitive perspective. More particularly, the epistemological dimensions of factive presupposition, epistemic modality and evidentiality have been analyzed within van Dijk’s (1995b) discourse-cognition-society paradigm. Focus has been on the mental modeling and cognitive mechanisms that construct ICMs, mental frames, image schemas and prototypical representations about Tunisia’s democratic experience and its unique emancipatory revolution in 2011-2012.

The fourth significant contribution of this study is that the findings unveil Clinton’s ideological background and common-ground knowledge. Factivity has been utilized in her political discourse to hide ideologically tainted beliefs. Such ideological knowledge, disguised as factive knowledge, does not only represent Clinton’s perception, but also the US Administration’s view of revolutionary Tunisia and its democratic shift. Since the main results have been recapitulated and the major implications of the current PhD study have been identified, the subsequent part of the present chapter is devoted to the limitations of the present research.

5.3 Limitations of the Study

While analyzing the corpus of the present PhD research, one has noticed some ambiguities and limitations. The first limitation is that focus has only been on Hillary Clinton as discourse emitter. Although presupposed knowledge in Clinton’s discourse is presented as irrefutable and inescapable, active and intelligent recipients may not accept it as shared, presupposed knowledge. They may doubt its truth value and reject it because of its incompatibility with their epistemic worlds. Since there is no idealized knower, people may not accept whatever the speaker says. Skepticism can be stimulated by incompatibility
between what is said and the real world, or between what is said and the abstract knowledge of the addressees. As such, what is presupposed may diverge from what is mutually known or believed to be true. In short, eliminating or excluding other discourse participants from the scope of analysis is one of the limitations of the present study.

The second limitation that needs to be clarified relates to evidentiality and the different types of evidence. One can note that the sources of information are not always reliable. Consequently, although Clinton uses auditory evidentials, like ‘tell’ and ‘hear’, this does not assert the truthfulness of p. The source of information might distort the truth, hence factive presupposition defeasibility. As for the other examined types of evidence in the corpus, inferential and assumed evidence is less believable. Reliability can, therefore, be questioned because people’s inferences and assumptions may differ depending on their perspectives, backgrounds, goals and interests. Add to that, inferential and assumed evidence is an indirect informational source that may be based on wrong assumptions. Hence, people may have doubts about the reliability of the speaker’s sources of information. They trust direct, tangible and observable sources more than intangible, abstract and subtle concepts and ideas. In sum, problems related to evidence and reliability of information may affect the results of the present study.

The third important issue to be highlighted is the difficulty of distinguishing between what is presupposed and what is explicitly stated in certain utterances. Sometimes, the difference between what is back-grounded and what is fore-grounded is vague and confusing. Understanding the intentions of the speaker seems to be a challenging task in spite of discourse lexical features and context clues that have been used to comprehend discourse. To decode the meaning of Clinton’s utterances, the analyst has to uncover her intentions to produce a cognitive effect on recipients. This can be done through encoding-decoding processes that partially reveal the communicative purposes of the speaker. This encompasses inferring meaning from context, decoding the speaker’s mental representations of events and entities and uncovering out presupposed knowledge in Clinton’s political discourse. To sum up, ambiguities related to implicit and explicit knowledge is another important research difficulty.

After identifying the main limitations of the current PhD research, it is important to shed light on possible prospects for further research.
5.4 Future Prospects

It is important to raise some questions that need further research. First, mental models need more practical analysis. A clear cognitive theory is needed to understand their nature and how they control discourse and influence text and talk. Second, discourse analysts require a more explicit theory that explains how context and situation models are built. Third, different language users, members of different communities and different social or ideological groups may have different understandings and different interpretations of the same discourse. These queries suggest more research on the cognitive mechanisms that govern discourse production and comprehension. Since van Dijk’s approach is criticized for being very mentalist because it gives more importance to people’s minds than social structures, discourse analysts should investigate more sophisticated and practical approaches to CDA.
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